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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: INDIA, THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY?
Introduction

The debate on the most appropriate form
have been answered with the
allies.

fall

of the

government appears

of

communist Soviet Union and

These previously undemocratic countries have

toward democratization.

However,

this

to

its

made moves

all

conclusion as to the overwhelming

success of the Western style democracy as the prototype political institution
to

be espoused

by the work

is

certainly not

of Francis

unanimous. This debate

Fukuyama's "The End

argument presented by Ken Jowitt

Fukuyama

asserts that

it is

is

of History",

in his "The

best

summarized

and the opposing

New World

Disorder".

democracy's inherent strengths, and due

to

the shortcomings of antidemocratic regimes that the democratic type of

government has won the competition

Fukuyama

form of government.

as to

what

asserts that

is

the most appropriate

we may

be witnessing "the end

point of man's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western
liberal

democracy

Fukuyama

as the final

form of human government ." 1

assert that liberal capitalism

additionally states that

it is

is

Not only does

the prevailing paradigm, but he

as a matter of fact, the absolute end of history.

However, with the massive moves towards democratization world wide,

Fukuyama

also envisages a rising level of ethnic conflict, a well as the

Clearly, such a definitive statement based

continuation of terrorism.
failure of anti-democratic

In contrast to

Fukuyama, Ken

democracy has appeared
Fukuyama,

regimes seems to be too

Francis, "The

End

to

of History

",

idealistic.

Jowitt's hypothesis

have won, the

liberal

is

that

though

democratic ideology

The National Interest 16

1

on the

,

Summer

is

1989:3-18.

the

kind of ideology which will always leave some
portion of dissatisfied
beings, and will therefore generate powerful
anti-liberal
that section of the population.

Therefore in contrast to

human

movements from

Fukuyama who

argues that there will be no other major government
dominated by an antidemocratic ideology, due to the apparent success of democracy,
Jowitt posits

new way

that there could be a

comparable

of

life

where the ideology would be

to that of the democratic ideology. Jowitt suggests
that, the

will regularly witness

the rise of both internal

world

and external movements

dedicated to destroying or reforming it-movements that in one form or

another will stress ideals of group membership, expressive behavior,

and heroic action ." 2 These other ideologies could

collective solidarity,

include the pan-Islamic types of government

Although Jowitt does not conclusively

etc.

state

ideology will prevail, he does allow for those of us

Western

style democratic institutions

There does seem
are

some

is

which type

who

not the only

of counter

believe that the

way

to

modernize.

be a world wide trend toward democratization, but there

to

countries where existing democracies have been toppled, to be

replaced with not any other particular type of government, but with chaos

and anomie. Such
India

is

a case

is

India.

a parliamentary secular democracy,

modeled

after the British

Westminster type of government. However, the tenability of India as
secular democracy

dubious with the secessionist movements

is

The

parts of the country.
like

a

Assam, Nagaland

etc.,

are

in various

Punjab and Kashmir, along with others

all in

the throes of a deep

crisis.

This thesis

study of the conflict in the two states of Punjab and Kashmir, and the

failure of

2

states of

a

democracy

Jowitt, Ken, "The

New

in

both

states.

World Disorder",

Journal of Democracy ,Winter 1991:11-20.

2

is

However, prior
important

to define

to identifying the actual crisis in India,

what

constitutes a democracy,

of governability such as the one India finds itself

What

is

and what leads

to a crisis

in.

Democracy?

a

According

to Schmitter

system of governance
2.
in

it is first

in

and

Karl, a "Modern political democracy

which rulers are held accountable for

a

is

their actions

the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition

cooperation of their elected representatives ." 3

The existence

of a

and

democracy

also includes:
control over government decisions about policy
in elected officials.
2.

elected officals are chosen in frequent

which

coercion

is

comparatively

and

fairly

is

constitutionally vested

conduced elections win

uncommon.

3.

practically all adults have the right to vote...

4.

practically all adults have the right to

5.

citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe

fun for

elective office.

punishment...
6.

7
or

citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information.
citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations

organizations... 4

There are some prerequisites as

overwhelmingly suggests that

literature

chance to sustain a democracy.
possible for the
to

to

mass

If

what
a

constitutes a democracy.

wealthy nation has a greater

the citizens live in poverty,

it is

not

of the population to develop the self restraint necessary

avoid becoming demagogic. 5 Therefore, a society divided between

^Schmitter

,

Phillipe

Diamond and Marc
Hopkins University

C &

a large

Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is. ..and Is Not" in Larry
The Global Resurgencv of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns

F. Plattner, eds..

Press, Baltimore, 1993:40.

^Schmitter and Karl,1993, citing, Dahl, Robert, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democarcy,

Haven: Yale University
5 Lipset,

The

New

Press, 1982:11.

Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy" in The American Political Science Review, 1967:73; Huntington, Samuel P.,
"Democracy's Third Wave" 1989:22; Sanguinetti, Julio Maria 1990:57, ;Ake, Claude,
"Rethinking Africa's Democracy", 1993:73) all in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds..

"Some

Social Requisites of

3

poor section, and
tyranny

6
.

a smaller rich elite will result in either

an oligarchy or

a

Lipset has been challenged by several scholars,
particularly those

writing on the English speaking Caribbean, which
deviate from this model
since these countries tend to be very poor, yet with strong
democratic
institutions.

Other important prerequisites

for a

democracy include the degree

of

urbanization and literacy. The greater the level of education the lower
strata
are

more exposed

commitment

to

extremist ones."

to

cross pressures

given ideologies and

which

will reduce the intensity of their

make them

less receptive to

supporting

This occurs by an increase in their involvement in an

integrated national culture, as opposed to an isolated and distinct one, and
therefore, the lower strata
class values
is

which tend

important because

moderating

conflict

and the middle

to

form

a coalition with

middle

be more moderate. Therefore, a large middle

the one

it is

class

which plays

a mitigating role in

by rewarding moderate and democratic

punishes more extremist ones

class

parties,

and

7
.

Also rather controversially, Lipset suggests that national income of a
country

is

related to the political values of the

upper

classes since the lower

the standard of living of the lower classes, for psychological reasons

becomes necessary

for the

upper classes

to treat the

it

lower strata as "vulgar,

innately inferior, as a lower caste ." 8 Subsequently, the poorer country, the
greater the tendency to engage in nepotism, since
in the

if

there

is

sufficient wealth

country redistribution can take place in an egalitarian fashion.

However, when there
The Global Resurgencv

of

is

not

much

wealth, there

is

fierce

competition for the

Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

1993.

^Lipset, 1967:75.
7 Lipset, 1967:83.

®Lipset, 1967:83.

4

Press, Baltimore,

scarce resources

9

Though

.

documented high

his second point appears to

levels of corruption,

many developing

existing in

be

justifiable

given the

and extensive patronage networks

societies, his

argument

attesting to the

psychological need of the upper classes to treat the lower strata in a

contemptible fashion

is

based on highly tenous grounds.

Additionally, political systems which do not allow the lower strata
access to

power except through revolutionary means

growth of

inhibit the

legitimacy since groups which have pushed through forceful means tend to

have hopes which often overestimate what the inherent limitations
political stability

do permit. Therefore, democratic regimes under such

A

will face the difficulty of being regarded as illegitimate.

democracy
culture"

the extent to

is

of

which nationals have

which maintains the various democratic

Huntington suggests that one of the primary

a

major

common

practices

criterion for

test of

"secular political

10
.

stress

Additionally,

democracy

is

equitable and open competition between political parties without

government harassment, or no

restriction of opposition

groups

11
.

Additionally, for Tocqueville, the existence of voluntary associations are an

important feature of democracies.
Therefore, the liberal tradition identifies several values as crucial for a

democracy which includes
(particularly
beliefs

amongst the

and preferences,

democracy

belief in the legitimacy of a

elite), a

tolerance for opposition, including their

a willingness to

compromise,

flexibility

cooperation, and moderation and civility of political discourse

°Lipset, 1967:85.

^Lipset, 1967:88.

^Huntington,

1993:17.

12 Diamond

Plattner, 1993:16.

&

5

and
12

.

In addition to defining

added what
necessarily

democracy

a

more

is

what

not.

a

democracy

According

to

is,

Schmitter and Karl have

them, democracies are not

efficient, either administratively or

economically, they are

not likely to appear more orderly, consensual, stable, or more
governable,

and they

will not necessarily

democracy

have more open economies. They suggest

that

will not necessarily will bring "economic growth, social peace,

administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets .." 13 According to

them, none of the above are prerequisites for democracies.
In conclusion, there are at least four different theses for the existence
of democracy.

According

practices will flourish

times,

and

if

to the colonial continuity thesis, democratic

institutions for self rule

were placed during

the transition from colony to independent statehood did not

if

occur with destruction of those institutions. The second thesis
culture thesis

which suggests

that

very least by the politically active
beliefs

and

colonial

in the existence of

democracy requires
elites to

a

is

the political

commitment

at the

share in the liberal values and

democracy, which include equality of

all

people, values toleration of opposition, free expression, moderation and

The

compromise.

third thesis, the

economic

class structure thesis can be

further divided into those that argue that economic development leads to

more complex, educated and
existence and creation of

channels.

classes,

13 Schmitter

new groups which

&

is

way

for

find expression in democratic

In contrast, Marxist scholars have suggested that the

important factor

middle

secularized societies, which opens the

most

not economic development, but rise of urban and rural

which could challenge monopoly

of elites 14
.

Additionally,

Karl, 1993:49-52.

14 Valuenzuela, Arturo, "Chile: Origins, Consolidation,

and Breakdown of a Democratic
Regime", in Larry Diamond, Juan J.Linz, & Seymour Martin Lipset, eds.. Politics in Developing
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1990:52-58.

6

"

some system

there has to be
the above,

it

seems

to

compromise and checks and balances. From

of

be that "democracy

countries with traditions of protodemocracy

Having defined what
identify

what leads

most

is

.

likely in

wealthy

capitalist

15

constitutes a democracy,

it

becomes important

to

to a crisis in governability in democracies.

Crisis of Governabilitv

Huntington suggests that there have been three

waves

different

of

democratization, each of which have been followed by a reverse wave. Each
of these reverse

countries

began

its

16
.

waves succeeded

we were

If

wave

to

is

in the

reducing the number of democratic

use Huntington's hypothesis, then clearly, India

of democratization with independence,

question as to which stage
India

in

we

and

to

answer

are currently at in the third wave,

I

his

posit that

penultimate stages of democracy.

Huntington suggests

away from democracy

that

among

in the first

the factors contributing to the

move

and second waves include,

weakness of democratic values among key elite groups. ..(ii) severe
economic setbacks which intensified conflict and enhanced the popularity of
remedies that could only be imposed by authoritarian governments, (Hi)
social and political polarization. ..(iv) determination of conservative middle
class and upper class groups to exclude populist and leftist movements from
power, (iv)
breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism or
insurgency ...'' 17
"(i)

the

Another
nationalism.

factor

One

which contributes

decay of democracy

serious threat to democracy

^Kohli, Atul,ed., India's Democracy:

An

is

is

religious intolerance,

and

Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations,

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:6.

16 Huntington,1993:3.

^Huntington,

to

1993:9.

7

theocratic aspirations, resulting in terrorism

and violence.

18

Additionally,

as long as religious ties reinforce secular politics,
chances for

and therefore democracy remain weak.
tolerance,

and therefore the democracy

democracy

also requires relatively

contending

political forces.

Another threat
cultural

found

and

in

Religious politics do not include
will

new

moderation includes the

A

stable

ability to deal

arise. 19

ones

to social integration

institutional

be weak and unstable.

moderate tension among the various

Political

with resolving key issues before

compromise

can be seen

when

there

is

a

gap between the ruling center and the periphery

most developing

societies, (Shils, 1975,

Weiner 1975) which poses

threat to social integration especially

when

Kahane suggests

then faced with the dilemma that

that

most

elites are

a

there are rising expectations.
if

they

enlarge economic and political participation to increase their support, their
privileges as the ruling elite will be reduced.

However,

such participation, and exploit their position

to retain

if

they do not include

power,

ironically, their

legitimacy will be reduced. However, most elites choose the latter
alternative

though

and leading

to

this causes frustration to

accumulate in the periphery,

an erosion of legitimacy and subsequently an increase

in the

possibility of disintegration. 20

Claude Ake also suggests
against democracy in Africa

is

that with reference to Africa,

that since Africa

is

one argument

socially pluralistic, ethnic

differences will be an obstacle to democratic governance.

He

suggests that

^Kolakowski, Leszek, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age", in Larry Diamond and Marc F.
Plattner, eds.. The Global Resurgencv of Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, 1993:323; Plattner, Marc F., "The Democratic Moment", in Larry Diamond
and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgencv of Democracy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 1993:35.
19 Lipset, 1967:90-97.

20 Kahane, Reuven, Legitimation and Integration in Developing Societies: The Case of India
Boulder: Westview Press, 1982:2.

8

,

ethnic conflict

would

must be firmly governed,

inflate ethnic rivalries

disintegration. 21

governments
an obstacle

and therefore pose the danger

away

to take

certain democratic principles,

to the existence of a

more

in a quest for

democracy
of political

In addition, the threat of political disintegration
leads

However, according
society, but

since the liberties of

in

to

act as

democracy, as the Indian case shows.

Ake, the problem

bad leadership.

power and

which further

It is

lies

not in the ethnic pluralistic

the leaders

who

politicize ethnicity

political support. 22

Importantly, democracy depends on popular legitimacy. Both

Dalpino,

who

uses Thailand, and

political corruption

democracy. The

was

Diamond who

uses Nigeria, state that

a potent factor in overturning the existence of a

political corruption in

Thailand was a major source of

public discontentment and led to the February 1991 military coup. 23
Similarly,

democracy has been twice overturned

deep cynicism, economic mismanagement and
political corruption at the highest levels. 24

suggest that accountability

A

key debate

,

a

political turmoil

On

and Marxists.

due

to

Both Dalpino and Diamond

key condition

for democratic progress.

between

the side of the structural

from Durkheim, Parsons, to Huntington, there has been an

almost unanimous consensus on the
to "modernity"

because of the

in the crisis of governability literature is

structural functionalists

functionalists

is

in Nigeria

is

fact that the transition

from

"tradition"

characterized by disorganization and political decay because

21 Ake, 1993:72.

22 Ake, 1993:72.
23 Dalpino, Catharin
F.

Plattner, eds..

E.,

Diamond and Marc
Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

"Thailand's Search for Accountability" in Larry

The Global Resurgencv

of

Press, Baltimore, 1993:206-216.
24 Diamond, Larry, "Nigeria's Perennial Struggle", in Larry
eds..

The Global Resurgencv

of

Diamond and Marc

F. Plattner,

Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Baltimore, 1993: 217-228.

9

Press,

of the corrosive impact of
etc 25

Modernity tends

.

process,

it

may

economic development on existing

to eventually bring

democratic

social ideas

stability,

but in the

be destabilizing, as social and economic change, including

urbanization, increases in literacy and education, industrialization,
mass

media expansion-extend
broaden
there

is

political consciousness, multiply political

political participation ." 26

With the formation of new

an increase in demands as

a result of

demands,

social groups,

rising expectations",

and the

lack of the ability of the institutions to deal with these expectations
has

resulted in stagnation of the institutions themselves, and further social
decay.

For Marxists, the driving force

modernization and the class

conflict

is

capitalism as a result of

which

from such

arises

modernization. For Marxists, as stated by Gramsci, the
transitional societies can be explained

become detached from

by

"...

capitalistic

crisis of

authority in

precisely that great masses have

their traditional ideology

and not longer believe what

they used to believe previously .." 27
Marxists suggest that class conflict

is

important for

political decay,

while developmentalists suggests that "value disequilibrium" leads
political decay.

Therefore,

what

to

structural functionalist scholars label social

disorganization, Marxists call class conflict. However, while structural
functionalists see this
social

and

growing modernization resulting

in the

breakdown

of

political order, Marxists see in this decline of traditional

domination, a possibility of revolutionary change as a result of

25 Kohli, 1988:12.
26 Huntington, Samuel

P., Political

Order

in

Changing

Societies.

New

new

class

Haven: Yale University

Press, 1968:5.

27 Kohli, Atul, citing Gramsci, in Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of
Governabilitv. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990:25.

10

consciousness

28
.

Therefore, while for Marxists this anomie

good, for structural functionalists, the
institutions

must and

will

crisis is

inherently

is

inherently detrimental and

adapt to meet these changes

Regardless of the differences between the two, both suggest
that the
roots of the crisis of governability lies in the fact that there
has been a decline
of tradition,

and an increase

in

socioeconomic demands. However, because

the institutional capacity of governments to deal with these

does not form as quickly as the demands themselves, there

and there

order,

is

therefore a problem in governability.

new demands

is

a

With

breakdown

in

specific

reference to India, the argument of the structural functionalists appears to be

more

valid.

As

the following thesis will show, the central government has

not been able to deal with the

new demands

groups which have formed, and therefore,

placed by the various

this

new

has led to social decay, and

overcentralization.

Other scholars have suggested that the breakdown of democracies can
also be attributed to crises of legitimacy 29

Kohli suggests that there are

.

different political variables including leadership, ideology, intra-elite

harmony which can

influence

how

Demagogic leaders can exacerbate
beliefs

can make rule
Central to the

problems of

a stable

well a democratic state can be governed.

tensions, widely divergent ideological

difficult.

crisis in

India

democracy

is

is

to

One

the issue of the state.

of the

main

ensure that the state does not become too

swollen and the power of the state must be restrained so that the politicians
in

power remain responsive and accountable

not be too powerful, but

if it is

too

weak

it

to the people.

may

be unable

The

state

must

to deliver the social

28 Kohli, 1990:27.
29 Kohli, 1990:13, citing Juan Linz, The

Hopkins University

Breakdown

Press, 1978.

11

of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore: Johns

and economic goods

that conflicting groups

demand. Additionally,

bureaucracy must be subject to control by elected politicians but
time, the relative
politicians

who

Lastly

autonomy

of the bureaucracy

are susceptible to patronage
the issue of military.

is

Once

must be

is

used

doomed

30
.

"stability

it

and the

Therefore, military control be oriented only
to internal problems. 3 ^

for reasons to suppress the masses, then

considered almost

same

the military has been deployed

toward external defense, and not be an answer
military

at the

check on party

and corruption

has a tendency to only grow more, diminishing the
authenticity" of democracy.

a

the state

the

If

democracy can be

to failure.

Defining the State

Given

that this thesis

is

going to examine state-society relations in

India which has contributed to the decline of democratic principles in India,
it

becomes necessary

therefore

approaches

to explaining the role of the state.

dependency approach define
reflects

and reproduces

dominance

The

first

one, the Marxist and

state as "an alliance for social control

class relationships in the society;

institutions to achieve legitimation

the

There are four different

to define the state.

of a given

mode

and coercion;

of production

relationships that this implies ." 32

its

it

takes the form of

purpose

and the

which

is

to

maintain

specific class

For such theorists, the state holds

considerable power, yet acts as a populist reformer in the agrarian sector. The

second approach comes from a Weberian perspective which defines the
as an apparatus that

^Diamond,
^Diamond,

Linz
Linz

makes decisions and

& Lipset, 1990: 23.
& Lipset, 1990:25,

state

authoritatively exercises control

citing Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics:

and the Southern Cone. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:123.
32 Grindle, Merilee S., State & Countryside. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ Press,
Brazil

12

1986:16.

over a particular area (Skocpol, 1978; Stepan,
1978; Nordlinger, 1981). The
third
for

approach includes

power, and the

a pluralist analysis of different interest

state existing

interests are transmitted.

merely as a framework within which these

Finally, the state

enactment of policies embraced by
"identifiable

necessarily

is

state elites.

and concrete concerns about the

national development.

opposed

groups vying

seen as a

medium

In this approach, the state has

and pursuit of

definition

These concerns are independent

to or different

for

from the immediate

of,

but not

interests or welfare

or any particular groups, class, class fraction, coalition, or alliance in society. 33

The Weberian perspective

who
was

is

embraced by

sociologist

Edward

Shils

gleaning off the work off Weber and Parsons suggested that the state
to

be the key factor

effective

in

determining a

bureaucracy which would be

Shils outlined

in

new

social order

by creating an

charge of guiding the economy.

key relations between what he termed the Center

and the periphery. For

Shils, there

(the state)

were three primary components of

Center-periphery relations. These included a centralized value system which

attempted to have one unifying ideology, institutions which then
transmitted this ideology to the otherwise heterogeneous periphery, and
lastly the elites

who were

custodians of the value system and

the different institutions. 34
activist

The obvious

critique that such a

a passive

shortfall of this center-periphery

model

Model of State-Society Relations" in Wiarda, Howard
Comparitive Politics. Westview Press, Boulder, 1991:47-48.

13

was

one waiting

model was highly ethnocentric (Western

33 Grindle, 1986:17
34 Migdal, Joel, "A
in

controlled

Therefore, inherently for Shils, the state

and aggressive, while the periphery was

controlled.

who

is

bias).

ed.,

to

be

the

This

New

Directions

resulted in the emergence of other contending models
describing statesociety relations 35
.

The

pluralist

who

political scientist

where the

approach

was

society

is

most evident

in

a

strategies

is

of Joel Migdal, a

mixture of various social organizations rather than
state,

tandem with other organizations

personal survival.

work

outlines a different approach of state-society relations

merely one structure. For Migdal, the

which

in the

is

then an independent variable,

offers individual strategies or

Furthermore, individual choices amongst the various

purely based on the inducements in the form of material

incentives, exhortation

environment of

and coercion. For Migdal, the

politics,

and must

state

is

only part of the

with others to dominate

fight

politics.

Migdal then outlines three indicators which determine the strength of the
state.

These include

conform with
certain tasks,

population

how

policies,

its

and

effectively a state can

whether

compel

its

population to

a state can organize the population for

lastly the state's legitimacy as in the

eyes of the

36
.

The view

of the state as one

not reflective of popular sentiment,

which
is

is

dominant and controlling and

espoused mostly by those

who have

written on the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America.
regions, the corporatist

way

Wiarda, Schmitter, Berger

of

etc.).

life is

which facing

a large

most preeminent one (Bowen,

In contrast to such bureaucratic

authoritarian scholars are academics
institution

the

In these

who view

number

effectively maintain control or govern,

the state as a helpless

of diverse interests are not able to

and are subject

to revolution

(Huntington). Other scholars have gone as far as suggesting that the concept

35 Migdal, 1991:49

36 Migdal, 1991:52-53
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of the state does not exist in developing countries,

more important
state

emerged

homogenous

role in determining politics.

as a result of

and as such,

parties play a

For Nettl, the concept of the

narrowing the society into ethnically

or defined areas 37

Additionally, with specific reference to

.

socialist countries,

Kesselman suggests

that

socialist state is to

ensure that

the workers class and peasantry with

the socialist

movement

Lastly,

if

the

it

movement

to

is

be successful

one of the seminal works on the

colonial societies

is

Bangladesh which

Hamza
is

Alavi's

had

its

work on

roles of the

38
.

role of the state in post

the state in Pakistan and

representative of the Marxist school of thought.

arguments can be summarized
colonial state

ties in

one of the main

as follows.

power base

Alavi's

Alavi suggests that the post-

in the metropolis,

and therefore did not

represent any indigenous class interests. Therefore, the state could act more

independently. Additionally, the state took a large amount of the surplus

and directed

it

to certain types of activity.

dependent on the bureaucracy
contrast,

to

maintain

Therefore, for Alavi, the state
its

was

legitimacy and power. In

John Saul points out that "the overdeveloped nature of the

state is

not due to the need to subordinate such classes, but to the need to

subordinate pre-capitalist formations to the imperatives of colonial
capitalism ." 39

"The State as a Conceptual Variable", in Louis J. Cantori, & Andrew H. Ziegler,
Comparitive Politics in the Post-Behavioural Era. Lynne Reiner Publishers, Colorado,

37 Nettl,
eds.,

J.P.,

1988.

1988:326
38 Kesselman, Mark, "The State and Class Struggle: Trends in Marxist Political Science,"
Cantori & Ziegler, eds., Comparitive Politics in the Post-Behavioural Era, Lynne Reiner

in

Publishers, Colorado, 1988:128

39 Leys, Colin, "The Overdeveloped Post-Colonial State:
1976:41
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India:

The

Crisis

There were four different theories that predicted the
demise of

democracy

The

in India.

first

one was the theory of

which

political culture

suggested that India’s hierarchical social structures could not
sustain

democracy. According

from being the

Almond and

to

"civic culture"

religions, linguistic

made

etc.

India

As he

would

his,

was most eloquently conveyed by

Selig

India-The Dangerous Decades, where the hypothesis that

definitely

fall

apart as a result of such divisions

first

odds are amost wholly against the survival

states, "the

that. ..the issue

between

raised questions about the compatibility of

India and democracy. This thesis

Harrison in

India inappropriate for democracy.

stated that the social cleavages within India

groups

far

necessary for a democracy. The traditions of

hierarchy and caste institutions

The second theory

Verba, India's political culture was

is,

in fact,

whether any Indian

state

of

can survive

took hold.

freedom and

at all ." 40

Also

scholars like John Stuart Mill suggested that social heterogeneity endangered

democracy. This argument therefore suggested that the country might

endure secessionist tendencies by either having
with strong provincial
together.

The

rulers, or

a

an authoritarian

weak, truncated center
state

which held the

third theory predicting the demise of India's

suggested that democratic institutions required

literacy,

democracy

and wealth. India

with massive unemployment and poverty was therefore not

One

democratic experiment.

economic growth would lead

variation of the argument
to several dissatisfied

state

is

a

good

that a

members

low

rate of

of the

populace, which would then lead to revolutionary appeals. The second
version of this thesis

^Harrison, Selig

S.,

is

that a high rate of

India the

growth which

failed to distribute

Most Dangerous Decades. Oxford University

Madras:1960:338.
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Press,

benefits of

growth equitably would generate

and the have-nots.
a radicalized

class conflicts

between the haves

The fourth theory posited by Barrington Moore was

peasantry would turn against the land owning classes

that

the

if

peasantry was linked to the bourgeousie or intelligentsia, but
would become

merely
class.

a conservative

and passive force

they were linked to the landed

This would determine whether there would be democracy or
not.

Clearly

,in

the latter case, democracy

In contrast to the

democracy
fact

if

in India,

been able

developing

would not reach

above scholars

who

the poorer masses. 41

portend the demise of

an alternative group of scholars suggest that India has

to counter centralizing trends

flexible institutions.

in

by modernizing, and by

(Kothari, 1970;

Rudolph and Rudolph,

1967;

Weiner, 1967; Kahane, 1982). 42

However,
democracy,

it's

as this thesis will show,

actions in the

two

from democratic. Certainly, the
institutions

the

state that India

scholars

who

state

it is

far

has not been able to develop flexible

To counter the claim

fashion.

in

both states in

of the second school

has been able to counter antidemocratic trends, the

demise

offer

an explanation. They posit that

has not yet happened, does not

scholars

Punjab and Kashmir have been

believe in the merit of the school which portends the demise of

India's democratic
it

states of

exists as a

still

and has repressed the secessionist movements

most undemocratic

who

though India

just a question of

mean

it

will never

just

because

happen. For these

time before democracy

falls in India.

The

claims of these authors appears to be substantiated by evidence presented in
this thesis.

41 Weiner, Myron, The Indian Paradox Essays in Indian Politics.
:

Publications, 1989:322.

42 Kahane, 1982:12.
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The Role

of the State in India

The

role of the state in India, as well as in other countries

is

key as

it

plays an important role in determining the existence of democracy.
The state
is

not only responsible for social order, but also for economic development.

Therefore,

it

may

at

times be in a conflictual situation where

promote economic growth which could lead

it is

trying to

to political disorder.

In a socialist country like India, the state has a highly interventionist

nature which tends to be troublesome, and therefore leads to problems in
legitimacy.

Since the state

that distributive
it.

is

problems are

responsible for economic growth
social

and not

political,

it

cannot claim

and are not related

to

Secondly, since the state controls resources, battles for these resources are

fought not in the economic arena, but also in the political arena, therefore
politicizing society,

and economics. Therefore,

it is

difficult for

interventionist state like India to be democratic, because

it is

an

often in a

controversial relationship with society. 43

As

this thesis will

interventionist in nature,

show, the Indian

and

it is

state

has been

activist

the actions of the state

and

which have been

anti-democratic, centralizing and based on personalistic fulfillment rather

than attainment of goals for society

at large.

case studies of the states of Punjab and

Chapter 2
in the

is

this fact,

northwestern part of India, bordering Pakistan.

Jammu and Kashmir from

Jammu and

India

two

Jammu and Kashmir have been

a historical analysis of the crisis in the Punjab.

border with the troubled state of
into

To demonstrate

is

18

is

also shares another

through the Punjab.

reasons, both economic and political, Punjab

Punjab

Kashmir. The only land route

Punjab serves as the bread basket of India. Therefore,

43 Kohli, 1990:30.

It

used.

is

for a

Additionally,

number

of

of crucial importance to the

and

state of India,

unsurprisingly,

is

its

troubled existence within the Indian union,

an important element of Indian

1947, the year of independence itself

region, as Punjab

Punjab.

was divided

politics.

was marked by

into the Pakistan Punjab,

Mass migrations ensued, with

the

conflict in the

and the Indian

Muslims moving over

Pakistani Punjab, while the Hindus, and Sikhs remained with, or
the Indian side.
region.
crisis

This

Though

was not

to

moved

be the end of the existence of conflict

the conflict has historical roots, as the thesis will

was exacerbated, and brought

demand by

to the
to

in the

show

the

to the current stage of secessionist

the actions of the Center

and have resulted

in a state of

anomie

and chaos.
Chapter 3
Kashmir. The

a

study of the insurgency in the state of

state of

section of India
east,

is

Jammu and Kashmir

and shares

and the Indian Punjab

no surprise then

in the south.

lived in peaceful
crucial year in

Kashmiri

formed based on

Islamic state.

until

in the state of

independence

politics for

religion.

it

Given

that

Kashmir had

section shall show, this accession never

Kashmir was retained by India under
as

is

the only land route

in 1947.

to

a

be a secular

Muslim

came about

it's

state,

For

India were
state,

Pakistan

majority, the

However,

as this

for several reasons,

secular, democratic umbrella.

the case with the Punjab, the centralizing nature of the

19

it is

1947 marked a

was when Pakistan and

While India claimed

in the

Jammu and Kashmir have

accession of Kashmir to Pakistan seemed inevitable.

However,

is

of crucial security interest to India.

it is

harmony,

The Punjab

China

Given the geographical location of the

Hindus and Muslims

centuries, the

was an

that

located in the north west

a border with Pakistan in the west,

available to enter the state.
of

is

Jammu and

and

Central government has created a

crisis in

Kashmir, with a demand

for

secession from the Kashmiri Muslims.

The

thesis will

the crises in Punjab

be structured as follows. Chapters 2

and Jammu and Kashmir, the

actions of the Center

which have resulted

will conclude with a

comparison of both

position of India as a democratic state.

20

&

3 will deal with

historical origins

in the current crisis.

conflicts,

and the

Chapter 4

and reassess the declining

CHAPTER II
THE PUNJAB CRISIS
Introduction
This chapter
to

is

which the Punjab

a study of the

conflict

Punjab

conflict.

I

posed serious problems

will analyze the extent

for the effective

functioning of democratic institutions and processes in India.

independence the

state

has been unambiguously committed to preserving

the national unity against
state has

all

internal

been uncompromising

and external

in its stance

movement which develops

secessionist

Since

crushed, with armed force

if

threats.

towards any

Specifically the

threat,

significant strength has

necessary. All secessionist

and any
been

demands which

acquired strength were treated in this way, especially in the Punjab and the

Kashmir. In

this context, the question that

departed from

proclaimed

by an

a state ruled

power

its

state of

oligarchical elite

I

am

whether India has

democratic secularism, and has become

who

are

more

in the following chapter that the

the Central government, especially

its

interested in maintaining
It

will be

behaviour and attitude of

centralized drive (intensified under

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi), has exacerabated
is

is

rather than conforming to established democratic norms.

argued here and

and

raising

India's political problems,

principally responsible for the disintegration of the Indian democratic

secular state.

This chapter traces the evolution of the Sikh conflict. Currently, the
crisis

seems

to

be somewhat under control. However, the demands made by

the Sikhs have not changed.

been rising

In fact, to the contrary, these

in intensity since the early

demands made by

demands have

days of independence. While the

the minority Sikh population

21

were legitimate

in the

incipient stages, the behaviour

and

been one of confrontation, and not

attitude of the central
conciliatory.

government has

This has resulted in a

further alienation of the Sikhs, resulting in terrorism,
and ultimately in the

assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
terrorists claiming to

No

doubt, the actions of the

be fighting in the name of religion

However, regardless of blame, the

issue

is

dastardly.

a potent one, threatening to tear

is

apart the Indian union.

Religion

&

The
between

A

Politics:

Potent Combination in Secular India?

religion of Sikhism (like Islam)

religion

and

started to

assume more

Govind Singh. There

is

no division

This can be seen in the fundamental

politics.

philosophy of the religion

one where there

is

itself 44

What was

.

militant tones

are at least

the religion into a militant one.

initially a

peaceful religion,

under the tenth and

two views which explain the

The

first

one

is

Guru

transition of

the fact that the Sikhs

Muslim

suffered constant persecution by the ruling

guru.

last

rulers,

who

recognizing

the growing strength of the religion, regarded Sikhism as evil and declared
that

it

had

to

be rooted out of the system.

view suggests that the

religion

embraced militant aspects because

internal divisions because of the Jat Sikhs.

the keshadari sect,

who were

Ideologically, the Khalsa

excellence.

and the

In contrast, however, another

The

aimed

defend the

were followers

of

staunch believers of the Khalsa Panth.
at not

only spiritual

Therefore, given that the Khalsa

ability to

Jat Sikhs

of the

faith

with arms

bliss,

demanded
if

but also military

military prowess,

necessary was

deemed

44

The word "Sikh" means "disciple"and the members of the Sikh community are the
who led the Punjabis from the late fifteenth century to the early
eighteenth century. Sikhism was founded by Guru Nanak (originally a Hindu), who aimed
creating a faith that would bridge Hinduism and Islam. There were ten gurus, all of whose
disciples of the ten gurus

teachings are related in the Granth Sahib

,

the Qu'ran of the Sikhs.

22

at

essential, the religion

assumed

Sikhs, there has always

Additionally, for the

been unity between the secular and religious spheres.

This has been persent since

who

militant overtones 45

Guru Hargobind,

formally united religion and

politics.

It

the second

Guru

of the Sikhs,

has been argued that

incompatible with the Indian political system which

this is

based on the

is

separation of the two spheres, religion and politics. Given the secular

ideology of the Indian

Sikhism

is

state, this

unison of religion and

seen as a threat to the security of the

state.

politics

This

is

espoused by

allegedly one of

the roots of the current conflict.

Important

by ideology,

it is

militaristically.

to note is that

also stipulated that

the

if

is

means by which the
some unappeasable

a non-violent religion

many dark deeds have been

a very personal

believer satisfies

is

necessary, the religion will be defended

But in the name of religion,

committed. Although religion
"provides

although Sikhism

and intense matter,

religious person

needs.

or even

to the various factions

also

nominal

But, even as a individual

matter, religion for the most part is a shared experience.
holdings that links every human being to others ." 46

Sikhism has given

the

it

and

It

is

political parties

one of those

and the

population, a
"strong cement of traditionally shared beliefs about the meaning of their
existence ." 47

From

the late 19th century,

distinctiveness of the Sikh

have a separate

identity,

many

Sikh scholars stressed the

community, and argued

that

it

was important

with a strong emphasis on traditions. This was

direct opposition to the rise of the

Arya Samaj which was the

militant

ideology which threatened Sikhism. The Arya Samaj was formed by

4 ^Kapur, Rajiv, Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith. London: Allen

& Unwin,

in

Hindu

Swami

1986:5.

46 Isaacs, Harold, Idols of the Tribe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975:144.
47 Isaacs, 1975:152.
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to

Dayanand

in 1875 to

promote

a

more

purified and revived form of

Hinduism. The Arya Samaj was very appealing

and

this

Hindus

in Punjab,

threatened the Sikhs. Therefore, this fear of being assimilated
by the

Hindus

also forced the creation of the Singh

need

have

to

to the

a separate identity

Sabha which emphasised the

and focus on

traditional values important to

the Sikhs. 48

Another early

on establishing

historical indication of the distinctive focus of the Sikhs

separatist boundaries

is

evident with the creation of the Tat

Khalsa. In the early 20th century, the gurudwaras (temples) of the Sikhs had

been increasingly under reform because of mismanagement. The demand
for reformation of these

these

gurudwaras, and the mahants

gurudwaras assumed greater

significance as

started to suffer from a "mass crisis of identity." 49

refomers were the Tat Khalsa

element

in the religion.

What

assimilation of Sikhism into

such as

idols,

One group

they feared the most again

etc,

charge of

of such

non-Sikh

was

the

by now, many Hindu elements

as

were

in

more and more Sikhs

who vehemently opposed any

Hinduism

Hiindu customs

who were

all

present in Sikh worship. To

reclaim the identity of the Sikh religion, these Tat Khalsa reformers once

again stressed the individuality and separateness of the Sikh religion, and
the need to be distinctive

and separate. 50

Additionally, for the Sikhs, religion and politics have from the very
start

been inseparable elements. 51 This

is

especially problematic for the Sikhs

given they live in the secular state of India, where religion and politics
least in theory)

have

to

be separate. However, the Sikh religion

(at

affects

48 Kapur, 1986:22.
49 Kapur, 1986:44.
50 Kapur, 1986:45
51 Joshi,

Chand, Bhindranwale: Myth or

Reality.

1984:42.
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politics

and vice

versa,

and

that the key religious agency of the Sikhs,
the

Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandhak Committe (SGPC), has
definite and
clear involvements with the Akali Dal

The Roots

of the Secessionist

amongst other Sikh

Movement under

British

political parties.

Pulp

After two Anglo-Indian wars in 1849, the British finally annexed

Punjab,

its

final

conquest in the subcontinent. Although the British

conquered the Sikhs they recognized the important relationship between
military excellence
British

and the

army. This proved

religion
to

and they therefore absorbed them

be an excellent forethought because

in the

in 1857,

during the “Sepoy Revolution" in India, while most of the country rebelled
against the British, the Sikhs remained faithful to them.
decisive factor for British victory in the mutiny.

This

was perhaps

a

In return for such services

rendered, the British granted the Sikhs generous tracts of land, set up an
excellent administration
state of Punjab.

British

where the Sikhs were concentrated, and created

The Sikhs were

a

the

major and important force within the

army, and although they comprised only

2%

of the population of

undivided India, they constituted about 20%-30% of the Indian armed
services. 52
In accord with their well tested "Divide

purposely gave special privileges

and Rule"

to the Sikhs so as to

strategy, the British

ensure their loyalty.

This can be seen by the fact that though the Sikhs comprised only
total population,

they comprised almost 20-30% of the army.

2%

of the

As argued by

Horowitz,
merely an aspect of the
running of a politically neutral bureaucratic machine. Rather recruitment
"colonial military recruitment

was

initially not

,

52 Singh, Rahul, "Sikh India; the roots of the Punjab violence". The
1984, v. 191:13.
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New

Republic, July 16,

was heavily imbued with ethnic stereotypes

and was one of the most
important arenas for the working out of colonial ethnic
policy.
At the
,

broadest level, therefore, the transfer
of military institutions to new states
bequeathed to them instruments of force that were very
much a part of
ethnic politics.'' 53

The intention

of the British

which would remain
the Sikh

had

to

was compelled

clearly to create a "martial" race

faithful to the British.

be a keshadhari
to

was

Sikh,

In fact, to be recruited as a Sikh,

who was

a

member

of the Khalsa and

maintain and observe the tenets of the Khalsa. 54

benefits included giving the Sikhs special economic benefits

Other

and

opportunities to develop, thus consistently ameliorating the distinct identity
of the British.

Such

bliss

with the British tended to be shortlived

"Jallianwala Bagh" massacre,

where

in 1919,

after the

infamous

under the command of

British

Brigadier General Reginald Dyer, approximately 379 Sikhs were killed.

were

large gathering of Sikhs

fired at

A

although they were peacefully gathered

because there was an order which prohibited the assembly of more than

few persons. This massacre played a

crucial role in the unity of

in India against the British, particularly

had remained

faithful to the British

fact that the

condemn

the groups

and most importantly the Sikhs who

through

all

these years. 55

General Dyer was feted instead of reprimanded, and

and made them unite with the

all

a

rest of India.

Adding

Tragically,

this infuriated the Sikhs

fuel to the fire

was

the

Sikh priests collaborated with the British and did nothing to

the General.

gurudwaras, and

it

Furious, the Sikhs agitated for the reform of the Sikh

was

the result of this agitation that the Shiromani

Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC) and

^Horowitz, Donald

L.,

the Akali Dal

were formed.

Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkelev: Univ of California Press,1987:527.

54 Kapur, 1986:15.
55 Kapur, 1986:13.
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,

While the former was created

which was won over from the

manage

to

the

newly

liberated

British, a little

while

later,

the major Sikh political party 56

Golden Temple

the latter, served as

.

Post Independence

As independence approached,
They could

choice.

either

Following

Muhammand

League

Lahore that

in

it

the Sikhs

were

torn.

They faced

go with Pakistan, or they could stay with

Ali Jinnah’s declaration in 1940 to the

was

clear that Jinnah

was

a

India.

Muslim

clearly interested in a

Muslim Pakistan.
"Islam and Hinduism are not religions
fact different

and

and Muslims can ever evolve

However, India which was
If

would have

the Sikhs

had

common

a

There would be no place

the Sikhs.

in

word but in
only a dream that Hindus

the strict sense of the

and

distinct social orders ,

it

is

nationality ...”

for other religions in this

new

nation.

calling for a secular existence, offered a shelter for

insisted

on

their

own

state,

to fight Pakistan alone, since Pakistan

had

they feared that they
also laid claim to the

Punjab, where the Muslims were the largest community.
fate of the

,

Subsequently the

Punjab was decided by "Stafford Cripps Commission" 57 which

divided the Punjab into the Indian Punjab (the East part) and the Pakistani

Punjab (the West

5 6 Tully,

Mark &

part). 58

Satish Jacob, Amritsar:

Mrs.Gandhi's Last

Battle.

London: Pan Books,

1986:30-31.

57 This Commission was set up by Lord Mountbatten who was sent by the Queen to handle the
transition of the Indian subcontinent to home rule.
58
Brien, Conor Cruise, "Holy War Against India", The Atlantic, Aug 1988, v.262:61.
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.

Historical Fear of

One major
that their religion

an enveloping

Hinduism
factor

which consistently troubled the Sikhs was

the fear

would be enveloped by Hinduism. Hinduism tends

religion.

Since the

Guru, Guru Nanak was

first

by Hindu token, Sikhism could become

mere offshoot

a

of

a

be

to

Hindu, then

Hinduism,

therefore not a religion independent of Hinduism.

The

first

major threat

Samaj" in 1875 under
revitalise

to

Sikhism was the creation of the "An/a

Swami Dayanand.

Hinduism. The appeal

of the

This

body was an attempt

Arya Samaj proved

important for the Punjabi Hindu society

who now

to

particularly

turned to

it,

thus

ameliorating the differences between the Sikhs and the Punjabi Hindus.
This rise of the Arya Samaj
of

life

since the former

and the

was seen

latter

had

to

be intrusive into the Sikh

a lot in

common

way

including

forbidding idol worship, caste system, child marriage and the remarriage of

widows. 59

However

the Sikh distrust of the

Even an observer, the Governor General

Hindu had already been

of India,

Lord Dalhousie

sown..

stated, as

early as in 1849,

"The Sikhs are gradually relapsing into Hindooism, and even when they
Sikhs, they are yearly Hindooified more and more." 60

continue

,

This fear of being absorbed into Hinduism along with the trauma of
partition

marked

community

the beginning of a Sikh

of their

demand

for a distinct land

and

own. As early as February 1948, Master Tara Singh,

prominent Sikh leader demanded, "we want
can safeguard our culture and our tradition

59 Kapur, 1986:20-22.

60 Kapur, 1986:9
61 Kapur, 1986, :210
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"

61

to

a

have a province where we

A demand

for a Sikh majority state within the
Indian

union was

submitted by the Sikh members of the Punjab legislative
assembly

to the

Constituent Assembly, which was responsible for framing
the constitution of

independent India. This

memorandum had two

demanded

would

that

there

Sikhs to the extent of

Government

50%

he special

in the

communal
,

that

permissible, the "Sikhs should be permitted
comprising the districts

Assembly refused

in

which they were

to grant either of the

In addition to not granting their

40%

if

the above

state.

was too

A new

city,

one

to

form

in

the

was not

a separate province

a majority." 62

The Constituent

demands.

demands, Nehru had

that Amrtisar, the second major city of the Punjab, (Lahore

Pakistan),

first

representation for the

Punjab legislature and

The second was

services

The

requests.

also decided

had been taken by

close to the Pakistani border to be a capital of an Indian

Chandigarh was constructed on the banks of an

artificial

lake with the beautiful and panoramic sight of the Simla Hills. 63

Subsequently, in 1952, the Akali Dal brought up the issue once again.

They

realized a division of Punjab

among communal

lines

would not be

acceptable to the Government, particularly Jawaharlal Nehru. They

cloaked

it

in the

Nehru, had

set

demands
up

demands made by

for a state

now

based on languauge. In 1953, Pandit

the "States Reorganisation Commission" to consider

other states to

draw

The Akali Dal urged the formation

state

boundaries based on language.

of a "Punjabi Suba"

which united

Punjabi speaking areas. However, this proved to be a faulty

way

all

the

of obtaining

the separate Punjab, because although the majority of the Punjabis (both

Hindus and

Sikhs) spoke Punjabi, the Akalis

62 Kapur, 1986:210
63 Tully & Jacob, 1986:44
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wanted the

state's

language

to

be written in the Gurumukhi

script,

which was purely understood by the

and drawn up by the second Guru

Sikhs,

reason. Pandit

Nehru declared

that the call for a separate Punjabi

not based on linguistic needs, but along
for the Punjabi

Suba was

rejected. 64
"

Singh continued the agitation.
India,

for the Sikh scriptures.

On

communal

lines,

Using

this

Suba was

and the demand

the behalf of the Sikhs, Master Tara

The Muslims got Pakistan, the Hindus got

and we got nothing" 65 was the nebulous cry for a Sikh homeland.

24 January 1960, 132

man

(body),

began

a fast

do not want
to other

(soul)

members

and dhan (wealth)

As he

unto death.
to

of the

see the Sikh

communities.".

SGPC

"7

do not want

Panth insulted and

Ultimately, the fast

the schoolmaster from Rawalpindi district

Takht. This

was

the

end

is

was
was

Tara Singh also
but while living

to die,

I

the Sikhs treated as inferior

called off after 43 days,

and

called to trial before the Akal

of his political career. 66

However, the important
psyche

took an oath to give their tan

for the Punjabi Suba.

said,

On

the apparent betrayal

effect that this agitation

had on the Sikh

by the Punjabi Hindus who

fearful of Sikh

domination, and under the organization of the Arya Samaj, declared their

language to be Hindi and not Punjabi. This prevented the creation of
Punjabi state in the 1950s.

When

the rest of India

a

was carved out during

the

linguistic organization of states, the Punjabi Sikhs never forgave the Punjabi

Hindus

for this

apparent betrayal, although in 1966, Punjab was in

fact

divided into the subsequent state of Punjab (where Punjabi was the

dominant language) and Haryana, the

was already
64 Tully

&

political distrust of

Punjab Hindus

latent. 67

Jacob, 1986:214-215.

65 Singh, 1984:13.
66 Tully & Jacob, 1986:40-42.

67 Kohli, Atul, Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governab ility,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990:358.
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The leadership

of the Akali Dal passed

on

to Sant

Fateh Singh, a

(The Jat community was the peasant caste which was
dominant in

leader.

the east of Punjab.) Sant Fateh Singh following the trend
set

Singh, announced that he

Suba, and

if

However,

this fast

to

that

would undertake

would not succeed, would commit

was postponed

after

boundaries were redrawn
the majority

60%

However, the

dominance

68

Subsequently, the

now

of the population, the Hindus; 38%.

the traditional balance of
Sikhs.

self-immolation.

an agreement with the government

This resulted in

in 1966.

power

shift

shifted

was not

of the Akali Dal.

This

by Master Tara

yet another fast for the Punjabi

appoint a sub committee to resolve the issue.

fierce

Jat

away from

state's

the Sikhs occuping

With these changes,

the

Hindus

in favor of the

that decisive to guarantee the political

is

a

key factor bcause

this resulted in a

competition between the Akali Dal and the Congress for seats in the

Punjab. 69 As will be

shown

later, this is

exacerbation of the Punjab conflict.

It

one of the reasons

for the

has been also been suggested that both

Master Tara Singh, and Sant Fateh Singh, though pursuing the same
objective of creating a Sikh majority state, used different

achieve the same end.

means

to try

and

Master Tara Singh had no doubts that the Punjabi

Suba, which he desired, would be a Sikh-majority province, and that the
Sikhs had a right to self-determination, which was denied to them by the

Congress

in 1947,

rallied that the

merely

and ever

demand

a linguistic

since.

Sant Fateh Singh, on the other hand,

for the Punjabi

demand, much

Suba was not

like the

demands

a religious

demand, but

of the other states in

India. 70

68 Singh, 1984:216-217
69 Major, Andrew, "Sikh Ethno-Nationalism" in Jim Masselos, Struggling and Ruling,
Delhi:

New

Sterling Publishers Ltd, 1987:172.

70 Brass, Paul

R.,

"Punjab Crisis and Unity of India", in Atul Kohli, India's Democracy.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:177.
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Clearly, the above section has

shown

that

even before the rule of

Indira Gandhi, there were problems in the Punjab
situation.

commitment
democratic

of the Indian leaders such as

However, the

Nehru was toward

secular,

Therefore, although the problem does have historical

politics.

roots, dating to the years following independence, the
crisis did not take

the massive proportions

has since the rule of Indira Gandhi. Indira

it

Gandhi's centralizing drive, and her power
sole

and most potent

on

politics,

has perhaps been the

factor in the exacerbation of the Punjab crisis.

Explosion of the Crisis Under Indira Gandhi's Rule: The Centralizing Drive

The issue was further postponed following the outbreak

of the second

Indo-Pakistan war in 1965. In the meantime, the leadership of the Congress

changed with the death of Pandit Nehru. Power
daughter

Punjab

-

Indira Gandhi,

conflict.

who was

shifted to the

since independence.

father

Pakistan. 71

power

the crucial role played

However,

politics.

it

many

if

make

had died suddenly

71 Tully

that she

war with

allies as

a

she could, since she was brought to

group of elderly

politicians

who

or break her. Tully and Jacob suggest that this old elite of

politicians chose Indira

that Indira

in the

was

she was to maintain control of the Indian

power not by popular demand, but by
could

by the Sikhs

this,

can also be argued that Indira Gandhi was playing

She realised that

union, she had to find as

had denied

Scholars such as Tully and

Jacob (1986) argue that a probable reason she decided to do

was influenced by

of his

to play a pivotal role in exacerbating the

Mrs.Gandhi granted the Sikhs what her

them throughout the years

hands

in

Gandhi

Tashkent

to

be Lai Bahadur Shastri's successor (who

in 1965) for a simple reason.

Gandhi would be an easy puppet

& Jacob,

1986:42-43.
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to

They believed

manipulate, and this

way

none of

would be threatened.^

their interests

the legacy of the

Nehru name, and

this

Als0j

Mrs Gandhi did

carry

helped her gain considerable

prestige with the popular sector.

Under

Indira Gandhi, the Punjab State Reorganisation

was

Bill

executed where the entire state was trifurcated. The southern areas
which

were predominantly Hindi-speaking Hindu
state of

areas,

were formed

into a

new

Harayana, and the other Hindi-speaking areas of Punjab were merged

with the Himachal Pradesh. The

new

state of

Punjab comprised of the

remaining areas, and had a population of 54% Sikh

44% Hindu. 73

(9

million strong), and

Although Indira Gandhi did grant the Sikhs

their

demand

for

the Punjabi Suba, she balked at the thought of alloting the beautiful city of

Chandigarh

Punjab or Haryana. Chandigarh was

to either

control of the central

government but

at the

same time

it

to

was

be under the
to

house both

the state assemblies and both the secretariats of Punjab and Haryana. This

did not please the Akalis, and in 1969, Sant Fateh Singh planned to immolate
himself

if

Chandigarh was not given

to Punjab.

Hastily, Mrs.

Gandhi

decreed that Chandigarh would go to Punjab, but in return, Punjab would

have

to

surrender the two areas of Abohar and Fazilka to Haryana.

claimed that the

latter

were the Hindu majority

was Punjabi speaking, not

majority area which

went against Pandit Nehru's stand on
basis of religion. 74

analysts that

made by
was

However, there

But

it

was

a

was

Hindu

Hindi. In effect, the award

the alteration of boundaries

are also arguments

by the way the Government

of India

made by

on the

political

had handled the demands

the Akali Dal, and subsequently, the negotiations which followed,

clear that the Center

72 Tully

area.

It

& Jacob,

would not consider demands on

1986:43.

73 Singh, 1984:218
74 Tully & Jacob, 1986:44-45.
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the basis of

it

religion or

communal

identity

secessionist inclinations/'

75

by leaders

Besides, the

"

whom

two

to

show

in the heart of

the partisan

Punjab

power

Abohar and Fazilka

award these two

them makes

politics in

Although there was now
of the Akalis, they did not

to

considered had

districts of

are in the heart of Punjab. This decision not to

which were

it

little

districts

or no sense, and goes

which Indira Gandhi engaged.

a Sikh majority in the Punjab, to the anguish

win any

elections held for the Punjabi legislative

assembly between 1967-1980 because the Congress

won

making populist promises. This has

a practice of the Congress,

where they make promises

for long

been

directly to the people,

the support

by

perhaps promises they

could not keep, merely in order to win elections.
In the first elections in the reorganised Punjab, the Akalis formed a
coalition with the Jan Sangh.

Hindu

appeal.

The Jan Sangh was

a party with a largely

The Jan Sangh was extremely opposed

to the formation of the

Punjabi Suba. The President of the Jan Sangh had actually stated, "The Jan

Sangh regards

the Sikhs as part

and parcel of

hands with the Jan Sangh must have been
because

the

Hindu

society ."

To

join

a bitter experience for the Sikhs

this diluted their interests considerably. 76

The creation

of the Punjabi

Pandora's Box, for granting one
resulted in the current

crisis.

Suba was similar

demand

This

is

to

opening up a

led to a series of events

not to suggest that

if

Punjabi Suba had been denied there would be no current

Undoubtedly, there would

a crisis, but

one of

the granting of the Punjabi Suba to the Sikhs

compromises, made by the

34

demand

was

for the

crisis.

a different nature.

However,

the beginning of a series of

State, in its secular ideology.

75 Brass, 1988:177.
76 Singh, 1984, p.218-219.

the

which

As already suggested

before, the granting of the Punjabi

amounted

to granting land

Suba would have infuriated Nehru as

on the basis of

To Nehru who was

religion.

it

a

firm believer in the secular rhetoric and ideology within
the Indian
Constitution, this

here

abhorrent.

Another point

that the Center throughout the Punjab crisis

is

mistake:

the rhetoric

Punjabi Suba
here.

would have been

a

is

was always

good example

different

from the

way which

is

be

made

committed the same
action. Granting the

of this since secular rhetoric

Clearly, the center has acted in a

to

purely

was

self

violated

serving and

without a long term perspective.
Subsequently, the Akali Dal party gained
the elections of 1967.

power

However,

since both the Akali-Jan

momentum and

in 1972, the Akali

Sangh

coalition

formed between 1967-1972), were wrought with

captured

Dal was ousted from

governments (which were
factional disagreements.

It

has been argued that the union of the Jan Sangh and the Akali Dal was a

genuine threat

to the

power

of the Congress in the region.

Congress promoted defections and
credibility.

It is

the Akali-Jan
policies

within the Akali Dal to weaken

its

argued that the Congress was directly behind the collapse of

Sangh

coalition in 1972.

were followed through the

Ultimately, the Congress
this

splits

Hence, the

(I)

It is

also argued

by analysts

that such

1980s. 77

lost

power

to the Janta party in 1977,

and

time the Akali Dal formed a coalition government in the Punjab with

the Janta party. In the 1977 parliamentary elections, the Akali Dal polled a

higher percentage of votes than the Congress, and succeeded in capturing
of the nine
in

Lok Sabha

comparison

to the

seats.

all

This strengthened the position of the Akali Dal

Congress. 78

But, once again, in the parliamentary

77 Brass, 1988:178.
78 Brass, 1988:80.
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elections of 1980, factional divisions within the
Akali Dal contributed to
defeat,

and the Congress wrested power

its

of the government. 79

The Anandpur Sahib Resolution
In October 1973, a

the Akali Dal,

document was drafted by

which served

as the manifesto of the Punjabi

constitutional issues.

This document

Sahib, where, the last

Guru had formed

was written
the Khalsa,

name, the "Anandpur Sahib Resolution."
principles"

the working committee of

and thereby derived

The resolution

political objectives.

the Sikhs can be found in these objectives. The

Punjabi-speaking areas which had been

Holy Anandpur

in the

and four "aims" with ten religious programs

aims and approximately seven

first

view on the

listed

its

two

to obtain these

The main grievances
objective

was

to

of

add the

out in the delineation in 1966,

left

including Chandigarh, Sindh, Kangra and several other places which were

important to Sikh history. The second objective was that

in the

new

state,

central intervention should be limited to defense, foreign affairs, posts and

telegraph, currency
of

and railways.

In effect there should be a decentralization

power with more power granted
By doing

would be

to the states.

the above mentioned,

resolved,

powers would go

the underlying constitutional crisis

wherein, the constitutional assignment of reserved

to the states.

In a deeper sense, this

was

a

demand

for a

state of federalism, in the true sense of the

word. Although India

supposed

quite far from the concept, in that

to

be a federation, in

the Center holds a large

reality,

amount

it is

of power.

Centre under Indira Gandhi was to focus

and anything which was seen

is

Subsequently, the desire of the

all

the

power toward

the Center,

as threatening to the politicians themselves,

79 Brass, 1988:218.
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was

instantly resolved

Resolution

demands

by suppression. The demands

not only for a "federal State

calls

that

"all states

Anandpur Sahib

in the

in a real sense",

but also

are equally represented at the Center". 80

The

resolution also posited that the "Sikh religion was not
safe without
sovereignty

".

This could be interpreted as being a

Khalistan, although a separate state

was never formally

Akalis, before Operation Blue star. 81
distorted the

demands

of the Sikhs

call for a

separate

called for

by the

However, the Central government

and maintained

separate Sikh state, in order to turn sentiment

that they

away from

were seeking

a

the Sikhs.

There are several other versions of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution
circulation,

some

Agitation

One

.

of

which can be found

in the

in

White Paper on the Punjab

version in the White paper which had been "authenticated"

by Sant Harchand Singh Longowal

in 1977, asks for the "merger of all

Punjabi speaking areas to constitute a single administrative unit where the
interest of Sikhs

and Sikhism are specially protected." 82

not seem particularly secessionist but only a

demand

of

This

what

demand does

is

just in

any

democratic country. In a democratic country with minorities, since the
majority often prevails (Tocqueville's tyranny of majority)

happen
in a

that the voice of the minority gets

also

demands

may

often

subsumed. Therefore, minorities

democracy should necessarily be protected so

The resolution

it

as to

be

fair

and

equitable.

the redistribution of the unjust Ravi-Beas river

water award given by Indira Gandhi during the Emergency of 1975-77. 83

^Leaf, Murray, "The Punjab

Crisis",

Asian Survey, Vol XXV, No.5,

May

1985:481.

® 1 Gupte, Pranay, Vengeance: India after the Assassination of Indira Gandhi, London:

Norton

& Company,

W. W.

1985:127.

82 Government of India, White Paper on the Punjab Agitation.
India Press, 1984:6.

S^White Paper:6.
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New Delhi:

Government

of

Also included in the resolution

is

a call for maintaining the present

Sikh strength in the Army.84

a

proposal by General K. Sunderjit

ratio of

called for proportional representation in the army:

2%

if

the Sikhs constituted

of the Indian population, they should occupy only

positions.

Such

been reared

to

a

demand would

be the "military

clearly

be abhorrent

elite" of India

then have been holding that position.

2%

by the

of the

army

to the Sikhs

British,

The resolution

who had

and ever since

also called for

granting the "holy-city" status to Amritsar, and permitting installation of a
radio transmitter in the Golden Temple for broadcasting Sikh religious

hymns. The resolution
towards the safety of
states in India.

It

Temple Express",

life

had
it

and property

also failed to

which

A

call for

railway train, the "Golden

a separate Sikh personal law,

and had

11 other

equality in the social, agricultural, industrial
life,

constitute the

much debated

Resolution.

short analysis of the

considering the importance of
of the

name any

abroad and in other

The above demands, along with

(economic) and political spheres of

Anandpur Sahib

for Sikhs settled

had not recognized

interfered in the Sikh tenets. 85

resolutions

Government had shown apathy

also stated that the

demands made by

Anandpur Sahib Resolution
it

to the Sikh

demands.

the Sikhs are unjust or unfair.

is

It is

It

necessary

clear that not

one

clearly represents

the fear of any minority in a country as large as India. The Sikhs are a

minority, and as suggested before, fear being enveloped by Hinduism, and

not only Hinduism, but also by the Indian

state.

The Sikh

easily be lost in the large secular structure of India,

^White

Paper:73-74.
85 Kapur, 1986:222-223
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identity could

and the Sikhs

fear

complete dissolution. Looking

demands more

Politics

credible,

and not based merely on

in this light

makes

their

secessionist tendencies.

to the political climate in the late 1970's

was considerably weakened,
conducive

Gandhi had

to attack the

to find a

Congress

way

to curb

I

camp.

the Akali Dal to the Congress

Jat

the Congress

The Congress

was not
I

under

and divert popular support

support base of the Akali Dal

such as the rural

when

the prevailing atmosphere in Punjab

to the interests of the

away from

Sikhs

demands

and Alienation

Going back

Indira

at their

I.

The best way

to

in certain crucial areas

do

of the
this

was

and groups

Sikh peasantry which was under the influence of the

Akali Dal, as well as under the religious influence of the Sants and preachers
in the

Gurudwaras. 86

do the

trick for

In search of a charismatic religious leader

This creation of Bhindranwale, the terrorist, was solely a

creation of Indira Gandhi, and her son Sanjay. This fact has been
in the literature.

Clearly, Indira

power, and saw the opportunity
detract

way

amply

fearful of losing

who would

sympathy away from the more moderate Akali demands, and

then

this

she could retain power by dismissing both the moderate demands as

demands

as impossible to grant.

This

she would maintain her electoral position.
This political ploy soon gained

own

Gandhi was

in creating a terrorist figure

unrepresentative, and the extremist

way

could

them, Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay found Jarnail Singh

Bhindranwale. 87

documented

who

right

was created who espoused

In Bhindranwale's opinion, there

its

own momentum and

a leader in his

the concept of Sikh fundamentalism.

was much divergence from Sikhism and

86 Brass, 1988:180.
87 Brass, 1988:180; Joshi, 1984:4.
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this

could have negative effects on the

faith itself.

So, he instituted a

fundamentalist approach to Sikhism, and along with

element of violence into Sikh demands.

Hindu, anti-India and secessionist
started to join his following.
Sikhs.

fell

brought

With Bhindranwale,

policies

These

it

were

instituted

in the

active anti-

by the Sikhs who

into the category of the extremist

Several efforts aimed at reconciliation

all

ended

in the

same place

with no clear answer or solution. 88
Sanjay Gandhi and Indira Gandhi, along with their leading Sikh
politician, Zail

was

currently

away from

Singh (who was Chief Minister of Punjab from 1972-1977, and

Home

Minister) needed a cause and a

to divert attention

the Akali Dal, highlight the inefficiencies of the Akali Dal, and

thus gain power. The
historic

man

Damdami

man

Taksal.

they found, Bhindranwale, was head of the

The cause they found

Nirankaris, the heterodox sect of the Sikhs

who

in the issue of the

believed in the formless

nature of God. The fact that outraged the other Sikhs most was that despite
the decree

made by Guru Gobind Singh

that

he would be the

last

Guru, the

Nirankaris started to worship their founder Baba Dayal Das. This was

blasphemy and heresy

to the other (especially the Keshadari) Sikhs.

party called the Dal Khalsa
of the pure.

was formed on

The following week there was

13th April, 1978,
a brutal attack

gathering in which 12 Sikhs and 3 Nirankaris were
Zail Singh

since

it

had an

issue with

was “apparent"

Punjab, and not even

which they could

killed.

literally,

on

A new
the party

a Nirankari

The Gandhis and

discredit the Akali Dal regime

that the Akali Dal could not control violence in the

among

its

own

people.

88 Singh, 1984:13
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Bhindranwale was the hero.

In 1980, Indira

Gandhi returned

unleashed had not completed

to

its

power, but the monster she had

tirade. 89

The violence unleashed by Bhindranwale knew no bounds.
The

murder which was executed

horrible political

the

murder

was issued

managed

of
for

to

Baba Gurbachan Singh on April

name

24, 1980.

was

of religion

An

arrest

warrant

Bhindranwale, but being the "puppet" of the Government he

avoid being arrested. Zail Singh, the then President of India,

under instructions from and with
far as to tell

in the

first

direct complicity of Indira Gandhi,

went so

Parliament that Bhindranwale was innocent of the murder. The

second murder, on 9th September 1981, had more serious repercussions.
This time Lala Jagat Narain, the publisher of a

murdered.
another.

Narain and Bhindranwale were outspoken
It

was common knowledge

of the former.

Once

again, a warrant

Bhindranwale. This time
finally arrested in a

it

crisis, in

his arrest,

that the latter

was issued

was imperative

gurudwara

the beginning of the violence

Punjab

in

that

Inspector General A.S. Atwal

23 April 1983.

&
&

in Punjab.

which was unleashed

The

final

who was

in the

This arrest

As Atwal was leaving

was

remainder of the

month

community down

after

of Giani Zail
a

bloody

straw was the murder of Deputy

in charge of the police in Amrtisar,

the Hari

prayers he was shot dead.

90 Tully

he be arrested, and he was

Bhindranwale was released, once again, with the help

Khalistan. 90

one

had engineered the death

the pre-Operation Blue star years. Less than a

demanding

89 Tully

critics of

for the arrest of

Mehta Chowk,

Singh. This time, he emerged to lead the Sikh
path,

Hindu newspaper chain was

Jacob, 1986:57-65.
Jacob, 1986:63-70.
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Mandir

after

on

doing his routine

Following the death of the General, the tension between
two Sikh

Bhindrawale and Longowal, mounted. Harchand Singh Longowal

leaders,

was another

leader of the Akali Dal, and he

more moderate than any

The

of the others.

espoused peace and nonviolent methods

to

was considered
faction lead

win

their

to

be considerably

by Longowal

still

demands. However,

constant failure of the negotiations held between the Government and

Longowal not only demoralised
Longowal.

It

also

pushed him

the latter, but also delegitimised the cause of

to

do more

drastic things such as call for

"morchas" or marches, and more violent forms of agitation

more peaceful methods he had followed

the the

The heat was

murder

of Atwal.

convincing the
safe only

if

still

he was

convince the Head

on Bhindranwale. He was

priest,

wanted

for the

to the threat of arrest

Akal Takht. Tohra managed

High

Priest to

Bhindranwale was

concede

to

fact that

no leader was ever allowed

safe despite the several

he would have been arrested

him by

the Congress

I

Bhindranwale. This was the

under the protection of the Congress

Hindus indiscriminately and

had

police.

it

&

ruthlessly.
for

which

not been for the protection offered to
This protection has been documented

9 Hully &Jacob, 1986:63-70.

92 Tully

start of the

murders which he authorized, and

for

and the

troops,

itself. 92

relatively safe

until the terrorists started killing

He was

to

Akal Takht. Eventually factionalism within the Golden

import of arms into the Akal Takht

I

by

would remain

Temple complex, between Longowal's men and Bhindranwale's
forced the

to

Giani Kirpal Singh, that the only safe place for

Bhindranwale was the Takht despite the
to live in the

still

President, Tohra, that Bhindranwale

in the sanctuary of the

opposed

before. 91

Bhindranwale shrewdly reacted

SGPC

as

Jacob, 1986:108-110.
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by several credible sources, and
horrible

murders

in

known

a well

fact in India. 93 After a set of

September-October 1983, Mrs. Gandhi deposed the

Darbara Government

Throughout

is

in the Punjab,

this period,

it is

and imposed President's Rule.

also clear that in addition to supporting

Bhindranwale, the Center did not want

to

with the Akalis.

at least ten

members

Although there were

of the Akali Dal

come

and the Congress

I

to

any

sort of settlement

meetings between the

between 1983-1984, none of

these meetings resulted in anything substantial because the centre did not

want

to

concede any demands,

lest

Therefore, they portrayed the Sikh
the Indian union, as a
to isolate the Akalis

terrorist activities,

polity.

demand

enough so

that they

which would
I

demands

of the Constitution

is

that in the

of the Sikhs,

By doing

would be forced

would seem

all

demands.

community within

for a separate

further alienate

and would garner more

interesting to note
religious

demand

for a separate nation.

Therefore, the Congress

of terrorism,

they be forced to concede

into

so,

they hoped

engaging

in

them from the Indian

like a strong saviour in the face

electoral support. 94

However,

end the government conceded
and even went so

which guaranteed the Sikhs

far as to

all

amend

the
section 25

a distinct religious identity. 95

This granting of religiously based demands, while ignoring the more

economic demands of the Sikhs has been

a potent reason in exacerbating the

religious aspect of the crisis.

93 Joshi, 1984:6.
94 Joshi, 1984:75.
95 Article 25 of the Indian constitution, until the subsequent

amendment

treated the

Hindus and

Sikhs as one, and did not provide for different personal laws in terms of religious matters.
This was a matter of contention for all religious minorities in the Indian union.
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Operation Blue

Star:

A

Fatal Miscalculation?

With the deterioration

of the conflict to an

was apparently no other way out
its

terrorists,

other than flushing the Golden Temple of

and arresting Bhindranwale. This was the beginning

Operation Blue
irrespective of

Star:

army

the

where his/her

action

which infuriated every Sikh

loyalties lay.

Major General Kuldip Singh Brar,

and placed him

religion),

On
Blue Star
all

June

4,

swung

in

1984, the

This

was

sacrilege, for the

army

to

to the Sikh

day of Guru Arjan Singh's martyrdom. Operation

The

brutally killed, since they
It

shaven Sikh (offensive

a clean

charge of the operation. 96

into action.

setting of the complex.

first set

had

of

commandos who were
or no

little

knowledge

sent in

of the internal

seems incredible that an army action was carried

out without considerable deliberation as to
attack

of

Golden Temple and commit murder. Indira Gandhi summoned

enter the

were

time low point, there

all

how and where

would be based. After almost 48 hours

of firing,

the counter

Longowal and Tohra

surrendered, and the dead body of Bhindranwale was located. Although the

Government had given

specific instructions to use " minimum force "

ensure the safety of the Harmandir Sahib, the
in shambles. 97

resistance

Tanks had

Government

started

of India, tanks

fire accidentally.

totally

93
97 Nayar

&

of the

complex

on June

unexpected by the army.

5, after

were brought

in

consultations with the

on June

6.

The

library

was

set

Lost along with rare books and manuscripts were

handwritten copies of the Granth and hukumnamas

96 Nayar, Kuldip

much

to

be brought in during the operation because

was extremely heavy and

Although army action

on

to

firing left

and

& Khushwant

signed by various

Singh, Tragedy of Puniab. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1984:91-

Singh, 1984:93.
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98

Gurus.

Ultimately, though the

replace the

damage done

the operation
that only 92

were heavier than

jawans died. While the

was erroneous and

admitted.

Although

lost in the operation, in reality

official

the total

The military action

wave

officially

official figures of the terrorists

only to about 554, in

tallied

intact,

nothing could

Akal Takht or other buildings. Casualties

to the

army men were

Harmandir Sahib was

estimates

number

killed

it is

it

in the heart of the Sikh

and others dead
official

Government. The

3000. 99

homeland provoked

fact that the

SGPC and

the

High

But th edisproportion

and inappopriateness

action far outweighs the indecision of Longowal, the
in allowing terrorism to fester in the
It

High

of the

Priests

Golden Temple.

clearly

is

army

and the

100

can be argued that Bhindranwale, a criminal no doubt, could have

been arrested

in a legal

considered.

Even

he had

a

Priests did nothing to

stop Bhindranwale from smuggling arms into the Golden Temple

SGPC

total

and more importantly resentment against the

of anguish,

not condonable.

said

almost 700

argued that the

was almost

was

in

if

way by

the police

fortified himself

Bhindranwale

until

the police. However, this

were sent

in,

was simply not

Bhindranwale was secure since

amply. However, the police had not arrested

now, although they had several opportunities

because until the end of 1983, Bhindranwale was

still

to

do so

being protected by the

Congress.

Obviously, since Bhindranwale had

fortified himself

with arms

(supposedly smuggled in from Pakistan), the army was required. However,

seems hardly necessary

Golden Temple.
9 ^Nayar

&
"Nayar &

It

was

to

it

have had 2000 troops along with tanks invade the

also highly inappropriate,

Singh, 1984:103-104.
Singh, 1984 :108-109

100 Leaf, 1985:494.
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if

not downright stupid,

for the

army

number

on

to attack

a

day when they knew

of pilgrims celebrating the

martyrdom

that there

of Sant Hargobind.

resulted in not only the loss of terrorist lives, and
loss of innocent civilians as

and pilgrims.

also

It

it

army

lives,

to distinguish

seems highly unnecessary

Temple with about 2000 men,
additional troops.

became hard

the entire state

would be

a large
101

This

but also the

between

terrorists

that along with attacking the

was

sealed off with 70,000

There was a simultaneous invasion of other shrines

in

the state, a declaration of President's Rule and dissolution of the State
legislature, a declaration of

complete Press censorship, and martial law.

Given the existing framework,

was easy

it

for the Sikhs to perceive this

entire episode as a piece of evidence that the

Government was

hostile to the

needs of the Sikhs. 102

To add

fuel to the fire, the detention of all

prominent Akali leaders,

the declaration that the militant All India Sikhs Students Federation
illegal,

and the rigorous control

infuriated the entire Sikh

of the Punjab after the
103

community.

It

It

also ensured a place for

were

terrorists,

and

killed in the

name

undermine the cause

Bhindranwale

Sikh martyrdom, along with his right hand

action,

not only legitimized the efforts

of the militant Dal Khalsa but also sought to further

the moderates.

army

was

man Amrik

of religion.

of

in the history of

Singh.

Both

men

Bhindranwale blatantly

encouraged violence between the Sikhs and the Hindus, and expounded on

communal
of

hatred.

He

did not deserve to die a martyr, along with the

Guru Hargobind, who were

101 It

truly martyrs,

and who died

likes

for a truly just

day was chosen for the attack because there was some
secret information that the next day (June 4), there was a plan between the Sikhs and the
Pakistanis to retaliate against the Government and carry out a large-scale operation. The
is

argued that

this particular

validity of this claim cannot be asserted for certain.

102 Leaf, 1985:494.
103 Kapur, 1986:235.
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(Tully

&

Jacob).

cause. Indeed there

be condoned,

may have been
power

like the

of the killing of innocent
killing of innocent Sikhs

Gandhi) was analagous

politics of Indira

Hindu

civilians

Gandhi.

However, the tragedy

by the Sikhs, and the subsequent

by enraged Hindus

(after the assassination of

Mrs.

to barbarianism.

Clearly, Operation Blue-Star
retain control over Punjab.
rest of India,

repression of the Sikhs, a fact that cannot

was

This action

way

yet another

Indira

would make her seem

Gandhi could
heroic to the

and simultaneously provide her with the ammunition

necessary to impose direct rule in the Punjab. Once again, Indira Gandhi's

and power

lack of foresight,

based solely on centralizing power, took

politics

precedence over any other input. In the

have never gained the
of Indira Gandhi.

more support

momentum

first

or support

As documented, he was

for her.

place,
if

Bhindranwale would

not for the blatant support

created

by her

Additionally, having created this monster, Operation

Blue Star was carelessly planned, and poorly executed.

had hoped
hands

for

was more power would flow

after this

army

action.

was wrong, and unnecessary. However,
was

to

pay the

What

into the Center,

Indira

and

Gandhi

into her

Her short-sightedness did not allow her

understand that the action would only seek

politician

in order to provide

to

to alienate the Sikh polity,

and

Indira Gandhi, the self-centered

price in the end.

Following the army action the same year, to right a wrong, yet another

wrong was committed. On Oct
India,

31, 1984, Indira

was shot dead by her two Sikh

Gandhi, Prime Minister of

security officers, Satwant Singh

and

Beant Singh. There are no clear reasons given in the form of a public
statement as to

why

the

two

killed Indira

two men were not driven merely by

Gandhi.

insanity.

It

Yet

it is

clear that these

can be argued that

Indira Gandhi's party which launched Bhindranwale, and granted

47

it

was

him

so

many
was

concessions that he became a 'Frankenstein' out
of control. Not only

Gandhi the incensor

Indira

of the

phenomenal

rise of

Satwant and Beant Singh were Sikhs and as Sikhs, they

been wronged by

her. " Raj Karega Khalsa"

was

their cry,

were concerned, anything

that threatened their

was

had

to

evil

and

their religion

to

felt

be defended.

Bhindranwale;
that they

and

as far as they

homeland or
It

would be

their religion

a naive statement

say that the two guards acted out of an impulse; they had to

woman who had
their view, Mrs.

homeland and
This,

Gandhi had come

religion. 104

justifies the

Government and

assassination,

justify the assasination of Indira

subsequent

killing, the violence that

Gandhi.
followed in

Almost 1500 Sikhs were murdered, while

the police watched.

The week following the

Sikhs were categorized as terrorists and were publicly

all

humiliated, their houses looted and plundered, robbed of

and

the

to represent a threat to their country,

the aftermath of the assassination.
the

kill

engineered the demolition of their beloved Akal Takht. In

however, does not

Nothing also

had

all their

dignity,

their rights as citizens of secular India violated. 105

The

entire

drama

of the Punjab situation

post-Operation Blue Star amassed a

subsequently handled poorly,

which unfolded

momentum

at best,

of

its

steadily

own, and was

by the Center. Clearly

as demonstrated

above, Operation Blue Star was not entirely necessary. The whole problem

could have been prevented had Bhindranwale not been aided and abetted by
the Congress

I.

killing of Indira

However, given the

inevitability of

Gandhi, certainly not

subsequent anti-Sikh

riots

justifiable,

Operation Blue

but clearly inevitable. The

were handled poorly by the

104 Leaf, 1985:494-495.
105 Leaf, 1985:495.
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Star, the

state,

and there

is

substantial evidence to suggest that

which

initiated the violence,

it

was

the

members

of the Congress

and the police were instructed

I

to allow the

violence to continue. 106

The Rajiv Gandhi Rule: Post 1984
Following the death of his mother, Rajiv Gandhi assumed power.

Although he had
first

a

daunting task ahead,

seven months of his coming

to

it

was commendable

power he managed

to reach a settlement

with the Akali Dal by dismissing, transferring or by-passing

had advised

his mother.

threat to the very existence of India.

He

problem which required adept

He appointed Arjun

bureaucrats.

and maintained

all

those

who

After winning the general elections he understood

the gravity of the situation in Punjab and realised that this

political

that within the

direct access

was

a serious

also realised that Punjab

was

politicians to handle, not the

Singh

to take

a

army

or

over as Governor of Punjab

between himself and the Governor. He

also

kept Zail Singh, Darbara Singh (the former Chief Minister of Punjab) and

Bhajan Lai (Chief Minister of Haryana) out of the negotiations since they

had

all

a vested interest in the crisis.

On
discuss

21 July, 1985, Sant

some

which came

sort of

to

be

in

Delhi to

agreement with Rajiv Gandhi. Succinctly, the accord,

known

Longowal envisaged

Harchand Singh Longowal arrived

as the Punjab

Accord between Rajiv Gandhi and

the

Punjab referring of the Anadpur Sahib
Resolution to the Sarkaria Commission; referring to the river water disputes
for adjudication to a Supreme Court judge with the assurance that each state
will continue to get not less than what it was getting rehabilitation of the
" transfer of

Chandigarh

to

,

,

,

106 See V. Sharma, 219; Harji Malik, 240; Darshan Singh Maini, 251; George Mathew,259, and
A.G.Noorani, 273, in Amrik Singh, ed., Punjab in Indian Politics: Issues and Trends, New
Delhi:

Ajanta Publications,1985.
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army

deserters by providing them gainful employment,
compensation to the
innocent persons killed in agitation;and extending the
judicial enquiry into
Delhi riots into Bokaro and Kanpur." 107

The Punjab Accord was important because
the strategy of the government.

marked

it

a definite shift in

Gandhi granted more concessions

Rajiv

to

the Akali Dal than his mother had. This can be explained by
not only the
different political personalities of Rajiv
fact that

having

wave

and Indira Gandhi, but

both operated under contrasting

won

political situations.

by the

Rajiv Gandhi,

the elections with massive support while riding a

after Indira

also

sympathy

Gandhi's assassination was politically stronger than his

mother, and therefore he could put aside partisan politics in order to appear
to

be the more benevolent political leader. 108 The major concessions

in this

accord included transferring Chandigarh to Punjab, to adjust the river water

flow situation in favour of Punjab and to
the killings of Sikhs in

New

However, the end

two

fold.

began

set

up

a

commission

Delhi after the assassination of Indira Gandhi.

to the crisis

was not

at

hand. The problems were

Primarily, after the promising start, Rajiv Gandhi's efforts also

to fall victim to the familiar political pressures

his mother.

endeavour
situation.

to look into

and desires espoused by

Kohli suggests that the problems faced by Rajiv in his
to solve the

He

Punjab problem

is

endemic

to the Indian political

suggests that the dual forces of institutional weaknesses, and a

highly fragmented, diverse polity force leaders such as Rajiv Gandhi to

abandon

their electoral promises,

and force

centralization,

and

powerlessness. 109 The second factor ensuring the failure of Rajiv Gandhi

Punjab Accord and Elections Retrospect and Prospects. New Delhi:
Publishing House, 1988:163.
108 Kohli, 1990:365.

iO^Narang,

A.S.,

109 Kohli, 1990:340
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to

Gitanjali

solve the Punjab problem

was

the emergence of other militant Sikh figure,

including Jagdev Singh Talwandi to replace Bhindranwale.
The problem

now was

that

many

them and sold

of the extremist Sikhs

their cause to the

that

felt

Government by

Longowal had deserted

sealing the Rajiv-Longowal

Accord. After proclaiming himself to be successor of Bhindranwale,

Talwandi demanded autonomy

for the Punjab,

and launched

a verbal attack

on Longowal. He charged the Central Government with genocide
Sikhs.

of the

Bhindranwale's octogenarian father Baba Joginder Singh emerged as

new

yet another

leader of the All India Sikh Students Federation.

Ultimately, Joginder Singh announced in

May

1985 that he was unilaterally

dissolving both the factions of the Akali Dal and forming the United Akali
Dal.

This United Akali Dal

violence. 110

was plagued with

conflicts

and resulted

in

more

Therefore, increased terrorism, subsequent repression and

factionalism were factors which ensured that the State could not enact the

Accord.

The United Akali Dal declared
Panth

for his unilateral discussions

that

Longowal was

a traitor to the

with the Government. There was

growing dissension between the Longowal supporters and the United Akali
Dal under Joginder Singh. Meanwhile, elections were announced

member Punjab

legislative assembly,

United Akali Dal stated that

managed
effort.

to

On

it

and

would boycott

convince Badal and Tohra

to

Lok Sabha

111

110 Kapur, 1986:240-242.

Kapur, 1986:244-245.
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seats.

the elections, but

The

Longowal

support the Akali Dal's election

20 August 1985, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal

by Sikh extremists.

m

for the 13

for the 117

was

assassinated

The Punjab Accord between Rajiv Gandhi and
Longowal was
event in that

it

terrorist forces

thinking.

its

Priest of the

violence

brought peace back

were held

in

to the state

if

only for a short while. The

check and the Government had time

to retrace

But with the assassination of Longowal, and then the
Head

Golden Temple while within

was brought back

the four walls of the

into the problem.

in action.

Temple

itself,

Subsequently, the pro-

Bhindranwale group reoccupied the temple, and the
back

a key

terrorist forces

were

Additionally, increased political pressures on Raji to protect

the electoral interests of the Congress ensured that Rajiv could not
translate

the Accord into action.

Following the assassination of Longowal, in

a

sympathy wave which

turned out to be beneficial for his party, Akali Dal under

won

the elections.

The polling on September

turnout to be about 67%. The Akali Dal

won

25, 1985

Surjit

showed

Singh Barnala
the voter

a clear majority in the

assembly, winning 73 seats out of the 100 in the 117 seat legislative assembly.
112

This clear victory by Surjit Singh Barnala seemed to

the moderates over the extremists.
factor that the Akali Dal

had

show

the victory of

Although there was euphoria over the

finally

managed

to

win

elections in the Punjab

without being in a coalition, there was major factionalism and dissension
within the party. Eventually the Akali Dal Government
Badal, but retained the support of Barnala and Tohra.

Besides a

power

support of

113

struggle within the Akali Dal, the party had the

unenviable task of bringing peace
it

lost the

to the Punjab.

This

it

could not do because

faced major opposition from both the United Akali Dal, and the All India

Sikh Students Federation. The

m

latter

went so

Narang, 1988:168.

113 Kapur, 1986:249.
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far as to say.

emergence of the Barnala Government is not because
of the traitorous
Harchand Singh Longowal, but because
of the policies of Sant
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and the continuous
struggle of his
the

acts of Sant

"
supporters. 114

This was not the end of the
the

AISSF began

crisis.

The extremist United Akali Dal and

indulge in terrorist and extremist

to

activities

once again.

This led to the ultimate dismissal of the Barnala Government
only 21

months

being elected into power. President's Rule was imposed in

after

Punjab on

May

the electorate.

11,

115

1987 only

1

However,

year, 7

this

months and 16 days

after Barnala seized

did not signify the end of the violence. The

violence escalated and in 1990 the total lives lost were 3,650. 116

The Current Situation
After a long period of President's rule, (almost 5 years), following an

extension of President's Rule in the Punjab almost 9 times, elections were

held in the Punjab on February 25, 1992. There was a very low voter turnout,

but the Congress

(I)

won

a landslide victory capturing 87 seats out of the 117

strong Legislative Assembly, and 12 seats out of the 13 available for the Lok

Sabha

(the

lower House of Parliament). The Akali Dal managed

to capture

only 3 seats out of 117 seats for the Legislative Assembly. Beant Singh was

appointed by the Congress

Although

free

and

(I)

as Chief Minister of the Punjab. 117

fair elections

were

held, the violence did not

decrease even during campaigning. Despite the increased deployment of

army, 24 candidates were

killed,

out of which 3 were Lok Sabha candidates

and the remaining 21 were running

for State

Assembly

114 Kapur, 1986:249.
India

News,

,

Washington DC, Jan

16-31, 1992:10.

^Amnesty International Special Report on Punjab,
117 India News, Jan 16-31, 1992:10.
118 India News, Jane 16-31, 1992:10.
4 4
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seats. 118

This

violence only shows the lack of credibility of the Government,
and the lack
of faith the people

have

in the

Government. Also these elections were

boycotted by most of the militant factions.

Six groups led

Mann, Kartar Singh Narang, Baba Joginder

Badal, S.S.

group led by Manjit, and the SSF led by Mehta Chawla

announced

their

unanimous decision

The Beant Singh Congress

I

by Parkash Singh

Singh, the AISSF
all

blatantly

to boycott the elections. 119

Government has

little

or

no legitimacy.

After six long years of factionalism, the six major Akali groups have put
aside their differences, and are working for a sovereign Sikh

state.

The

formalized "panthic bodies-militant nexus" has threatened to set off a

movement

disobedience

if

the Beant Singh

government

is

civil

not deposed

immediately. As said by AISSF (M) General Secretary Harminder Singh

"The Sikhs

Gill,

will not only paralyze the administration but also force the

ministers to operate from the secretariat and circuit houses only."

The unified group not only demands the
release of

all

state of Khalistan, but also the

detained Akali leaders, as well as

all

the militants. 120

The

militants plan to
" dissolve

the panthic committees

to

form

the

united Akali Dal, erode the

by reviving Khalsa panchayats and asking farmers not to sell
government agencies, use the nexus with Kashmiri separatists to
acquire arms, and select targets to widen the communal divide and scare
state's write

wheat

to

away non-Punjabis."

121

In response to the measures of the militants

has

work

its

cut out, but has not

Although the
in jail

Dal

officially joining

hands with the

this

to

State

problem.

keep top Akali leaders

plan backfired with the Akali

terrorists to gain a sovereign Sikh state.

Today, Jan 31, 1992:42.

^India Today, April

to curb or ease the

under Beant Singh had planned

and thus control the movement,

H9 India
1

State

managed

and the Sikhs the

15, 1992:26-27.

121 India Today, April 15, 1992:26.
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The

managed

State has not

militants to

to curb violence either, despite appeals
to the

eschew violence

122
.

The Government meanwhile
hand"

in exacerbating the

arms. The argument
outside

is

still

continues to blame the "foreign

Punjab problem by supplying the militants with

made by many key

political analysts in India

that while the major part of the

undoubtedly with the State

itself,

and

its

problem with India

incompetency

situation effectively, the extent of Pakistan's "logistical
to the extremists

harder to solve

Punjab

its

is

fact that the
crisis

123

of Pakistani assistance
issue.

and physical support"

supply arms has made the

consistently used the issue of the "foreign hand"

any militant uprising. Although

to explain

explain

to

with the

.

The Government has

Punjab

power

lies

to deal

has served to worsen the situation. The

extremists can look to a foreign

and

is clear,

in the case of

the Pakistani element

However, the stand

of the Indian

is

Kashmir the extent

harder to prove in the

Government

apparent inadequacy in dealing with the

terrorist

in trying to

problem

in

that despite constant efforts to flush out the terrorists from the

Punjab and rid them

off their

arms,

new

replenishments of arms are always

available across the border in a never ending supply

excuse cannot go any further since the

crisis

needs

to

124
.

This "foreign hand"

be dealt with, and

excuses do not solve the problem.

Economic Causes
Although

of the Conflict

politics has

played an important role in guiding the demand

for the Sikh sovereign State of Khalistan,

economic

factors

have also played

122 India Today, April 15, 1992:27.
123 Bajpai, Shankar K., "India in 1991", Asian Survey, Vol XXXII, No.2, Feb, 1992:p.215.
124 Joshi, 1984:18.
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a

crucial role in exacerbating the conflict.
is

to outline a

are

I

I

attempt to do in this section

few economic reasons why the Sikhs have been
unhappy with

the Centre, thus resulting in their
that

What

demand

for a separate state.

have chosen are by no means exhaustive, although

some

I

The causes

believe that they

of the important ones.

According

to the 1971 census,

over 10, 378, 979 Sikhs of the 8,000,000

strong Indian population were concentrated in the Punjab.
By contrast,
Sikhs were a decided minority in the earlier census years.
(They constituted

33.3% of population from 1947-1966).
There are clear indications that the Sikh majority

been declining. As

a

in the

Punjab has

consequence of the Green Revolution of the

1960's,

there has been a large inflow of migrants (mainly Hindus) from Uttar

Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa. In contrast to the large inflow of non-Sikhs, there

has been a substantial outflow of Sikhs

to other parts of India, as well as

overseas in search of a better standard of living, education

has claimed that almost one-fifth of the Sikh population
Punjab. 123

Thus

it

etc.

lives out of the

can be argued that the Sikh affluence has

advantages and disadvantages.

Paul Wallace

its

definite

Importantly, given the Sikh fear of

assimilation, the fact that the immigration into the state, as well as their

emigration from the state
position,

is

a reason

may

own

be signs of an erosion into their majority

which has catapulted

promoted by and controlled by the Akali

fear.

This fear has been mostly

Dal, the

SGPC and

the various other

Sikh political parties. This fear has been the base of electoral agendas, that

by convincing the Sikhs

that they are in threat of being

is

dominated by other

groups, the Sikh political parties have attempted to garner political support.

125 Wallace, 1986:365.
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However, such communal based
problem

in

electoral

maintaining peace in the

campaigns have

clearly

been

a

state.

Being the bread-basket for most of India, there has been

a clear bias for

agriculture in the region, thus neglecting industrial investment
in the

Of

region.

was

total central

investment in India in March 1979, Punjab's share

meagre 2.2%. There

a

are

still

demands

for increased investment for

industry, a larger percentage of the river waters flowing through Punjab,
and

increased electric power.

been

126

built originally out of

The

loss of the

Punjab

state

Bhakra Nangal Dam, which had

development funds, was

also a

source of dissatisfaction under Indira Gandhi. 127

has also been argued that unemployment

It

there

is

gainful

so

much

Sikh unrest.

employment

It

available.

is

a

major reason

has been argued that there

To own even

a tiny

is

farmland

why

not enough
is

not possible

with the Punjab Land Reform Act of 1972, instituted by Indira Gandhi,

which

limits a family holding to 7 hectares, thus preventing further

accumulation of land and empowering the revenue
required the revenue

official

officials.

This method

to aggregate all the lands of a family,

and then

required the head of the family to choose for himself and for each adult son,

land up to the limit of 7 hectares, but none for the minor sons. By thus

diminishing the importance of the minor sons, the laws

"

not only violated

the basic concept of household order, but assured that the family holdings

once broken up could never be reaggregated.

much

" 128

Hence

this

law meets

opposition from the Sikhs.

A

major demand

in the

Anandpur Sahib Resolution and

all

the

subsequent demands made by the Akalis has been the issue of the Ravi-Beas
126 Wallace, 1986:372.
127 Leaf, 1985:478.
128 Leaf, 1985:479.
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The demands

water.

in question

are that the majority use of the waters of the

have been given unfairly

requires extensive usage of

them

to the state of

two

rivers

Haryana though Punjab

for agricultural as well as hydro-electric

purposes. However, this issue had not been addressed despite the
agricultural success of the Punjab. These river waters have been a source
of

contention
of

Haryana

first

between India and Pakistan

in 1966,

in 1947,

and

after the

between Punjab, Haryana and Rajastan.

Related to these issues of agriculture

is

129

the effect of the Green

Revolution 130 on the Sikhs. The Green Revolution succeeded
exacerbating income inequalities between the rich farmers
the

High Yielding Variety

of seeds, fertilizers etc, as

and poorer farmers who did not have such
differences

and several antipathies resulted

Sikh community. The only

and

militant actions

way

separatist

access.

The

in

who had

opposed

access to

to the landless

resulting economic

in a discontented

to unite the Sikh polity

demands

formation

and diverse

was by

escalating

to create political unity in a class

divided community. 131 Major (1987) also suggests that the Green

Revolution succeeded in strengthening and modernizing "primordial
sentiments" such as attachment to religion. 132
a minority, are

against
in a

them

more

religion

is

is

more

likely to

He

suggests that Sikhs, being

be convinced that any sort of discrimination

a direct result of the fact that they profess a different religion,

"assertive

and

a threat to the

visible" fashion.

Hindu

majority,

Therefore, for the Sikhs, their

and

this

being

so,

they are more

129 Dang, Satyapal, "Punjab in Crisis" in Paul Wallace and Surendra Chopra, eds.. Political
Dynamics and Crisis in the Punjab. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University Press, 1988: 414-415.
130The Green Revolution was an agricultural project undertaken by the Government of India
with Western aid which attempted to increase the yield of output by planting "High Yielding
Variety" (HYV) seeds, and with better inputs such as fertilizers etc. This project was deemed
to be a success by both Western donor institutions and the Government of India itself.
131 Kohli, 1990:354.
132 Major, 1987:176.
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likely to believe that

any

sort of discrimination

a result of this. 133

is

Therefore, the inequities that resulted from the
Green Revolution could

blamed on the

easily be

Yet another

state.

demand concerns

the position of the Sikhs in the military

structure.

Sikhs are

of Sikhs

conspicuously lower than that under British colonial

are a

is

still

conspicuous in the armed forces, but the proportion

growing number of Indian

of Sikhs in the

example

of

armed

who would

officials

like to see the

forces reduced because of their "unreliability"

which are the army desertions around the time

There

rule.

number
,

good

a

of Operation Blue

Star. 134

These key economic factors are also fueling the drive towards the

demand

for Khalistan.

the country

by providing cheap food,

industrialization

and

Government good
While using

to consider these

has suffered in terms of
policies.

far

agricultural producer,

the economic

at

it

serves

and therefore

its

demands

force a

where Punjab would need

interests to

issue.

amount

of

as well.
to aid in the

keep Punjab as the

dependent relationship

the Central

the

bringing peace in

has not engaged in any policies

industrialization of the Punjab as

would do

potentially reduce the

an effective long term strategy aimed

would include solving

It

problems while addressing the

framework could

However, the Center so

the Center

it

terms of river allocation

in

a political

conflict currently,

the Punjab

Clearly, while the Punjab has been the breadbasket of

government

vis a vis

for support,

both financial and industrial.
Pettigrew (1986) states that what was key for the Akali Dal in
to garner

support for

its

policies

was

its

133 Major, 1987:176-177.

134 0'Brien, 1988:62.
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ability to place the various

its ability

economic

and

political

that this

demands within

was not

a religious

a political ploy

by the

framework. She suggests however,

Sikhs, but instead

was

inherent to the

Sikh tradition where religion and the community
social order were
inherently related

135
.

Factionalism within the Sikh
It is

a

common

every Sikh to a

Movement

among people

error

terrorist, for

this

and world wide

undoubtedly there are many power

within Sikh ranks. The Sikhs are

autonomy. However,

in India

all

united in one demand:

to

equate

factions

more

does not necessarily equate into the demand

for a

separate State.

Before Operation Blue Star, the division between the Sikhs was

There were the

terrorists

who wanted

who wanted more autonomy.
belonged

to the

Shiromani Akali Dal, which

Parbhandak Committee) which
moderate organization.
is

and the moderates

In the context of the Punjab, the moderates
is

the self proclaimed sole

The SGPC (Shiromani Gurudwara

representative of Siskh interest.

SGPC

a sovereign state,

is

a

Sikh church organization

The relationship between

.

The

chief

demands

is

also a clear

the Akali Dal and the

extremely important because the former derives

the religosity of the latter 136

clear.

of the

its

legitimacy from

moderate Akali Dal

includes a rewriting of the Indian Constitution to allow for more state

autonomy, the transference of Chandigarh
industrialization policy for the Punjab.

It

to Punjab,

was only

and adopting an

the constant denials of

these consensus based policies which resulted in the moderates making

135pettigrew, Joyce, "In Search of a new Kingdom in Lahore", Pacific Affairs, 1986:10.
136 Major, Andrew, "From Moderates to Secessionists in the Punjab," Pacific Affairs, 1986:p44.
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narrower demands, such as the recognition of
Amristsar

as a holy city,

and

the recognition of Sikhs as a separate
'quam'-nation. 137

The exremists on the other hand include groups such

as the All-India

Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), and the Youth
Akali Dal. The extremists
desire the

same demands

the following ways,

whole)
to the

interests,

(i)

(ii)

They focus more on Sikh

They adopt

more negotiating

Government,

as the moderates, yet they differ from
moderates in

opposed

more confrontational

stance, as

violence,

Any

(iv)

solution

necessarily have to include a strict punishment for those

the Sikh religion,

and restoration

for secessionism

Blue Star

when every

opposed

secessionists.

was extremely

Sikh

who have

limited.

"hurt"

The

third

Prior to June 1984, the

However,

violated, the differences

felt

would

of full "honour" to the Panth. 138

group within the Sikhs included the

demand

to Punjabi as a

stance of the moderates vis-a-vis the Central

They espouse

(iii)

a

(as

after

Operation

between the various

groups became more nebulous.

As with

the people, the Akali Dal has been torn with factionalism.

The Bhindranwale-Longowal dissension was
factionalism.

While the

Bhindranwale,

it

latter

just the

beginning of such

did not endorse the terrorist activities of

can be argued that the Centre, through

its

policies,

This pushed him to committing

delegitimised the stand of Longowal.

himself to more militancy in order to retrieve some of the legitimacy

him

in

an attempt

to regarner the

emphasised before, the solution
expediently solved

if

lost

by

support of the people. Clearly, as has been

to the

Punjab

crisis

not for the Centre's power

137 Major, 1986:46.
138 Major, 1986:49.

61

could have been more

politics,

and the dissension

within the Akali Dal

itself.

The blame however,

lies

more squarely with

the

Centre.

Other factions of the Akali Dal have emerged since the
death of
Bhindranwale. The

latest reports

important factions have decided

pursue

demand

their

from India suggest that
to join together

six of the

and with the

most

militants, to

for a sovereign state.

Conclusion

The Punjab

was one

crisis

that could

have been solved expediently

and with minimum bloodshed. Instead, the power
Gandhi,

in

an attempt

Indian Union

itself

base, at the expense of the

made

is

overwhelming. Clearly, the few times

to the Sikhs,

it

was

the

more

which were granted. For example, demands such
of the Sikh daily prayer,

were

all

issues

banning the smoking of

either supressed or ignored.

Centre.

to the Punjab, the river

Any

as allowing the broadcast

cigarrettes in Amritsar etc,
political

water issue

in the Punjab, the transfer of
etc,

were

all

avoided by the

solution which did not include these vital political and

economic demands were meant

demands

demands

These issues include economic ones

such as an additional focus on industrialization

Chandigarh

religious

Perhaps the more important

primarily religious issues.

were

played by Indira

has been substantially documented. The consensus

ascribing Indira Gandhi's guilt

concessions were

power

to increase her

politics

of the extremists

moderates, for
conceded. This

it

was

to

As explained

fail.

before,

it

was

the

which were met more than the demands

of the

the religious issues of the extremists which were

in fact

negated the existence of India as a secular

state,

because religious demands had no legitimacy and should not have been
granted.

However, the more

political

demands,
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if

granted would have

guaranteed the legitimacy of the moderates, and alleviated
the need of the

moderates

to

go over

to the side of the extremists.

Additionally, Bhindranwale

was

clearly a creation of the Congress-I

under Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay Gandhi. As explained

earlier in the

chapter, the Gandhis envisioned Bhindranwale to be the
contrasting force to

Longowal and other moderate demands. By encouraging
Bhindranwale,

demands

clearly, the desire

of Longowal,

this

momentum

of

which then further alienated
the

power

politics of Indira

herself.

own, and had

its

that,

disavow

apparently ingenious and fool proof plan was

be the undoing of Indira Gandhi

acquired a

such as

fold — to initially delegitimize the

and then having achieved

Bhindranwale. However,
to

was two

a terrorist

all

The

force of

Bhindranwale

to result in the

army

action,

Sikhs from the Indian polity. Clearly,

Gandhi which allowed

for the

it

was

massive

degeneration of rational, and politically-based demands into what has

culminated to secessionist demands and the cry

Although the Punjab

crisis

and the unsolvable nature

on Indira Gandhi, there are several variations
one includes the

fact that Indira

electoral successes.

for the creation of Khalistan.

of

it

has been blamed

of this accusation.

The

first

Gandhi was concerned only with her

Therefore, by postponing the inevitable action against

the terrorists until the eve of the elections in 1984

would portray her

as a

savior of the unity of India, and therefore guarantee her success. 139 Another

version

is

the assertion that Indira

could not solve the problem and

it

Gandhi was an

was

ineffectual leader

this dithering at the

that resulted in the exacerbation of the Punjab conflict.

Indira

Gandhi

as a

weak and

ineffectual leader. 140

The

who

head of the

state

This view portrays
last

version portrays

139 Sheth D.L, and A.S. Narang, "The Electoral Angle" in Amrik Singh, ed., Punjab in Indian
Politics: Issues and Trends. New Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1985:123-35..
140 Tully

&

facob, 1985:87.
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Indira

Gandhi

as a leader driven solely

by power who overcentralized the

Indian polity and therefore promoted deterioration
of Center-State
relations. 141

Ultimately however,

it

was

the political conflict between Indira

Gandhi and

the Akali Dal

Such Centre

state conflicts are not unusual, but the

was

conflict

the above

which resulted

in the exacerbation of the conflict.

problem with the Punjab

the potent mixture of religion and politics

crisis.

The

fear of assimilation,

economic

errors resulted in the Punjab crisis assuming a far

which exploded

factors

more

and

into

political

horrific proportion

than was ever envisioned. 142
Kohli suggests that the tendency to blame the Sikhs

However, the one credible accusation against
their factionalism.

the Sikhs

is

is

highly limited.

the element of

This factionalism has prevented any meaningful

dialogue between the Centre and the state in an attempt

to solve the

problem. 143 Additionally, another criticism of the Sikhs, especially the Akali
Dal

is

that

when

they were in power (for example, in the 1977 Janata Party-

Akali Dal coalition rule), they did not attempt to institute the demands they

made

in the

Anandpur Sahib

Resolution.

If

they were really interested in

the policies per se, perhaps the best opportunity for them to enact these

would have been when they were

policies

demands needed approval from
several

have

demands which were

instituted.

political

in

power. Clearly some of

their

the Federal level, however, there were

internal to the state itself

which they could

Their failure to institute these policies, or pressure their

patrons into granting these demands, yet making them

141 Brass, Paul, "The Punjab Crisis and the Unity of India", in Atul Kohli,
Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:169-213
142 Kohli, 1990:355.
143 Kohli, 1990:355.
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ed.,

vital

I

ndia's

demands

to the

Congress

I

after

having and before gaining power makes

their position vis-a-vis the legitimacy of their claims a

Violence has

its

own momentum, and

Sikh agitation for a separate, sovereign
central government, acting purely

little

tenuous

144
.

this is particularly true of the

state, Khalistan.

on narrow,

Tragically, the

self interested

and partisan

grounds, has only succeeded in further alienating the Sikhs. Therefore,
conclusion, while
situation

is

it

seems inevitable

by granting statehood

that the only

to the Sikhs, or

concessions to the Sikhs. However, this strategy
this struggle, since granting concessions to

way

by
is

in

to resolve the

at least

making serious

once again not the end

to

one minority group while

repressing others cannot be justified, and will therefore result in a serious

wave

of secessionist

so far been contained
state

is

and the

movements

across the country,

by repressive and

in a difficult position.

The time

has maneuvred

itself in a

state

movements which have

totalitarian state policies.

for concessions

position

The only choice remains, Khalistan.

144 Joshi, 1984:70.
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where

Clearly, the

has long since passed,
it

has no choice

left.

CHAPTER III

THE CRISIS IN THE VALLEY OF KASHMIR

Introduction

As

is

the case with the Punjab, the erosion of secular
democratic

principles,and the centralization policy of the dynastic Gandhi
regime has

been

a central

element in determining the course of the

Jammu and Kashmir
Kashmir have had

145

As with

.

the Punjabi Sikhs, the

a troubled relationship

Their fear of being subsumed under
certain

demands on

Hindu

India has led them to

which has culminated
This chapter

is

The following
with reference

in the

have succeeded

demand

of

make

However, the Center

self-serving politicians, (Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi,
politics,

Muslims

with the Central government.

the Central government.

pursuing a path of power

crisis in the state of

amongst

others)

in alienating the

for secession

by

led

Muslims

from the union of

India.

a historical analysis of the current crisis in Kashmir.
table

is

breakdown

the

of the state of

Jammu and Kashmir

to religion 146
.

Table 1

Population Figures by Religion for the state of
Region

Ladhak

Area (sq./kny Population
52.3%
8,639
45.3%
12,378
2.24%
33,554

TOTALS

54,571

Kashmir
Jammu

i

s

no t the

100%

entire state of

Indian union. Rather

it is

Jammu & Kashmir

% Muslim

% Hindu

%

94.96

4.59

0.05

29.60

466.25

4.15

46.04

2.66

51.30

64.19

32.24

3.57

Other

Jammu and Kashmir which

the valley of

is demanding independence from the
Muslim Kashmir which is attempting to secede from

the Indian union. Therefore, for the rest of this paper,
146 Wirsing, Robert G., India. Pakistan

I

will refer only to Kashmir.

and the Kashmir Dispute. NY:

Press,1994:125
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St.

Martins

Clearly, while

Jammu

predominantly Hindu, and Ladhak,

is

predominantly Buddhist, the area under consideration and
which has been
the location of strife for the past 45 years since
independence

Kashmir

itself,

which has

However,

a majority population of

force Kashmiris to

Muslims. 147

government has been

demand independence from

section will attempt to

formed

the valley of

as in the case with Punjab, the erosion of secular
democratic

principles at the level of the central

the center

is

show

that

is

which have contributed

a platform for the

it is

the Indian union.

What

this

once again the actions and excesses of

to the insurgency in,

demands

a crucial factor to

and which have

of secessionists.

Colonial Rule

The recorded history

of

Kashmir goes back

to 40 A.D.,

but the roots of

the current conflict are securely

embedded

when Jammu and Kashmir was

ruled by the Dogra dynasty. The Dogras

were

a lineage of

whom was

Hindu

Hari Singh

rulers

in the earlier half of this century

who had been

who ascended

ruling from 1839, the last of

the throne in 1925.

Like his

predecessors, Raja Hari Singh openly favored the Hindus and allowed only
the barest

means

of subsistence to the Muslims.

This oppressive system continued

till

the 1930's

when

the

first

glimpses of the eclipse of the Dogra dynasty came

to view.

A young

enterprising Muslim, Sheikh Abdullah started to

demand

greater

representation

in.

He was

before he had set off other

1932

and

Muslim

arrested in 1931 by the Raja Hari Singh, but not

Muslim

when Sheikh Abdullah was

activists.

Martial law

was

declared. In

released he established the "All

Kashmir Muslim Conference."

147wirsing, 1994:125.

67

Jammu and

When
recurring

the British

Government could not ignore

Muslim uprisings

Glancy was appointed

in the valley, a

to investigate the

the situation of

commission under

Muslim grievances

Bertrand

Sir.

of under-

representation and oppression. In February 1932 British troops were sent to

enforce law and order. Subsequently in the spring of 1934 the very
election process

was

representation.

In June 1939, Abdullah

instituted,

and

a state

was

not only for the Muslims in Kashmir, but

He

whole.

filled

vowed

with a

set

passion to fight

to fight persecution
set

up an

movement bent on

people

of, irrespective of religious

his party

effecting the

Government

of, for

"All

backgrounds. The three main factors

were nationalism, an

and sincere secularism. Soon

National Conference appointing as

who

a

and by the

in

interest in left

wing

Kashmir the Muslim Conference

threw out Abdullah and his National Conference. This resulted

Sadiq,

on

National Conference." This was intended to be a

secular

which governed

up with Muslim

new

broke away from the Muslim Conference, and

Jammu and Kashmir

socialism,

assembly was

first

in turn locked

its first

President

Abdullah up because of

a

in the

Ghulam Mohammed

deep rooted hatred.

Subsequently, with the Indo-Pak war emerging, and with the potential

withdrawal of British rule from India, there was

a period of political

vacuum.
In 1947, in the incipient stages of the conflict, India
Britain,

actors

on the scene fighting

Muslim League

led

for

by

While the two were united
British,

still

a colony of

but there was a strong movement for independence. The two main

independence were the Indian National

Congress, led by Pandit Jawarharlal Nehru and Vallabhai
India

was

Mohammed

in their

Ali Jinnah

demand

for

however, they fundamentally differed

68

Patel,

and the

All

and Liaquiat Ali Khan.

independence from the

in their

philosophy of an

independent subcontinent. While the Indian National Congress dreamed
a secular united India,
state distinct

the All India

Muslim League yearned

from the Indian dominion. Jinnah believed

of the subcontinent

had

separate from that of

argued that as

Hindu

a small

and religious

a social, cultural

for

of

an Islamic

that the

Muslims

identity, distinctly

India and hence were a nation on their own.

He

minority they would be potential victims of

oppression by the vast Hindu majority.

At

this time, the British

Indian subcontinent was

fast

had come

to

terms with the

becoming more

of a

fact that the

burden than

decided to leave India. To oversee the smooth transition from being
colony to independent

and

a blessing
a

appointed Lord Mountbatten as

states, the British

Viceroy of India in 1947. The division of the subcontinent into the two
nations, India
allegiance; the
India,

and Pakistan was

to take place according to

predominantly Hindu provinces were

and the predominantly Muslim provinces were

problems arose with the division of the princely
rule, these princely states

form the Union of

to
to

states.

communal

form Pakistan. The

Under

the British

were nominally independent, but they had

recognize the supremacy of the British Raj.

Now,

to

they were given the choice

of acceding either to India or Pakistan.

The question

of accession of princely states

the conflict in Kashmir.

recommended
based on two

The

British

marked

the beginnings of

under Lord Mountbatten,

that the Indian princes accede either to India or to Pakistan
criteria:

(i)

if

the princely state had a

Muslim majority

population, then the state should accede to Pakistan, and conversely,

was

a

Hindu majority population, then

accession to Pakistan by the

the state should go to India,

Muslim majority

states

if

there

(ii)

should only occur

if

these states were geographically contiguous to either East or West Pakistan.
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Therefore, while for the most part, the accession of
princely states were clear,
three princely states posed a problem. These
included
a

Hindu majority

state ruled

by

a

Muslim, the Nizam of Hyderabad,

Junagadh, which was also a Hindu majority

Nawab, and

Hindu

lastly

Hyderabad which was

state ruled

by another Muslim

Kashmir, which was a Muslim majority

king, Maharaja Hari Singh.

state ruled

by

a

Both Hyderabad and Junagadh wanted

to

accede to Pakistan, neither were permitted by either the British or the
Indians
to

accede to Pakistan.

Hyderabad was not allowed because

it

was

located in

the heart of the south and clearly not contiguous to Pakistan, and
Junagadh

was not permitted because
have

a

it

had

Hindu

a

majority.

However, Kashmir did

Muslim majority population, and had common borders with both
West Pakistan. 148

India and

Post-Independence, and the First Indo-Pak

Kashmir, under Hari Singh

initially

War

of 1947

wanted independence. The Raja

did not want to accede to Pakistan for fear that

it

may mean

the massacre and

expulsion of the Hindus and Sikhs, a situation which obviously could not be
Likewise, he did not want to accede to India, because they

tolerated.
it

that

could imply the end of the Raja's control, as his power would be

overshadowed by the Indian Government. Lord Mountbatten
have asked the Maharaja on one of
of

felt

independence and

remained

12, 1947, a standstill

reported to

his visits, to forego his personal

listen to the voice of his people. 149

in a state of

is

dreams

However, the Raja

limbo for a few months before announcing on August

agreement, with both India and Pakistan, without

148 Thomas, Raju G.C in Raju G.C Thomas,

ed., Perspectives

on Kashmir: The Roots

South Asia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992:3.
149 Birdwood, Lord Christopher, Two Nations and Kashmir. London: Robert Hale

in

Ltd., 1956:40.
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of Conflict

acceding to either. Pakistan signed
it

claimed that

it

this

agreement, but India did not because

did not have the approval of

all

the people in the state.

India asserts that following this standstill
agreement, Pakistan fearful
of losing

its

Kashmir

to coerce

standstill

wheat,

control over Kashmir, applied an economic
blockade on
into accession.

salt,

kerosene,

oil

and

cloth.

had collapsed due

being the reason that

October

Pakistan violated the terms of the

agreement and cut the country

infrastructure
this

it

22, 1947, there

to India's failure to

by saying

itself

supply coal

of tribal activism in the

Maliks.

These

tribes

wanted

who had been

to

killed

that

its

to Pakistan,

On

Northwest

tribes involved in this activism

help their Muslim brethren in distress
for

supply of gasoline,

its

Pakistan defended

were rumors

Mohmand

from

could not deliver goods to Kashmir. 150

The main

frontier of Pakistan.

Afridis and the

it

off

were the

move
by

into

and

state troops

contravening orders forbidding celebration of "Pakistan Day". Hari

Singh, then sought Indian assistance to thwart this insurgency, and under

Nehru's orders and Lord Mountbatten's insistence that
help the Kashmiris
India

if

it

would be

illegal to

India had no legal accession to the territory, therefore

would only help

if

legally acceded to India. Therefore,

1947, the Raja sent a signed accession to India following

on October

26,

which India then

sent in a successful airborne operation to Kashmir.

The Indian and Pakistani version

of this insurgency are

unsurprisingly contradictory. According to the Pakistani version, they were

not the sponsors of the insurgency; however,

by the tribesmen

in

it

was

a

spontaneous uprising

support of the oppressed Kashmiri

on the other hand, firmly contends

that the insurgency

co-religionists.

was

created by

Pakistan, in order to coerce to secede to Pakistan. Nevertheless, this

l^Korbel,

Josef.

Danger

In

was

Kashmir. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951:69-70.
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India

the

,

beginning of the
letter of

war over Kashmir. 3

first

accession signed by Hari Singh

had already landed

in Srinagar,

was

was post dated

and not prior

Srinagar as the Indians have always
to retain in India

has been suggested that the

It

a political

made

move by

it

to the

after the

Indian army

Indian army landing in

out to be. Secondly, the decision

the British

who wanted

to

have

a

safeguard against the threat of Communist China. 151

What

initially started as a

Pakistan border, resulted in a

low intensity

conflict along the Indo-

fledged war. Pakistan occupied the

full

northwest frontier province of Kashmir, but the Indians stopped the
Pakistani

army from proceeding any

the Indian
It

Government decided

As

further.

a resolution to the conflict

to refer the conflict to the

United Nations.

strongly believed that a multilateral intervention in the conflict would

lead to a resolution of the conflict in

recommended

to the

Government

its

Consequently, the U.N.

favor.

of Pakistan to secure withdrawal of

tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from Kashmir; and

withdrawal of Indian forces

India, a progressive

required for the maintenance of law and order.

drawn, and

it

came

into effect

on

I

to the

to the

A

government

minimum

cease-fire line

of

strength

was

January, 1949. Also, the U.N. resolution

suggested, to insure freedom and impartiality in an eventual plebiscite, that a
plebiscite administrator be
plebiscite.

nominated with adequate powers

to

conduct the

Independence was not an option. 152

India and Pakistan both agreed to this U.N. resolution, but failed to

abide by

it

strictly

by retaining military

Kashmir. Pakistan then absorbed

all

151 Hussain, Mushahid, "The Kashmir Issue:

forces

under various guises

the northern areas which

Its

New

Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots

Thomas, ed..
Westview Press, 1992:345.
152 Korbel, 1951:113-115.
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it

in

had

International Dimensions", in Raju

of Confli ct in

South Asia, Boulder:

captured during the war. The northern areas which were around the

Chinese and Soviet Unions' borders were administered by a cabinet

Kashmir

officer, whilst the rest of

is

Kashmir. Meanwhile, India absorbed the

and accorded
Included in

it

a special status

this article are

no wonder

that

problems

in the Valley.

accession

was

leader, Sheikh

was

to

legal,

Kashmir under

of opinion right

war did break out and

Azad
its territory,

own

land in

from the onset

of the

there continues to be

their position that the

and supported by both the Maharaja, and the popular
of the National Conference.

be provisional and conditional, until

determine the future of the

offered

as

at a later stage in this section)

The Indians stand by

Abdullah

Indian government

known

laws that only native Kashmiris can

Given the dramatic differences
it is

rest of

is

under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

Kashmir. (This issue will be discussed

crisis

and

in Pakistan

level

is

by the Indians

state.

One

The accession however

a plebiscite

which would

of the biggest grudges against the

The reason

that such a plebiscite never took place.

why

as to

the plebiscite

ground. They suggest that according

to the

was not held

is

U.N. resolution,

on tenuous

all

Pakistani and

Indian troops should be withdrawn from the Valley before a plebiscite would
to the Indians, the Pakistanis never

be held. But according
troops,

troops

removed

and since they were the aggressor they should have removed
first.

However, Pakistan was

without India removing

its

afraid that

troops then that

Finally, while Pakistan's stated policy has

holding of
plebiscite,

Kashmir

a fair

and impartial

changed

is

tactics,

plebiscite,

and has

for the

if

all

their

their

they removed their troops

was not

a fair position either.

always tended

to

support the

India, after initially supporting the

most part

insisted that the issue of

not open to debate, and Kashmir was therefore not contested

territory.
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Ultimately however, this resulted in no plebiscite being held due to
the intrasingence of both warring parties. India continues to suggest
that
plebiscite

had been held

right after the war,

popularly acceded to India, and knowing

remove

hoping

their troops

by the

further reinforced

fact that at the

to India,

would have no doubt supported
it

tried to

its

fullest extent to

According

Pak war on
the

war

to

However,

the Pakistanis refused to
is

time the popular leader. Sheikh

and given

that he did, the

masses

meet Indian demands. 153
it is

hard to lay blame

either side, yet neither should

itself.

and

his position. Pakistan continues to hold that

Wirsing (1994),

clearly premeditated

neither

this,

legally

such a situation. The Indian opinion

to avert

Abdullah, favored accession

Kashmir would have

a

if

it is

for the first Indo-

have been particularly surprised by

clear that India's intervention in

and any statement

Kashmir was

to the contrary is false.

was Pakistan an innocent bystander

as claimed.

However,

Leaders in both

countries harbored territorial ambitions about, and neither of them had

more than
Kashmir.

the "flimsiest regard" for the peoples, or the wishes of the Raja of
If

aggression was committed in the time prior to accession,

done by both

sides. 154

From

it

was

the onset, neither India nor Pakistan have

allowed for the third option, independence

for

Kashmir.

The Second Indo-Pak War
In 1951, local elections

were

held,

National Conference emerged victorious.

and Sheikh Abdullah and
Bazaz

(1967), a well

his

known

scholar in India, suggests that the alienation of the Kashmiri people began

under Sheikh Abdullah himself, who practiced undemocratic and

153 Thomas, 1992:. 25.

154wirsing, 1994:53.

74

intimidatory politics.
the Indian army.

Opposition parties were silenced, with the
collusion of

Since at this time Sheikh Abdullah

was

still

on good terms

with the Indian National Congress, he could rely
on the support of the
Center. Therefore,

it

was

the

aim of the

rulers to liquidate,

and not convert

However, simultaneously with these repressive measures,

critics.

Abdullah government also engaged
reforms.

It

was hoped

in several political

that such reforms

would

the

and economic

restore the state to normalcy

and they could abandon repressive measures. However, the
suppression

made people more

and the more they opposed the regime

resentful

more

the

draconian measures were used to suppress the people. This further
alienated

Given

the people.

that this suppression occurred with the covert blessing of

the Central government, the anger of the people

toward the

state

directed not only

government, but also toward the Center

perhaps an opportune time

uphold

was

civil liberties

for the Indian leaders to stand

and human

do so began the process

155
.

This

was

by democracy and

rights in the state, however, their failure to

of alienation.

This alienation coupled with the rising tide of Hindu revivalism
created sufficient concern in the valley of Kashmir. 156

Hindu fundamentalism and
Abdullah

was key
1952.

to

do

a volte face

in turning the

Kashmir, began

and turn against the government
of

rising

Hindu communalism,

the

of India.

Hindus

What

of

government and launched several

in the time

Prem Nath, Kashmir in Crucible.
156 Bazaz, 1967:66.

anti-

between 1949-1952. Several Dogra

Hindus were arrested during such movements. However,

155 Bazaz,

this rising

Abdullah was an incident which occurred

to rise against the

government movements

was

the actions of the center which forced Sheikh

mind

Encouraged by the

It

New

75

Delhi:

Pamposh

in 1952, after

Publications, 1967:65.

in

pressure by the Indian media, a substantial number of
these activists were
freed.

However, none

of the

made Sheikh Abdullah
by the center were

and he now

Kashmir.

in

when

complicated

freed.

This

started

working against the

from the United

At

this

time not only were events further

Pakistan joined the South-East Asian Treaty Organization

which alarmed India because Pakistan now had support

in 1954

States in terms of

arms and

aid,

but additionally, the

and growing dissension between Abdullah and

alienation

were

Delhi and Nehru were growing increasingly concerned with
the

developments

(SEATO)

jail

perhaps the ideas of secularism espoused

realize that

a farce,

also in

157

government.

New

Muslims who were

the interests of the

Central government were marked. India, at this time abandoned the offer of
a plebiscite

because

it

claimed that such a treaty between Pakistan and the

United States changed the regional circumstances. However,

make such

a link

the reason

Nehru withdrew

counter this

new

is

not particularly clear. 158

alliance,

how

India can

But some scholars suggest that

his offer of a plebiscite

was not merely

but merely because of increased domestic

pressures on him, which included the rise of

to
political

communal groups which

way

demanded

that

states. 159

Simultaneously, the relationship between Abdullah and Nehru

had

Kashmir not be treated

started to sour,

and the

latter

in a

from other

could not count on Abdullah's

unwavering support. The Kashmiri people had
India,

different

started to turn

away from

and more toward independence.
At

this time,

Mohammed,

one of Abdullah's lieutenants, Bakshi Ghulam

with the support from the Central government wrenched

157 Bazaz, 1967:67-68.
158 Thomas, 1992:24.
159 Cheema, 1992:100.
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control of the party.

It

has been suggested in some

circles that

Abdullah had

seriously criticized India's policy towards
Kashmir merely in order to obtain

more resources from

India.

Some

others suggest that Abdullah

was

truly

disconcerted by the actions of the Center and could
not continue to support
it.

Nevertheless, with encouragement from Delhi, which

was

still

sore over

Abdullah's inflammatory remarks, Bakshi had Abdullah
arrested, and seized
control.

Under

the

new

further intensified.

leader Bakshi

Ghulam Mohammed,

was

repression

Citizens could be arrested without grounds, and could
be

detained for a period of 5 years, released and then re-arrested. In
addition,

Bakshi created a Peace Brigade which was the vehicle with which to
silence
the opposition, and imposed heavy restrictions on state press, ordained
that

public meetings could not be held for political purposes unless they

supported the ruling party! Elections which were held
rigged, and Bakshi and his

men

in 1957

and 1962 were

unsurprisingly won. There were also

several other measures to curtail the

autonomy

of the state

which included

an extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, transfer of services

from the

state

list

to the

Union

list etc. 160

Furthermore, with the dismissal of the Abdullah government, there

were many

dissatisfied sectors in the

Kashmiri populace. This led

formation of the Plebiscite Front. In order to deal with
Central government introduced

many

to the

this situation, the

repressive and undemocratic

measures by placing unpopular government

at the

helm

of matters.

The

Central government also engaged in a policy of appeasement in order to

quieten the people. The concessions included several arbitrary quotas,

permits and contracts. During this period, the Central assistance

160 Bazaz, 1967:69-71.
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to

Kashmir's Five year plan rose

to 9 7%!

Interesting to note

that while for other state's central assistance

and 10%

loan, for Kashmir,

it

was

in the

was

in the

however

is

the fact

form of 90% grant,

form of 70% loan and 30%

grant.

This would ensure that Kashmir would constantly be
in a situation of being

unable

to

pay back the debt and

set

it

into a cyclical

dependent relationship

with the center. 161
Additionally, the center did not create long term employment

generating avenues for the population, instead,
single largest generator of

was

this

grew

vertically

set in place

and

also gave legitimacy to several undemocratic regimes.

a greater constitutional

and

legal integration

and these measures lacked both

state,

was

It

continued to remain the

employment. These processes were

through the large Indian bureaucracy, and
horizontally.

it

political

There

between the center and the

and moral legitimacy. 162

therefore a small class of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen

It

who

controlled the society in Kashmir.

The actions by Bakshi were noticed with alarm by Nehru. However,

was not much he could do about

there

remarkably quiet since he realized that
contain the Kashmiri people.

Nehru

of resignation,

now
be

hopeful that

so.

Bakshi

was

was perhaps

in 1963

seized the opportunity.

civil liberties

Jammu and

long as finally under great
these riots

and therefore he remained

this

However,

would be

somehow managed

Prime Minister of

it,

The people

own

of

the theft of a sacred

to

However,

this

was not

to

protege, Shamsuddin, as
to last for

broke out. The immediate cause

relic,

offer

Kashmir were

Kashmir. This was however not

stress, riots

way

when Bakshi made an

restored.

to place his

the only

the Hazratbal,

for

which was allegedly

161 Punjabi, Riyaz, "Kashmir: The Bruised Identity” in Raju G.CThomas, ed. Perspectives on
Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992:142.

162 Punjabi, 1992:142.
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a

piece of hair from the Prophet

Mohammed's

head.

However, the

mysterious disappearance, and then reappearance of

and the government was overthrown,
under G.M. Sadiq.
there

was hoped

It

would be some

that

to

this relic, incited riots,

be replaced by a

new government

under the new government, Sadiq,

positive changes, but instead the extension of Articles

356 and 357 to Kashmir further limited the autonomy of the

angered the Kashmiris. Erosion of Article 370 occurred

announced
Kashmir.
therefore

that Article 357

and Article 365 would

in

states,

1964

and

when

India

also be applicable to

This eroded Kashmir's special status in the Indian union, and

was viewed

as a betrayal both

by Pakistan and by Kashmiris

themselves. 163
This alienated the Muslims

hold them

down by

Sadiq was dissolved
(that

is,

force.
in

who now

believed that India wanted to

Additionally, the National Conference under

1965 in order to

the National Conference

was

to

make room

for the

Congress party

be replaced by the Congress party).

This further angered the Muslims of the state for

whom

the National

Conference held a symbolic meaning of freedom. The National Conference

had enjoyed glorious

traditions,

and evoked patriotism, and

sacrifice.

Therefore, the abolition of this party alienated the Muslims even further,

and

a peaceful integration

with India was more and more impossible. 164

Furthermore, the games played by the center in terms of propping up

governments which would support the center made the democratic
in

Kashmir seem

a

little

unbelievable.

longer supporting the Congress, he

by the corrupt and inept Bakshi.

When

project

Sheikh Abdullah was no

was thrown out

of

power

to

be replaced

Bakshi's actions, though clearly intolerable.

163 Cheema, 1992:105.
164 Bazaz, 1967:91-93.
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were tolerated by the center

until

it

them. Bakshi was promptly thrown

realized that he
in

jail,

to

was no longer

be replaced by Sadiq

supported the Congress. These moves by the center
were key
the population

and ensured

of use to

that integration with India

who

also

in alienating

was become more

unattainable, as democracy looked rather elusive.

Various other meetings to resolve
1950

were held through the

this conflict

with no concrete, peaceful resolutions being passed. Being
constantly

s

down by

turned

India, the then President of Pakistan,

other strategies to capture Kashmir.

Ayub Khan

He supported China

turned to

in the traumatic

Sino-Indian war of 1962. However, more importantly, he decided that
military action

was

the only

way

to seize

Kashmir.

action called "Operation Gibraltar". This operation

phases. The

To

test

called

first

of

Kutch

war over such an
the

in Gujarat.

As

two

skirmishes in a region

The Indians refusing

to

be drawn into a

unstrategic area, referred the matter to the U.N.

Ayub Khan

internal rebellion.

into

in January, 1965.

However,

in sight. 165

September 1965, Pakistan launched the second phase

Gibraltar".

this

was divided

Khan embarked on border

end of the problem was not
In

formulated a plan of

phase of the operation was commenced

Indian resistance,

Rann

He

of "Operation

sent Pakistani guerrillas into Kashmir to trigger an

yet another cease-fire

was being arranged by

the U.N.,

time India broke the rules and sent a counter-offensive further south on

the Pakistani border.

Meanwhile, both U.

S.

and

Britain, highly upset

over

the deteriorating situation in the subcontinent, cut off arms shipments to

both India and Pakistan. After another meaningless and indecisive war, yet
another U.N. resolution was passed by the Security Council, with U.S.,
British,

and U.S.S.R support,

calling for

165 Ganguly, 1990:60.
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an immediate withdrawal of troops

by both India and Pakistan.

In February 1966, a peace conference

Tashkent, in Soviet Central Asia, under Soviet funding.

Agreement restored
cease-fire line in

the India-Pakistani international

Kashmir hoping

for

an end

was held

at

This Tashkent

boundary and the

to the long

and dreary

conflict. 166

Peace was short-lived. In 1971, war broke out yet

for the third

successive time between the two bellicose and uncompromising
nations.

This time the issue did not deal directly with Kashmir, but involved
Pakistan's eastern wing. East Pakistan. India decided to help the
Bengali
nationalists

emergence

to secede

of Bangladesh.

Kashmir,

conflict in

differences
conflict as

who wanted

it

from Pakistan. The war resulted with the

Although

this

was nevertheless

between Pakistan and

war saw only

limited military

crucial in further cementing the

While India saw

India.

its

role in the

merely "helping" out a distressed group of people, Pakistan saw

India's complicity as a direct threat to Pakistan,

and the desire

for India to

eliminate Pakistan. Certainly both sides do have merits, yet this only further

exacerbated the differences between the two parties for

was becoming more

of an

adumbration than

whom

reconciliation

a reality.

Post-Simla Accord
In 1972, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India and Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan,
to try

and

settle the issue

an agreement which

is

once and

for

met

all.

their differences

an Indian

hill resort,

They signed the "Simla Accord",

the basis for argument even today.

paragraph of the agreement stated that
settle

in Simla,

The second

"the two countries are resolved to

by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by

166 Bird wood: 1956:58.
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any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon by them."
reads this paragraph to

Kashmir without

mean

that both countries

While India

resolve the issue of

a third party arbitrator, Pakistan insists that such an

interpretation

was unacceptable because

repudiates

national sovereignty.

its

would

167

it

limited

its

choices,

and therefore

Despite varying interpretations of the Simla Agreement, the period

between the Simla Agreement and 1983 was

relatively quiet.

Of key

importance in these quieter years was the re-entry of Sheikh Abdullah

to

power. In 1975, he signed an accord with Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister
of India,

who upon

the death of Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri, took

over power. Abdullah returned to power after almost twenty years of being

away from

politics.

Having signed

the Simla accord with the Pakistani

government, the Indians had received

government
countries

that

it

would not use

would meet again

was

who

Legislature of the State of

and

two

Jammu and

Union

Bill. ..receives

of India"

and

Jammu and Kashmir
Jammu and

that "no

seeking to

with

(President of India's) assent."

which disrupted the sovereignty

of India.

law made by the

make any change

Kashmir.. .shall take effect

Also the Indian

Parliament would continue to have power to make laws

alive.

that the

for India to re-open negotiations

constitution of the state of

unless the

force in Kashmir,

signed an agreement with Delhi in 1975 that Kashmir

a "constituent unit of the

in. ..the

guarantee from the Pakistani

for a "final settlement of

Kashmir." 168 This was the time
Sheikh Abdullah,

a

to

prevent

In return. Article 370

activities

was kept

Furthermore, the Congress Chief Minister, Syed Mir Qasim resigned

167 Ganguly, 1990:62.

has been a
168varshney, Ashutosh, "Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir
in Sou th
Conflict
of
Problem" in Raju G.CThomas, ed. Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots
Asia. Boulder:

Westview

Press, 1992:217.
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and Abdullah succeeded him. This negotiation did
not lead

to

any

significant protest in the Valley.

Furthermore, elections in 1977, further

legitimated Abdullah

and he won overwhelmingly. 169

s

position,

Post-1982

Such

tranquillity continued

and upon

son Farooq Abdullah took over and
fervor.

He

leadership.
control.

won

his death in 1982, Abdullah's

the 1983 elections with great

challenged not only the Congress party but also

He was

its

central

seen to be the beacon of hope against central government

way, Farooq galvanized the Kashmiris, and succeeded

In this

satisfying the long suppressed hatred of the central government.

in

Farooq

aligned himself with national opposition parties and formed the Opposition

Conclave. However, this was the time of Mrs.Gandhi's centralizing drive,

where she sought

to

undermine several

opposition, and placed her

own

state

governments ruled by the

stooges in power. Defections were

encouraged. Since Farooq was not in favor with the Congress, and was
actually rousing popular sentiment against the Congress, on the grounds of

national security and in a display of power.
principle, ousted

power.

Farooq and placed

G.M

New

Shah, a Congress supporter, in

This happened with defections being engineered by the Central

government, and

group of twelve National conference

a

Shah and supported by the Congress, formed
in 1986,

Delhi violated the federal

Shah was no longer seen

deposed and

a

new

169v ars hney, 1992 218
:

to

be

a

legislators, led

by

new government. However,

in the national interest, so

he was

accord was signed between Farooq and the Rajiv Gandhi

.
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He was

government.
face

and signed an

then replaced again by Farooq

a volte

alliance with the Congress. 170

These series of incidents were traumatic

to the

although Farooq had been popularly elected,

Firstly,

who had done

people of Kashmir.

when he was

threat to the government, he

was immediately dismissed by

the flimsy excuse that he

a threat to national security.

was

not indicative of democratic practices at work. To

make

defection of Farooq to sign a deal with the Congress

seen as a

the Center on

Clearly this

was

matters worse, the

made

the Kashmiri

people more angry.

The events between 1983-1989 culminated

in riots in 1989

with the

rigging of elections. Already disheartened by the turn of events concerning

Farooq, and the obvious disregard of the central government of democratic
principles, the rigging of the 1989 elections

ended the tolerance

of the

Kashmiri people.
Several Islamic groups had been in existence since independence.

However, they were not

really a potent force in elections.

of the largest groups, the Jamaat-i-Islami
elections,

1

in 1978,

and none

in 1983. 171

had won only 5

and the growing fundamentalisation

power

of such

was

seats in the 1972

However, with the

center

election

For example, one

of the Islamic

activities of the

movement,

the

groups was growing. In 1987 new elections were held, and

crucial in determining the turn of Kashmiri politics.

group, the Muslim United Front had gained momentum.

this

A new

The Mulsim

United Front (MUF) was a conglomeration of various small opposition
groups.

However,

in opposition

was

the National Conference under Farooq

and the Congress. They successfully rigged

170 Punjabi,1992:148
171 Varshney, 1990:220.
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the elections and

won

overwhelmingly. This disenchanted the people, and
following lack of funds

and other economic problems, erupted

The reaction
the Muslims.

in 1989. 172

to this blatant violation of democratic
principles

Some

of the candidates from the

MUF

angered

then went on to join

various extremist groups. Later on that year, Muslim
fundamentalists

burned the Indian

and

flag,

called

Farooq a

traitor,

intensified with the suppression of these riots.

and anti-Farooq sentiment

However, with Congress

support, Farooq continued to rule without legitimacy. The sanctity
of the
electoral process

was

at

Interestingly, this
revival.

an

all

was

time low.
also the time

India's response to the uprisings

1983-1991, according to Varshney (1990),

nationalism,which led to

when

have been

was

a rekindling of

Rao

is

The years

of

Kashmiri nationalism. The
to

do no

better than previous

Political conservatives within India tend to limit the options

of the ruling party,

oppose any

brutal. 173

the time of abusive secular

Congress under Narasimha Rao has managed
governments.

Pakistan had a military

and

this

has been no exception. Such conservatives

sort of concessions to the separatists.

under jeopardy

as there are different

Within the Congress

dynamics and

itself,

politics of

dissension within the Congress. 174
India has increasingly suffered from internal political
rising inter-caste tensions,

mosque

issue.

crisis

and the Hindu Muslim tension over

including

the

Ayodhya

This led to the eventual dissolution of the V.P. Singh

administration which had pledged a "military defense" of Kashmir, and was

unwilling to allow for neutral surveillance. In

Kashmiris from Azad crossed over

May

1990, thousands of

to the Indian side,

172 Punjabi, 1990:150.
173 Varshney, 1990:221.

174wirsing, 1994:170.
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and almost started

another war, but

this

was

also defused.

However,

in the

once again some gunmen killed a leading Kashmiri
leading to increased rioting. This

was

government. 175

to

cleric,

of 1990

Maulvi Farooq

further suppressed brutally

Indian army, further alienating the Muslims.

government was dismissed

summer

by the

Subsequently, the Singh

be taken over by the Chandrashekhar

However, no government has been

able to handle this

explosive issue which has a circular politics of alienation.

One
Hindus.

of the major impacts of this uprising has

While the militants claim

government claims
to

have

a

this is

that the militants

complete and

unanimously secede

to Pakistan.

of

government-sponsored, the

have engaged

total majority of

been the mass exodus

Muslims

in ethnic cleansing so as

in the areas

Anywhere from

who

will then

150,000-200,000 Kashmiri

Pundits have fled the Valley. 176

The Militant Groups

A

very important set of actors

groups that are present. There are
only one

is

pro-independence, the

in this conflict is the various militant

six identified militant groups, of

Jammu and

which

Liberation Front (JKLF).

The

other five, the Hizb-ul Mujahideen, A1 Jehad, A1 Barq, Ikhwan ul-

Musalmeen and A1 Umar Mujahideen
membership

is

all

pro accession. 177 Active

estimated at 5,000 while India claims that there are an equal

number attempting
all

are

to cross the border.

the different groups

178

It is

which are present, none

interesting to note that out of

of

them considers accession

175 Malik, Iftikhar, H., "The Kashmir Dispute: A Cul-de-Sac in Indo-Pak relations", in Raju
G.CThomas, ed. Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia. Boulder:

Westview

Press, 1992:312.

176 Wirsing, 1994:141.
177 Wirsing, 1994:141.
17 ® Ganguly, 1990:62.
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to India.

Certainly, this goes to demonstrate the absolute
unacceptance of

India as the country with which they desire to be
associated.

Of

the

six,

groups

and

is

the

first

two, the JKLF and the

The JKLF espouses

in the Valley.

more popular

of the two, but the

patronized by Pakistan, and

is

HMJK,
a

most important

more moderate brand

HMJK
more

therefore

are the

of Islam,

considered to be better

is

and

effective,

feared. 179

The

violence between the groups themselves has been troublesome and has

supplied India with numerous opportunities for playing one off against

New

another.

Delhi was however ineffectual in using the divide and rule

strategy as espoused by the British between the

HMJK. 180

Irrespective of

militants,

though voicing

lives for

any other

is

fled the valley

if

not more, of Kashmiri Pundits and Kashmiri

fled the valley.

between 1990 and 1993

same period

Government

concede that the

has been estimated that somewhere between 150,000-200,000

Kashmiri Pundits have

the

to

JKLF and

a just cause, but they also take along with them,

the lives of an equal number,
It

one has

rival groups,

their strong views, are sacrificing not only their

what they believe

Muslims.

factor,

two

is

A

total of 37,058

Hindu

alone, with the death

toll

families have
of

Hindus

for

about 350. 181 Given that these are figures released by the

of India,

rather conservative,

it

can be surmised that these figures are probably

and there are probably

a lot

more

casualties.

Causes of the Kashmir Conflict

Varshney suggests
revivals.

at least four factors for ethnic

These include the

fact that several ethnic

and

nationalist

groups cut across various

international boundaries, or spread across regional boundaries with another

179wirsing, 1994:132.
180 Kadian, 1993:150.
181wirsing, 1994:150. (Source: Ministry of

Home
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Affairs,

Government

of India)

state.

These groups when clamoring

repression.
stories

engineered to promote their cause. Thirdly, weapons of deadly

mass

technology imparts a
to the case of
It

lies

be together are objects of national

Secondly, partisan leaders reconstruct histories with
selective

potential are in

apply

to

availability.

Fourthly, the spread of informational

new emotional

intensity 182 All four of these factors
.

Kashmir.

has been overwhelmingly suggested that

three

at the core of the conflict

main problems. Religious nationalism represented by

Pakistan,

secular nationalism by India and ethnic nationalism in the identity of

Kashmiriyat

183
.

In addition to the above factors,

have been suggested as important contributors

some other

in the state 184
.

and

which

to the conflict are the potent

combination of the heavy handedness of the Center, rigged
Pakistan's involvement,

factors

elections,

also a result of the history of separatist politics

Certainly none of the above factors singularly determined

the course of action, but

it is

my

contention that

if

not for the actions of the

center which have been neither secular nor democratic, the existence of the

current crisis in Kashmir
(i)

Partition:

One

The

would be

British Factor

of the causes of the current crisis in

when

time during independence
partition.

seriously in doubt.

There are

many

Kashmir

different ideas surrounding the British influence

were

British favored the

imperialistic policy of Divide

Muslims following the old

attributed to the

controversy surrounded the entire issue of

during partition. Some scholars suggest that the

therefore the British

is

and Rule, and

183
directly responsible for partition itself
.

182varshney, 1992:192.
183varshney, 1992:196.
184 Wirsing, 1994:118.
185 Callard, Keith, Pakistan's Foreign Policy:

An

88

Interpretation,

New

York, 1957:14-15.

However, more popular

is

the view that partition occurred mostly because
of

the intrasingence of both the Congress and the

Muslim League,

therefore

absolving the British of any blame and placing the reason for partition

within India

186
.

Aside from the issue of partition

handled the issues surrounding partition
scrutiny.

It

was

187
.

188
.

This

made

who

felt

that such a bias

the issue of

Kashmir

a

more

for.

doubt, the conflict even in the incipient stages was only part of the

problems facing India. The question of Pakistan's aggression

beginning
place

the British

India retained control of

if

This no doubt angered the Pakistanis

important one to fight

larger

way

has come under considerable

would have preferred

unfair and detrimental to them.

No

the

has been suggested that Lord Mountbatten was not particularly

impartial in the issue, and

Kashmir

itself

itself,

is

inextricably linked to the fraudulent accession

in the

which took

Pakistan claims that long before the events leading up to the

Security Council resolution, and Pakistani troops had entered the state, the

people of Kashmir had revolted against the monarch, and created what

now known

as

Azad Kashmir. According

Singh had no right to accede

to

him

189
.

However,

ground because merely because

some

scholars,

Maharaja Hari

anyone, either India or Pakistan, because long

before he had lost his sovereignty,
revolt against

to

is

when people

clearly this

in the area

argument

is

a people revolt does not

the land has lost his sovereignty over them.

had

on highly tenuous

mean

Clearly, this

risen in

the ruler of

argument

is

not

entirely persuasive.

186piHai, K. Raman, The Political Triangle.

New

Delhi:

187wirsing, 1994:47.
188 Beg, Aziz, The Wailing Vale. Lahore: Babur and
189 Beg, 1969:157.
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Young

Amer

India Publications, 1970:20.

Publications, 1969:156.

Additionally, one of the criticisms leveled against
Nehru

apparent unacceptance of the very creation of Pakistan.
historically

Nehru never accepted

have said "one day integration
ten tears-

I

the

It is

is

his

alleged that

two nation theory and was reported

will inevitably

do not know." Furthermore, he

is

come.

It

supposed

will

be

in four, five,

have said

to

to

that,

"Indo-Pakistan confederation remains our ultimate aim." 190 This
has for

long been a grudge against not only Nehru, but against most Indians.
This

seeming unacceptance of the existence

some way.

Therefore, since

and Kashmir was indicative
been
(ii)

bone

a

of contention

of Pakistan, threatens Pakistan in

Nehru challenged

the very existence of Pakistan,

of the secular project in India,

between the two warring

it

for long has

parties.

Cold War Alliances

The global cold war has

also affected the status of Kashmir.

Conditions which preceded the second war between India and Pakistan

in

1965 were different. By this time, both India and Pakistan had acquired
military

equipment from the United

in line with cold

communism
arms and
agenda

war

in the area,

aid.

U.N
the

and therefore supported Pakistan by providing

of the Indian government,

to

and the Soviet Union. Keeping

United States was fearful of Chinese

The Western countries were

Additionally,

tended

loyalties, the

States

fearful of the

and India was seen

to

proclaimed

be pro-communist.

Western leaders piqued by Nehru's non-alignment

support Pakistan and therefore did not support India

Security Council meetings.

West opposed

socialist

India, took

up

in

any of the

Likewise, the Soviet Union, merely because
India's cause. 191

190 Beg, 1969:176.
191 Rizvi, Gowher, "India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Problem" in Raju G.CThomas, ed.
Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, Boulder: Westview Press,
1992:54.
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Rizvi states that initially Nehru's

commitment

to the plebiscite

was

genuine, but he succumbed to domestic pressures as well
as foreign pressures
created by the Cold

For example,

when

Nehru believed
withdrew

war

192

(This has been discussed earlier

.

on

Pakistan signed the South East Asian regional treaty,

that this treaty affected regional security,

his offer of a plebiscite).

Therefore, the cold

and therefore

war was an important

factor in determining the continuation of the crisis in Kashmir.

shown, the support of Pakistan by the West, and

the Security Council decisions, India

was supported by

(iii)

was supported by

to Pakistan

the Soviets, while

angered the Indians and made them

hostile to reaching a settlement with the

government

of Pakistan.

Internal Politics

The existence and continuance

of the crisis can also be traced

internal politics of both the warring nations.

patterns

coming

show
to

that

most

As

far as

Pakistan

politicians use this issue as the crucial

is

to the

concerned,

pawn

in

power. The minute any Pakistani politician shows any sign of

wavering on the issue
loses popular support.

(as
It

propaganda was the issue
on

conflict, as in

the United States. Additionally, the fact that the

United States was giving aid

more

As has been

therefore, the Soviet

support of India, was a factor in the early stages of the Kashmir

Pakistan

in the paper.

India, the

Benazir Bhutto was often accused of doing), he/she

may

be then derived that one main issue of election

of Kashmir,

more secure they were

and the more harsh the

politician

of obtaining the popular vote.

was

In

addition, Pakistan's historical claim to Kashmir, (based on the fact that

Kashmir's large Muslim population rightfully belong with
Pakistan), forms the Pakistani platform.

192 Rizvi, 1992:74.
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their brethren in

On

the Indian front, initially,

Nehru was

attacked by

communal

politicians in the 1950s.

This reinforced Sheikh Abdullah's beliefs that

Kashmir would never be

safe

for

under

India's control,

and he

started to lobby

independence. This desire was further fueled when various sectarian

political parties

which included the newly formed Jana Sangh,

Mahasabha, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, (RSS) and
joined hands with the

communalist group

Jammu

to reverse

the

Hindu

the Akali Dal

Praja Parishad, another Kashmiri

Kashmir's autonomous status in the early

1950s. 193

Furthermore, over time, India's politicians have also been using the
issue to

win

elections,

and using

communal war

this

convincing a majority of the Hindu population that

cry have succeeded in
it is

imperative to

reconsider the special status given to not only Kashmir, but also to Muslims
as a whole.
liberates,

it

This has resulted in threats to the Pakistanis that

runs the risk of hurting 30 times as

There

is

an interesting dichotomy.

central reason proving India's secularity.

Kashmir,

yet,

on the other hand

letting

On

argument given by Hindu

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
it

is

that

if

many Muslims

the one hand,

Pakistan
as

it

saves. 194

Kashmir

is

a

Therefore, India needs to retain

go of Kashmir could signify

of a greater magnitude, including a possible

traditional

if

Hindu

a tragedy

backlash. 195 The

nationalist parties such as the

Kashmir

is

to secede to Pakistan

has a Muslim majority population then Pakistan must be willing

because

to also

196 These internal politics where
accept the other Muslims of India as well.

193 Rizvi, 1992:54.
194 Varshney, 1992:200.
195 Varshney, 1992:203.
196 Thomas, 1992:14.
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there has been a revitalization of the
fear of the minorities),
(iv)

have succeeded

(in contrast to the

in exacerbating the conflict.

Center-State Relations

Contrary

Kashmir
the

Hindu movement,

is

popular conception

to

in India that the current crisis in

motivated by Pakistan, there

problem

in

Kashmir

is

is

revolt. 197

The

who

are guilty of "political

"violence and brutality" in the state,

crisis in

prove that

not one of sponsored terrorism. Instead, one can

assign blame squarely to the Indian leaders

mismanagement" and

sufficient evidence to

Kashmir did not occur because

of

which

any one

led to the
political

event or mishap, but was created by undue interference by the Center in the
state. 198

The lack

communal

of democratic principles in the form of rigged elections,

politics

and over-centralization

of the Center has led to the

conflict.

There

is

no denial

of the fact that there exists a corrupt hierarchical

structure of Center-State relations.

As

stated

by

Balraj Puri,

"New

Delhi's

policy on Kashmir has been vacillating from one extreme to another; from

complete trust of

its

people to complete distrust, from treating them as

special category to treating

of the Center in

New

them

as colonial subjects."

199

a

The determination

Delhi, especially under Indira Gandhi, and her son,

Rajiv Gandhi, to obtain complete control, and subsequent regionalization of
states has

been well documented. The Congress

(I)

under the Gandhi's

constantly forged questionable alliances with leaders in the states where the

Congress

(I)

did not have a substantial constituency. Evidence of

clearly seen in the alliance in 1986

between the Congress

(I),

this

and the National

Conference. In addition, in the elections of March 1987, the coalition

197wirsing, 1994:115.

198varshney, 1992:208.
199 Puri, Balraj, Economic and

Political Weekly,

93

February

8,

1986:245.

can be

between the Congress
process,

and the National Conference rigged the

(I),

and ruined the chances

of the

Muslim United

and absolute deceit convinced the Kashmiris, and
had no regard whatsoever

compromise the

willing to

Almost every
and

to

rights

for

some

Front.

election

This trickery,

rightly so, that the Center

democracy, and ethical practices, and were

interests of the state for fulfillment of their goals.

election in

Kashmir has been rigged except the 1977 one

extent the 1983 elections.

under Articles 19 and 22

Additionally, until 1979, fundamental

of the Indian constitution

which guaranteed

basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech, protection against arbitrary
arrest etc., did not

apply

to

Kashmir.

Subsequently, the 1987 election in

Kashmir was rigged, and there was fraud combined with repressive

tactics.

Article 370 of the Indian constitution limited the state's accession to

defense, foreign affairs and communications.

However, other provisions

could only be extended with the concurrence of the state government.

However,
1986, the

this

concurrence was instead installed though rigged

Governor of the

government, "concurred"

state,

to

Jagmohan, appointed by the

of the

In

central

extend Article 249 to Kashmir, which gave the

Parliament the right to legislate even a matter pertaining to the

on the resolution

polls.

Upper House

state,

merely

of Congress in India, the Rajya Sabha.

This denied the autonomous position of the Kashmiris as promised by

Nehru. To make matters worse,

this

was done

in secret. 200

This weakening of India's institutions (except the growing Center)

evidenced by the power

politics exercised

by the Gandhi regime, where

governments which did not support the Center were toppled, the
effective channel of voicing discontent etc.,

,

lack of a nation

local

lack of an

wide leadership,

200 Noorani A.G., "The Betrayal of Kashmir: Pakistan's Duplicity and India's Complicity",
Co nflict in South Asia,
in Raju G.CThomas, ed. Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of
Boulder: Westview Press, 1992:272.
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and growing corruption have negated

and have

certainly

it

to

make

Center could

would

Kashmir.

somehow

retain control of Kashmir.

of the Congress ensured that the Congress

inroads in states where the party lacked a constituency
and

dubious alliances were forced
an example of

in

Kashmir

in

also suffered several routs in several

vitally necessary to

The steady organizational decline
ought

democracy

slowed the process of normalization

The Congress party which has
state elections find

the existence of

The Congress-Conference

.

alliance of 1987

was

These elections demonstrated two things. One, the

this.

over the power of a state and had

at will take

resort to unfair electoral practices.

This

was

little

morality and

therefore indicative of

the lack of faith in democratic principles and federalism. Therefore, with

channels of democracy thwarted, the Kashmiri dissidents

insurgency was the only

way

felt

that

an

they could respond to the Center's unfair and

undemocratic practices. 201
(v)

Religion:
It

The Hindu-Islam Dichotomy

has been suggested that Hinduism

may

be

less of a

potent factor to

hold various Indian ethnic groups together, as a religion such as Islam can

because while the former
centralized faith. 202

Islam,

as the true faith, while

philosophy than a

is

a decentralized religion, Islam
is

a monotheistic religion,

Hinduism

religion.

separation of Church and

is

Hinduism

is

a

more

which perceives

a pantheistic religion,

Therefore,

is

more

more

itself

of a

inclined to the

state.

In the ideas of the founding fathers, including Gandhi, there

was an

innate belief in tolerance and accommodation of other religious beliefs.

Ganguly, Sumit, "The Prospects of War and Peace in Kashmir", in Raju G.CThomas,
Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia. Boulder: Westview
20)1

Press, 1992:357.

202 Thomas,1992:9.
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ed.

Nehru

strongly believed in the separation of church and state and
saw that as

an essential prerequisite for any modern

encompassing nature

of

state. 203

However,

Hinduism has been perceived

this all

as a threat

by other

religions

which

religion.

This capacity of Hinduism to view other religions as merely

feel as

though

offshoots of their religion

is

this

acceptance denies the legitimacy of their

a problem.

However, Hinduism cannot do

Buddhism

Sikhism, Jainism,

odds with each other ever

etc.

Islam what

Clearly Islam and

since the

proselytizing nature of Islam and

to

its

etc.)

have placed

it

in

at

The

of India.

intolerance of the rigidity of

antagonistic relationship with Hinduism.
if

threatens to do to

Hinduism have been

Mughal invasion

(such as in the caste system, idol worship

not be a surprising fact

it

its beliefs,

an

In light of such factors,

it

would

indeed the Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir did

not get along. However, ironically, in the Valley of Kashmir, prior to the
current insurgency, the Muslims and Hindus have historically engaged in a

good

relationship.

The Valley Kashmiri Muslims have been equally

persecuted by Muslim Moghuls and Afghans, and therefore, they were more
secular in their orientation,

making them appear

closer to their

Hindu

However, over time there have been many inroads

counterparts. 204

into

this relationship.

However,

at

one

level, the

Kashmiri

conflict can

be divested as

a

response to the waves of ethnic subnationalism that have swept over India
over the past decade. As recently as January 1990, the Kashmiri language was
stripped of certain key words, and replaced with their Sanskrit (an ancient

Indian language) counterpart. As stated by one political

203xhomas,

1992:12.

204 Thomas, 1992:13.
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scientist,

the roots

of the crisis in Kashmir

in

lie

the Kashmiri’s people's fears
for their national-

cultural identity in the face of the aggressive advance
of the Hindu/Hindi

notion of nationalism in the country ." 205
(vi)

Differences between India and Pakistan

has been suggested that

It

at the heart of the conflict is the differing

ideologies of the pre-partition Indian Congress, and the

Muslim League.

After independence, the British wanted to create a confederal arrangement
of
three parts

-

Pakistan, India

and Bangladesh. This plan was formulated

under the Cabinet Mission Plan of
agreed to
to

push

it,

1946.

Nehru was not amenable

to

However, while Jinnah and Gandhi
such a plan, therefore forcing Jinnah

for his separate country, Pakistan.

For Nehru, the creation of states

based on religious grounds was unacceptable

Muslims

of the All India

nation theory for they

in principle.

Muslim League, they staunchly

felt

that as long as they

were part

However,

for the

believed in the two

of India, they

would

never be treated equally and would always remain the oppressed minority.
For the Indian National Congress, the two nation theory was completely

unacceptable not only because this would imply that the Muslims
left

behind

in India

India's boundaries

scale

would always be

aliens in a hostile country, but also,

would constantly be under

Muslim conversions

to

who were

Muslim majority

threat

if

there

areas. 206

were

to

be large

This basic

fundamental difference between the Muslim League and the Indian
National Congress has always remained

at the

very crux of the conflict in

Kashmir.
For India, Kashmir
effect

would be admitting

205gN, Economic and

Political

is

of vital importance for

that

its

loses Kashmir,

secular project has failed.

Weekly March
,

if it

3,

206 Thomas, 1992:18.
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1990:422.

it

in

The evolution

of

the identity of Kashmiriyat,

which

is

Kashmiri identity which has evolved

a

over a long period of time, and Hindus, Muslims,
Sikhs, Buddhists and even
Christians have contributed to the emergence of this
identity. This unique
identity has allowed for

Valley,

and has

elsewhere.

also

Muslims

made them

Pundits have developed their
in the

of Kashmir, also

own

country

.

identity,

is

it

Muslims cannot

was

However, conversely,

is

is

is

a

sham

is critical

its

it

own

Hindus and

of the hypothesis that the uprising in post

even primarily" the work of Pakistan. 208 This notion

however very popular

in India.

However,

took place, Pakistan participated and took
for the Pakistanis to gain control of

it is

full

once the uprising

clear that

advantage of

it.

The incentive

Kashmir had not diminished

Particularly, in the 1989-90 uprising, there

is

border came in the form of arms, aid and

terrorist training

Additionally, as has been stated before,
if

for Pakistan,

live amicably.

"exclusively, or

Pakistan

different

to legitimate

crucial for the creation of Pakistan since

Wirsing (1994)
1989

Kashmiri

as

which makes them

also needs to prove that India's secular project
existence, that

known

of crucial importance to India to

secular project.

its

in the

207

Therefore, retaining Kashmir

ensure the success of

harmony with Hindus

very different from their co-religionists

Hindus

Similarly, the

from other Hindus

to exist in

the secular project in India

it

since 1947.

evidence that support across the

camps

209

could be of potential significance

fails for

it

would

certainly legitimize,

and make more profound the two nation theory espoused by

the leaders of

Pakistan.
207 Punjabi, 1992:136.
208 Wirsing, 1994:114.
2 ^ 9 Mehta, Jagat, "Resolving

1990s", in Raju

G.CThomas, ed.
Westview Press,

Asia, Boulder:

Kashmir in the International Context of the
Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South
1992:394.
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to

(vii)

Article 370 of the Indian Constitution

According

to Article 370 of the Indian constitution, Kashmir's

relations with the

Government

of India

was

restricted to control over

defense and communications, while other powers were vested

Government

itself.

However, the complete

in the

trivialization of Article 370 of

the Indian Constitution has been an important aspect of the exacerbation
of

the conflict.

The Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party
parties

(Hindu)have been trying

earliest

evidence which supports

when Sheikh Abdullah was

(BJP),

along with certain other key

to constantly repeal this article.
this claim

arrested.

the appointment of the governor

In fact the

can be seen on August

9,

1953,

Subsequently, in more recent times,

Jagmohan

in

January 1990, without

consulting the wishes of the then Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah clearly
delegitimizes the special nature clause attributed to Kashmir.

On

the other side of the debate, this privileged status accorded by

Article 370 to

Kashmir arouses resentment

overwhelming
that

Muslims

feeling

in other states.

amongst the Hindus

There

of India, supported

is

an

by the BJP

of India should not have a separate civil code, as well as

should not have a separate Article
the other states.

On

to give

the other hand, the

it

special

Muslims

powers not enjoyed by

of

Kashmir

feel that

it is

imperative for them to have certain powers, and control over their destiny.
This basic conflict over Article 370

is

an important factor in understanding

the conflict.

99

(viii)

Repression
It is

clear

by the numbers and strength

Kashmiri peoples (an example, on March

1,

of the demonstrations

by the

a million strong procession

passed through the streets of Srinagar demanding independence) 210 that
they definitely do not want to remain as part of India. However, the
Indian

Government

in the

form of the paramilitary, and the Indian army merely

suppresses these peaceful marches by imposing curfews, and indulging

random shoot outs when

these marches do take place.

operations clearly demonstrate that these authorities
peaceful crowds of

unarmed demonstrators.

in

Certain investigative

fire

indiscriminately on

Every Kashmiri Muslim

is

equated with a militant.
India's brutal suppression of the conflict
fact that India

is

amply demonstrated by

the

has deployed almost 350,000 men, including the Army,

paramilitary forces of the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Central

Reserve Police Force (CRPF) in order

to

suppress the revolt.

population of only 2.5 million there are 350,000 armed

mean one armed
There are no

Therefore in a

officers,

which would

Indian military personnel for every 3-4 Kashmiri youth. 211

state personnel involved, for they are seen as sympathetic to

enmity between the forces deployed by

the cause, and additionally, there

is

the Center and the state troops.

Furthermore, the Indians have also invited

armed

Israeli

A
Kashmir

four

commandos.

member team on

visited

paramilitary.

from March

An

behalf of the committee for initiative on

12-16, 1990, to investigate the atrocities of the

excerpt from their report:

210 Bose, Tapan; Mohan, Dinesh; Navlakha, Gautam; Banerjee, Sumanta; Economic and
Political

Weekly,
21

March

Hussain,

31, 1990:650.

1992:346.
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The team found,

in the course of investigation, that these,
abuses (ones of indiscriminate
arbltrar y ari ests ' unlawful searches, unprovoked
assaults on peaceful demonstrators
l
and the complete dislocation of normal life due to
imposition of curfew for months togetheraccompanied by raping, plundering, theft, and harassment)
have been carried out by" the
official law enforcement personnel-the Central Reserve
Police Force, the Border Security
Force, and in certain cases, by the Indian army.
That these cases of blatant violation
of human
rights were not isolated instances
of aberrations, but operative extensions of an official policy
was evident to the team members..."

klU n

'

S'

Almost

all

descriptions of the Indian

foreign visitors as well as

some

army

in

Kashmir, as given by

Indians, report that the

one of occupation. The contrast between the situation
there are

some Sikhs

in the

army

itself,

and

army
in the

in this case,

unquestionably reciprocated

212
.

is

is

nearly complete, and this

is

this alienation.

suppression of the revolt has been brutal, and has

engage

of India's policies in Kashmir.

in legal judicial

punishments

punishments which are truly

is

locals

widen

stark.

is

Punjab where
total

The daily counterinsurgency operations

the paramilitary only seeks to further

condemnation

Kashmir

where there

and complete alienation between paramilitary forces and the
obvious. The distrust of security forces

in

of

The

elicited international

Not only do

the security forces

but

the extra-judicial

for terrorists,

it is

These include revenge

killings,

executions, assassinations, rape, arson, and torture. This fact has been amply

documented by Kashmiri Muslims, Pakistani
importantly, by both Indian and foreign

human

The Government response and control
abysmal and

this

of such activities.

observers, and most
rights

groups

213
.

of such atrocities has been

government inaction amounts

to

government sponsorship

This completes the alienation of the Kashmiri Muslims

from the "democratic" and "secular"

state of India.

The actions

of these

personnel needs to be rewarded with severe disciplinary action, however, the

212wirsing, 1994:154.
213 Wirsing, 1994:158.
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Indian government
defense. 214

needed

also justifies these actions

It

by saying

justifies their actions

by saying

to contain terrorism. Clearly, there

reporting such

facts,

but the

that such actions are

can be exaggeration

Center

fact is the

that the troops act in self

itself

has

all

when

but acknowledged

the excesses of the security forces, and clearly there have been
violation of

human
rights

rights in graphic forms.

is

the

secessionist

norm

in

almost

movements,

libertarian in

New

in

Delhi,

it

all

Given

that torture

of India particularly

and deprivation

when

dealing with

Kashmir, according to a renowned

was

of civil

civil

"absolutely universal" and only

more

"systematic and extreme" than in other parts of India. 215
In the 1989-90 conflict, while lip service
political solution to the

was being paid

problem, the Singh government,

governments before him, sought

to

to find a

like the

Gandhi

suppress the revolt, and to authorize

stronger steps toward counter insurgency, no matter

how

brutal the

execution. 216
(ix)

The Hindu Backlash
The Hindus

of India have always

conditions granted to Kashmir.

Some

further aggravated the Indian public.
jurisdiction of the Indian

felt

threatened by the special

of these

which were passed

in 1952,

These include the highly limited

Supreme Court

in,

a limited applicability of Article

352 of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir. Article 352 states that the
President has a right to declare a state of emergency in case of invasion, or a
threat to the stability of the country.

national defense

was

However, even such an

article, vital for

limited because this could only occur in "at the request

or with the concurrence of the government of the state."
214 Bose, Mohan, Navlakha, Banerjee, 1990:652.
215wirsing, 1994:160.
216 Mehta, 1992:394.
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Additionally, there

was

the use of a distinct flag, while no other state in India

use a separate state

flag,

and

lastly,

had

this right to

the rights of Kashmiris to enjoy

full

fledged rights in the rest of India, while the citizens of India
would have only
limited rights in the state of

been

a potent factor in rising

a serious factor

too

Jammu

many

and. 217 This bias toward Muslims has

Hindu fundamentalism and has

plaguing Indian

therefore been

For one, the Hindus believe that

politics.

far

concessions are given to the minorities, including the Sikhs and

the Muslims,

and such discrimination has not benefited them. Therefore,

extremely concerned, they have lobbied

at all levels to reverse this

discrimination and argue that despite the fact that they are the majority in
India, they are also the ones suffering the most.

with alarm by

all

states

doubt, this

other minorities including the Muslims,

that the secular project in India

Hindu

No

is

most

is

who

viewed

therefore feel

certainly a sham.

nationalist feelings include a strong resentment against the

"pampering" of Muslims, and a generally negative impression of

Muslims, including the suspicion that Muslims had an inherent loyalty
Pakistan, and Pakistan

was engaging

pervasive Hindu nationalist

in terrorist activities in India.

mood which

is

succeeded in further eroding secular values.
notion,

it is

of India's

Article 370, to bring

would back

all

the party's

Given

this

to

Hindu

who

revivalist

states that

"90%

the BJP's election pledge to abolish

of India's states

means

This

distinctly anti-Muslim has only

not entirely improbable to believe Wirsing

Hindus would today back

to

under the constitution of

amend

single civil code." 218

217 Kadian, 1993:108.
218 Wirsing, 1994:166.
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civil

law

to

India,

compel Muslims

and

to a

Economic Causes

(x)

Notwithstanding Article 370, Kashmir has not been treated
any
differently in terms of the

Center-state relations.

become

substantially

hegemonic power structure which determines

As with

other states, the Central government has

more powerful than envisioned

in the Constitution.

has a disproportionate control over finances, taxes, resources
and foreign

By

It

aid.

virtue of the several Five Year Plans organized and executed
by the

Planning Commission since independence, the Center determines
which
state receives aid, the size,

many key

and the

distribution.

Furthermore,

it

controls

administrative, employment-generating services like the Indian

Administrative Service, the Indian Police Service and the Indian Revenue
Service.

each

It

state.

also controls the paramilitary forces

and the governors

office in

This over-centralization has been resisted not only by Kashmir,

but by several other states as well.

However,

hampered

its

specifically to

Kashmir,

this over-centralization

economic growth. In addition

has

to the other political grievances

of the people of Kashmir, these economic controls only serve to exacerbate

the problem.
the

money

is

There

is

an outflow of finances from the

invested out of the state (the credit to deposit ratio

the lowest in the country), there
that

it is

state since

the timber

is

a shortage of electric

and water resources from Kashmir

power

is

most

of

only 36%,

despite the fact

that are

used

for the

rest of the country. 219

Additionally, such discrimination has been historical.

elsewhere

in the thesis,

government

As

stated

following the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah's

in 1953, the center

has engaged in partisan

politics,

and has

controlled the flow of finances to the state in order to retain support.

219 Kadian, 1993:155-156.
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For

example, the central assistance given

to the state

was disproportionately

in

the form of a loan, rather than a grant, in contrast
to the Center’s policies
states. 220

with other

Muslims not only

in

Furthermore there has been discrimination against the
terms of finances, but also in terms of employment.

Overall in India, the Muslims tend to be the poorest sections
of the
population.

The position

The Muslims

of the state have no

government

and

jobs,

of the

Muslims have not improved

more than 13% share

their share in services

is

less

since 1953.

in central

than 6%. 221 This has

long been a point of contention for both the Indian Muslims as well as
Pakistan

who

see this as a failure of the secular project.

Failure of the Secular Project?

Pasha (1992) suggests that the problem with India and secular
principles
that as a

is

was never

that secularism

fully "internalized.” 222

mass ideology, secularism did not manage

communal

monopoly

this

particularly

the Congress

was broad acceptance

by the dominant

political

and

had

a

of secularism

social groups.

begins a decline with the death of Nehru, and exacerbated

under the regime of Indira Gandhi. Indira Gandhi time and

communal

time again used

politics to

maintain power.

in the rise of right-wing religious consciousness

of

But even as a state

Under Nehru, when

of nationalist ideology, there

as part of Indian politics

However,

to retain control as the

character of Indian politics demonstrates.

ideology, secularism has declined.

This means

Nehru including

against

This has culminated

some

of the legacies

affirmative action for the minorities, tolerance for other

220p unjabi, 1992:142.
22 ^Noorani, 1992:272.

222 Pasha, Mustapha Kamal, "Beyond the Two Nation Divide: Kashmir and Resurgent
Islam” in Raju G.CThomas, ed. Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1992:376.
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religions etc 223

Within Kashmir

.

National Conference.
as a result of

own

its

itself,

However with

the proponent of secularism

was

the

the erosion of the National Conference

excesses in complicity with the Congress, the voice
of

secularism has also been losing ground in Kashmir

There has been a

rise in

that the secular nature of

.

224

Muslim fundamentalism,

Kashmir

is

being challenged.

clearly indicating

The mosque now

serves as a place of worship as well as recruiting fundamentalists
and
militants.

The

cultural

and

political

Punjab, have been reinvigorated.
the region also
of

is

dimensions of religious

The exodus

of

life,

many Hindu

wing and fundamentalist Hindu
the RSS.

families

indicative of the failure of the secular project.

moderate Hindus has been allegedly matched by the import

like in the

from

This exodus
of

armed

right

organizations, including the Shiv Sena and

This importation has allegedly been encouraged and instituted by

the Center 225
.

Pasha also suggests that

it is

not the growing fundamentalization of

Islam which has resulted in such a chaotic state in Kashmir. However,
the existing social situation

where the Muslims have been

repressed and disadvantaged position that has
religion.

He

made them

it is

in a continually

turn to their

suggest that the "primordial sense of being and the restricted

code have drawn heavily upon Islam which has always remained the

primary source of identity

have emerged as
certainly not

for

Muslims ." 226 Therefore, fundamentalists

a response to the inexorable social conditions,

something inherent

to the religion itself.

223 Pasha,1992:376.
224 Pasha, 1992:376.
225 Pasha, 1992:377.

226 Pasha, 1992:372.
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and

it is

While the uprising has multiple roots and causes, and ignorance

any one issue

is

not academic,

it is

mismanagement and heavy

clear that the

handedness by the Center has resulted

of

and

in alienation,

a decline in

democratic and secular principles as espoused in the Constitution.

If

the

Center had not engaged in rigging elections continually, or had not brutally

suppressed the uprisings, and had respected the strong individual character
of Kashmiriyat, there

would not have been an erosion

of secular

and

democratic principles, which could have perhaps prevented the escalation of
the conflict.

Conclusion

The
suffered.

conflict has

been phenomenal

Figures for the

number

of

period 1988-1993. (The low figure
figure

by the

militants) 227

only a few thousand are

in the

number

dead range from 6000

Additionally, of the 150,000 Flindus in the Valley,

left.

The others have died

Both Hindus and Muslims

feel

or fled.
at the

On

hands

the other
of the

armed

betrayed by the government. While

"mutilated and defiled" by the government, the Hindus

the

Muslims

feel

"uprooted and betrayed". However, both

feel

to 35,000 in the

given by the government and the high

is

hand, the Muslims constitute a majority of deaths,
forces.

of casualties

feel a great

deal of anger

toward the Center. 228
For India, the issue has marked the erosion of both democratic
principles as well as secularism.
political

The

accommodation with the

rigging elections

etc., in

an

inability of the

terrorists,

effort to

and

Center to reach a

their willingness to resort to

hold power marks an erosion of

227wirsing, 1994:138.
228 Varshney, 1992:222.
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democratic principles.

them

to resort to the

Also, their inability to reach a political solution forces

use of the Army. The

apolitical institution, but

Operation Blue

is

On

Star. 229

fundamentalism has led

to

Army

has so

far

remained an

decreasingly less so, especially in the aftermath of
the secular front, the rising Islamic

anti-Muslim attitudes and violence across the

country.
In order to maintain

its

unity, India

must somehow maintain,

loss of

Kashmir would perhaps mark the beginning

India.

Varshney's (1992) prognosis for India's existence as a secular

democracy

is

perhaps not good. According

polity functions in an

commitment

to

environment of a

democratic

plebiscite to the Kashmiris.
liberalism.
let a

Does liberalism

liberal

of the disintegration of

him, India's secular national

democracy.

liberal principles that

It

was Nehru's

made Nehru

offer

But soon nationalism defined the limits of
also include the

freedom

to secede?

people secede then people are not free to choose their

does concede freedom
for

to

to secede

it

becomes

If it

rulers.

democracy can only function only where

Over

230

does not

But

if it

a "lofty but bloodless principle"

people outside the areas of secession. Therefore, for Varshney, a

constructed

for the

a nation has already

liberal

been

Certainly this seems true in the case of India.

the years, India has constantly accused Pakistan of aiding the

militants in Kashmir.

Although Pakistan formally denies these charges,

there are certain pieces of evidence that demonstrate Pakistani involvement
in the insurgency.

There are certain international press reports which

229 Ganguly, 1992:365.

230varshney, 1992:197.
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suggest existence of sanctuaries for insurgents in Pakistan Occupied, or Azad

Kashmir. 231
India has to

wake up

to the fact that the crisis in

the result of impoverishment,

some

not the result of

democracy

the secular
to abide

unemployment and such

fanatic Islamic fundamentalists

of India.

things.

not solely
equally

It is

who want

2,

to

break up

1947, "...the fate of

ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge

is

is

The problems are within India and India has

by the promise made by Nehru on November

Kashmir

Kashmir

we have

given not only to the people of Kashmir, but to the whole world." 232

New

Delhi also has to realize that a measured and relentless use of force will not

keep the Kashmir Valley within the Indian Union. The
Kashmiri Muslim wants
troops

New

to

no

fact is that

remain part of India. The more

and more

efforts

Delhi sends to Kashmir with the hope of suppressing the

Kashmiri right

to self determination, results in the peoples

with militants, and supporting them. Abhorring the

sympathizing

atrocities that

have

been executed by the Indian troops, the Kashmiri people have no desire
whatsoever

remain with India. The point remains

to

Muslim population, Kashmir can no longer be used

that,

with

its

large

as a litmus test of India's

secular form of government.

By

that

insurgency
Pakistan.

is

same

token, Pakistan should realize that the current

not an automatic indication that Kashmir wants to accede to

This

is

best exemplified

231 Barbara Crossette, “Bhutto

is

by the cry,"We want freedom.’

Dismissed in Kashmir

233

after 20 months,", The

New

York

Times,

Aug 7, 1990:2.
232 GN, "Defending

National Cultural

Identity", Economic

&

Political Weekly,

March

1990:423.

233 Bose, Mohan, Navlakha, Banerjee, "India's Kashmir War", Economic

Weekly,
March 31,

1990:656.
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&

Political

3,

Kashmir has

also

become

a litmus test for patriotism in Pakistan.

Religion

cannot become the only basis by which Pakistanis can decide that
Kashmir
rightfully belongs to them.
in

Admittedly, the overwhelming Muslim majority

Kashmir does share the same

cries of the

religion, as Pakistan, Islam.

Kashmiri Muslims, as well as the militants from the

Liberation Front (JKLF) are clear.

JKLF

"We

in

in.

23

an interview

will not accept

winning

However, the

stated clearly

by one militant from the

L

anything

and getting

elections

As

Jammu &

than independence.

less

Our armed

seats.

We

struggle

are not bent on
is

for independence

Kashmir.."

A

few months ago, the ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan brazenly talked

of a 1,000 year

war

to

wrench Kashmir from

India.

To counter

this,

her

Indian counterpart, ex-Prime Minister V.P. Singh, equally callously and
ignorantly

warned

that a local

would not even endure

war

ignited in

Kashmir by Pakistani proxies

1,000 hours. 235 While indulging in such

meaningless rhetoric, both countries have been in a war preparation phase
since

November

1989.

They both

are in an offensive-defensive stance,

and

the possibility of a pre-emptive strike looms in the back drop.

Accompanying such

bellicose rhetoric

capabilities far in excess of

the world there

is

talk of

is

the increased build

up

any reasonable requirements. While

in military
in the rest of

disarmament and peace, India and Pakistan have

raised their military expenditures.

In 1987-88 alone, while India's defense

spending was $9,730 million, Pakistan's was $2,540

million. 236

23 4javed Mir, (militant from JKLF), India Today, March 15, 1990:24.
235 Sen Gupta, Bhabani, "Neither War nor Peace", Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 June,
1990:24.

236 Mukerjee, Dilip, "Hi tech players in a dangerous game of catch". Far Eastern Economic
Review, 9 June, 1988:32.
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The
war.

is

that neither Pakistan nor India can afford
to

they both were to fight until

If

(which

truth

exactly

is

are that such a

war could

easily last
if

the

Rs. 27,000 crore!

This

speaking, estimates have been
of a

low intensity

the current conflict,

Government alone

come

to six

war was

to do), then claims

weeks or even

to last only 1,000

longer.

Estimates

hours (the claim

V.P.Singh. ex-Prime Minister of India), the cost for India
alone

would be

was one

up

this

have been achieved

what both governments claim they want

have been made that even

made by

their objectives

all

have

if

is

assuming an Indian

made

conflict,

that

compared

and whose

war would

escalated into a

Rs.4,500 crores a week.

to the conclusion that this cost

cost

victory!

war which

to the 1971

was Rs.200

crore a week,

cost the Indian

Political scientists

would equal

Broadly

have then

the current budget

allocation for agriculture, rural development, energy, industry, minerals and
social services,

and

will put the Indian

economy back by

a decade! 237 (Such

estimates from the Pakistani point of view were not available, but

assumed

that the costs

would be

development programs foregone,
Fundamentally, the

fact

in

terms of lives

lost,

etc.).

Both of them can

also.

ill

afford to have a

while their internal political and economic state

and

in a

war

exists horrifyingly in the

complete disarray. While there

is

talk of war, the

of nerves,

floundering

background. Both India and Pakistan have

hedge against defeat cannot be ruled

game

is

war

danger of a nuclear

nuclear capabilities, and the possibility of one of them using

classical

economic

remains that war would be a calamity not

only for Pakistan, but for India
at this time,

same

the

it is

out.

and waiting

However, neither show any signs
237 India Today, "Scary Scenario",June

it

as an ultimate

The two sides are playing

a

for the other partner to blink.

of doing so.

30, 1990:34.

Ill

International experts believe

that scientists in both countries can rig a

bomb

in less

than a week of getting

the appropriate signals from their respective
governments.

While Pakistan

has provisions for about 5-6 bombs, India has
provisions for about 40-60.

With the

possibility of a long

scenario,

it

war becoming

a nuclear-biological-chemical

has to be conceded that in such a

game

there are never any

winners, and never any losers. 238
It is

time India and Pakistan reevaluated the situation.

that the current

governments

really

It is

also time

understood the complexity, and more

importantly, the atrocities of their actions. While each exists just to

demonstrate

to the other the extent of

its

own

forget that they are not playing with their

they are playing

fundamental,

problem

is

determine the

to

human

own

and

is

more than

just a territorial

satisfied.

However,

I

at least

to this,

want

a

to this

I

admit

I

one which will leave
it is

cannot see a
all

three

time that India and

air these differences.

One

however, India should withdraw

paramilitary forces stationed in Kashmir,

and must punish

all

it

thing

Admittedly

if

India does

let

in

all

who

are guilty of

and destroying property.

,

June

30, 1990:33.
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a plebiscite, there will be an

over the country. Punjab would be

arms, and the other insurgencies in

238 India Today

the

the "curfew-

Kashmir have

unleashing of fundamentalist passion

all

must discontinue

those security forces personnel

killing innocent people, plundering, raping,

up and

game

there has to be a plebiscite, and this plebiscite has to be administered

soon as possible. Prior

raj",

whom

The solution

problem.

strongly believe that

Pakistan stop using Kashmir as an outlet to

as

This dangerous

fate of a peoples, all of

right to self determination.

long term solution to this problem,

is clear:

lives.

to

not an easy one. This problem has been festering over the past

is

forty years,

groups

power, they both seem

Assam and Nagaland,

amongst others would follow

shortly.

Kashmiri people should not be made

But as

its

come

India has to

by training

must

also

terms with

to a great

obvious disregard for

its

part

its

this.

must stop supporting any insurgency

militants, providing insurgency

remove

These passions

corrupt regime. Kashmir can longer be part of India,
and

to

Pakistan for

have argued before, the

to suffer.

extent have been unleashed by the Center by

Kashmir, and by

I

all

camps and

the troops from the border, and

shelters.

in

Kashmir,

Pakistan

must allow

for

plebiscite.

The U.N. should dispatch peacekeeping

forces to the area,

possible oversee the administering of a plebiscite.
best solution to the crisis at hand.

would be an easy
want

do have

task to accomplish

would be by

if

far the

admit that assuming that

to

would be highly

this

utopic. India does not

go of Kashmir, irrespective of the circumstances, and Pakistan

to let

wants

I

This

and

to seize

Kashmir so

Other solutions

that

to this

Muslim "brotherhood" can be

problem could potentially be

established.

that India should

seriously listen to the voice of the Kashmiri people, and to the best of their
abilities try

and redress the wrongs suffered. However,

believe that the Indian government has crossed

and irrespective of the

situation, the

all

never allow

this,

is

my

opinion,

Kashmiri people will not want
if

not the end of the problem because Pakistan would
to include a

reassessment of federalism, secularism, and democracy in Indian

would mean
interest to

to stay

Kashmir decides

and moreover, any solution would have

Center-state relations

I

permissible boundaries,

with India. However, assuming the impossible, even
stay with India, this

in

would have

to

assume

a

new

politics.

dimension, and

this

politicians

would

necessarily have to forego their personal

meet broader

goals.

This seems highly implausible.
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to

The other extreme solution would be
Pakistan.

This

aggravate

it.

that

would

Kashmir

would once again not

India will not

signify an

is

end

let

is

no doubt

have Kashmir accede

solve the problem, but in fact

Kashmir accede

to Pakistan not only

to the secular state of India,

of high strategic

There

to

in

and military convenience

my mind

direct result of the over-interference

seems

to

be only one choice

determine what the people want. This
retrieve

some

lose Kashmir,
for this is

left,

plebiscite,

because

to India.

conflict has

Much

in the process

nowhere

federal principles

else to

a

a plebiscite in
if

granted,

like the case

Kashmir

to

would somehow

of the democratic aspects of India's political structure.

and

been

in the state, a lack of truly

democratic principles, and an erosion of secular values.
of Punjab, there

would

but also because

whatsoever that the

by the Center

to

It

may

both Assam and the Punjab, but the blame

be found

in the

communal

and democracy exercised by the

114

politics

center.

and lack

of

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF INDIA'S SECULAR DEMOCRACY?
The above discussion

of the crises in both the Punjab

and the Kashmir

leaves us with a key question-is India a secular democracy? The actions of

the Center in both states have clearly been undemocratic, repressive and the
policies

which have been enacted

From chapter

1, it is

are alienating in nature.

evident that there are some prerequisites for a

democracy. These include a certain level of urbanization, a degree of

economic development,

literacy, politics

based on compromise and

cooperation, lack of corruption, lack of repression, and a provision for
articulating

as the

first

demands made by groups through democratic
two indicators

their rates of literacy

greater urbanization over the years from independence.
are important indicators of

questions altogether.

I

to attain

posit that while literacy

democracy. Of

far

Whether

democracy are

far

and have
literacy

different

and urbanization have been

important for Western countries to democratize,

way

As

are concerned, Punjab fares better than Kashmir.

However, on the whole, both have increased

and urbanization

channels.

it is

more importance

is

not necessarily the only
the level of repression

present in society, and the provision for channels to articulate demands. As
is

evident in both the Punjab and Kashmir case, on these two important

counts, India

fails to

be a democracy.

Instead of providing black or white answers about the existence or lack
of democracy.

Diamond, Linz and Lipset suggest

democratic and undemocratic state
there

lies a

much broader

is

that the

boundary between

sometimes blurred and imperfect, and

variation of political systems.

They

therefore

recognize various grades of democracy. They suggest that in countries
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a

where the

effective

competition

power

restricted,

is

of

an elected

limited that

may

be held,

this

competition

popular preferences. Additionally, where

some

party

freedom and/or fairness of elections compromised,

that although there elections
reflect actual

official is limited, political

still

political parties are so

unable to compete, so

political interests are

accurate description of India today, that system

system. 239 So far then, according to Lipset et

is

al.,

does not

far

an almost

a semi-democratic

India has degenerated from

being a democratic country, to a semi-democratic country.

If

actions are not

taken to address the problems in both the Punjab and the Kashmir, and the
role of the military

is

increased, India will continue the slide

away from

being a democracy. As stated by Stepan (1988), as long as there

rule

is

military governance, the question of the country being a democracy
tenable.

The

lack of free

by

is

highly

lack of democratic principles, intervention of the military, and

and

fair elections

therefore leaves India in a very dubious

position vis-a-vis the level of democracy.

The following

what how

effective a

table theorized

by Lipset gives us some indication

democracy India

is.

as to

240

Table 2

An

Effective

Democracy

EFFECTIVENESS
+

A

B

C

D

LEGITIMACY
Societies
like the

United

239 Diamond, Larry

which would be included
States,

,

fuan

Sweden, and

J.Linz,

in category

Britain

& Seymour Martin

A

would be

which have both high legitimacy

Lipset, eds., Politics in

Developin g

Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder: Lynne Rienner
8
240 Lipset,

countries

Publishers, 1990:

.

and

Seymour Martin, "Some

Political

Social Requisites of

Legitimacy" in The American

Democracy: Economic Development

Political Science Review,
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1967:90.

and

effectiveness,

and therefore have

a stable democratic political system.

Conversely, ineffective regimes are those in category D, which
symbolizes an
unstable regime, and
that in this

1947-1965

schema

fell

perhaps not

would be break down unless held down by

of things, India

in category

B where

under the rule

was

it

a highly effective one.

By

of

a legitimate

into category
is

D

where

it

has lost

its

legitimacy, and

posit

I

Nehru, from a period of
government, but

contrast, post 1967,

Indira Gandhi, and her son, Rajiv Gandhi, India has

force.

under the aegis of

moved

is still

closer

and

closer

not effective. This

especially true of the relationship of the Center with both states described

in this thesis.

India

Therefore according to this model, the democratic regime in

highly unstable and could potentially "break down".

is

As

is

obvious

from the previous two chapters, both the Punjab and Kashmir have been
held

down by

force.

Addressing the several theoretical issues raised
having discussed the actual cases

worthwhile exercise

to see

how

in the

in

Chapter

1

after

Punjab and Kashmir, would be

a

well India measures up to the different

standards of democracy.

Political

Culture

With regards
to

democracy, Dahl

democratic culture
India, the

to the thesis that the political culture

commitment

non-violent, and there

to liberal values

which was

still

was

a

the elite especially in the early stages. Clearly in

quarter of the nineteenth century.

British

emphasizes the importance of

(1971), in particular,

among

must be conducive

and democracy existed

since the

The independence movement was

a professional bureaucratic system

largely intact

and available
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left

for the Indians.

largely

by the

An

first

idealized

commitment

part of the

of

Western notions of

Western educated

elite.

liberal justice

and welfare was

culture. 241

The Indian National Congress espoused, "democratic

rules of

procedure, tolerance of adversaries and reconciliation of conflicting
claims."
This

was

further

emphasized by the Gandhian notion of ahimsa 242

accommodation, religious tolerance and compromise. 243 Therefore,
colonialism
a

was

commitment

and

a crucible of India’s

to

democracy, and

democracy.

Congress was crucial

for the existence of

espoused by the Western educated

democracy

that this

elite

the elite to the masses." 244 This fact

perhaps the reason for

is

commitment

liberal

"making commensurate adjustments

designed

after

reinforced by Saberwal

Western

attitudes,

ideas." 245

in redefining

He

of cultural

and

while after

and the forms

in

difficulties, in

and reconceptualizing

tradition.

institutional resources did not leave
resilient

and durable

much

state

For example, the lack of a master institution such as the Catholic

241 Das Gupta, Jyotindra, in Larry
Politics in

suggests

suggests that institutions in India

terms of usable material for constructing

structures.

from

"gift

who

Western models have no deep layer within Indian

The endowment
in

and

democracy

to

could be characterized as

terms of institutions, there have also been some serious

attitudes, orientations

elites

in India.

this crisis of governability is that,

independence, India took over

was

democratic principles under the

However, some scholars note

that

democracy was espoused by the

this

this early institutionalization of

Clearly, post 1947, there

Developing Countries:

Diamond fuan J.Linz, & Seymour Martin
,

Lipset, eds..

Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder: Lynne

Rienner Publishers, 1990: 232.
242 Ahimsa espoused by Gandhi

is the principle of non-violence.
243 Das Gupta, 1990:232-233.
244 Kohli, Atul,ed., India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relatio ns,

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988:9.
245 Saberwal, Satish, India: The Roots of Crisis. Delhi:
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Oxford University

Press, 1986:8.

church has been one important differing factor between
Europe and India.
Therefore, the elements needed to sustain institutions with
western design

were not

available. 246

The Actions

of the Political Elite

The big change

-

Post 1947

in Indian politics occurred

with the death of Nehru

and with Indira Gandhi taking power. Since 1967 under Indira Gandhi,

the

capacity of the state to govern based on compromise and consensual politics

has declined. Along with

and the manifestation

this decline, there

of this process has

established political channels.

growing incapacity

been activism outside of the

This has led to increased violence, and the

of the state to deal with this violence has led to

repression, problems of law

The blame

has been an erosion of order,

and order, corruption and increased

for this decline in

disintegration of the Congress

is

violence.

democratic principles, and the

overwhelmingly pointed toward the

dynastic Gandhi rule, especially under Indira Gandhi. 247 The Congress

under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi was one based on

and where members were selected not based on

their level of

but instead in terms of their loyalty to the Gandhis. This

documented
Das Gupta,
1988;

fact

1990; Mathur, 1992; Mitra, 1990; Varshney, 1989;

Cohen,

competence,
has been amply

in the literature (e.g., Kohli, 1990; Weiner, 1989; Saberwal, 1986;

Manor

1988; Hart,

1988).

What perhaps

formally marked the decline of democratic rule was the

Emergency period between 1975-1977 when
and

personalistic rule

political liberties,

muting opposition

246 Saberwal, 1986:57.
247 Kohli, Atul, citing Gramsci, in

Indira

rule

and

Gandhi suspended

voice, restricting the

Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing
Governabilitv. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990:5.
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all civil

Crisis of

freedom of the
Clearly, this

amounted

press,

was not

by claming

that the security of India

entirely true,

and

by Shouri

as stated

was

at stake. 248

(1978), this almost

to fascist rule.

Following the Emergency (1975-1977), although Indira
Gandhi did
hold elections, in which she massively
alternative political party to hold

By

early 1980s.

this time, her

lost,

the absence of a viable

power brought her back

deep desire

to

into

power

in the

hold onto power no matter what

the cost resulted in the decay of the Congress party as a party of
democracy.

Gandhi "increasingly transformed

Indira

an institutional

beholden

Gandhi

mode

of

accommodation

to a ruling leadership." 249

to preserve their

the nature of the organization from

power was

to rely

hands of the

facilitate

to

undermine

orderly challenges.

to increase their

rather than increase and strengthen

of involvement with the

and Kashmir.

By

Such

moderate Sikh

government

factions, yet her

political interference

Myron, The Indian Paradox Essays
:

engage

in

Publications, 1989:326.
249 Das Gupta, 1990:235.

250 Kohli, 1990:18.
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in

personal

institutions. 250
in her

a

way

patronage and

for her to

maintain

introduced widespread corruption,

therefore leading to an erosion of democracy.

248 Weiner,

own

left

In the Punjab, her disavowal

support of the radical Bhindranwale was

power.

to

Gandhi and has been evidenced

particularly true of Indira

actions both toward the Punjab

latent

on populism, and

and enabled the leader

leader,

Both Indira and Rajiv worked

power base
is

both Rajiv and Indira

Therefore, the destruction of institutional constraints

control in the

nepotism.

This

for

direct promises to the electorate, a leader can mobilize broad

electoral support.

more

an electoral instrument

The only way

those institutions which were designed to

making

to

Indian

Simultaneously, as these

Politics,

New

Delhi:

Sage

institutions

have weakened, non-institutional paths

political inheritance

to leadership

such as

have taken the place of established norms. This

is

evident following the assassination of Indira Gandhi in
1984, her son, Rajiv

was unanimously

"given" the position of Prime Minister and ruled head
of

the Congress party.

Therefore, the decay of political institutions
Indira

Gandhi

to

power, and her desire

to control the reins of

the beginning of decline of secular politics.
culture
the

was no longer conducive

commitment

valid, as

it

to

democracy

is

far

threatened.

As

is

is

power marked

evident, the political

by the leading

more important

democratic values.

As

the rise of

democracy. With the death of Nehru,

to democratic values

was now

committed

to

was marked by

to

was no longer

elite

maintain power than to be

Wherever there

is

centralization,

obvious, under the Gandhis democracy was

seriously hampered.

Socioeconomic Causes

The

thesis that there

must be some amount

economic wealth, and

of

socioeconomic satisfaction before there can be democracy appears
in the case of India.

(Lipset, 1967;

bureaucrats and suggests that management of conflict

which have resulted

and aimed

at

in

be true

Huntington, 1969) For example, Bardhan

identifies three classes, the industrial capitalists, the rich farmers

policies

to

low

among them

public sector investment, and have therefore

shown

like

food subsidies,

a bias for

consumption

251
rather than investment in order to garner support and votes.

251 Mathur, Kuldeep, "The State

has led to

and productivity

capital accumulation

expanding patronage-inducing elements

and

This

is

and the Use of Coercive Power in India," Asian Survey, Vol.
April 1992:339, citing Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in

XXXII, No. 4,
India. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984.
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obvious

both the Kashmir and the Punjab where the Planning

in

Commission under Central government
in a

dependent relationship

rule has ensured to keep both states

vis-a-vis the Center.

probably justified in feeling some anger

The Sikhs

in that since they

be the bread basket of the country, the Center refused
industrialization project in the Punjab.

This

is

to

of Punjab

were

were considered

to

undertake any major

definitely a sore point for the

Sikhs because they feel they are disadvantaged in relation to the rest
of the

country as a lack of their industrialization.

Kashmir have been deprived
to the rest of India.

of

economic benefits which have been granted

Therefore, the Center has obviously and very blatantly

attempted to stay in control of both
these

two groups

Likewise the Muslims of

states, furthering fueling the

angst of

of people.

Repression

The

thesis that

democracy cannot

exist

where there

is

military

suppression once again holds true in the case of India. In 1984, there were
least 40 million Indians living

under military law, making India one

world's largest military-dominated democratic

states. 252

The

at

of the

state in India

has been too quick to adopt coercive methods in order to meet social

The erosion

challenges.
relations

and supported

the state the

first

of the political party system
a

widening police criminal

weakened

politician nexus. 253

and the

to

suspend

civil rights,

democratic principles of the Indian

political

system tends

252 Cohen, Stephen,

An

For

step in dealing with any sort of uprising in either the

Punjab or the Kashmir has been

Democracy:

state society

to

liberal

disappear

at the

P., "The Military and Indian Democracy," in Atul Kohli ed., Ind ies
Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1988:100.
253 Mathur, 1992:348.
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Any

local level.
state

of

and

threat

is

viewed as

a blatant threat to the existence of the

a challenge to the authority of the state.

Kashmir

especially, there

As documented

in the case

have been widespread abuses of power, and

repressive prison administration. 254 This

is

obviously not indicative of a

democratic regime.
Clearly, the state in India

compliance, but
the state.

narrow,

The

self

at the

is

same time

using force which

the frequency of

lack of realization of this fact

serving desires of the political

onto power no matter what the costs

democratic state depends on the

way

it

uses force, the political

realize this

may

way

elite in

and therefore contributed

it

is

ensure short term

use

may

delegitimize

indicative once again of the

elite

be.

its

may

who have

a desire to hold

Although the

responds

stability of a

to social conflicts

and the

India under the Gandhis failed to
to the

growing alienation

of the polity.

Additionally, while in the past India's military has been mostly apolitical, in
the recent past, this

is

not true anymore, and the political

activities of the

Indian military, especially in light of Operation Blue Star has been growing.

Corruption
In India, political corruption

is

abundant. This does not bode well for

democracy. In Robert Wade's study of corruption

in India,

he

states that

"The essential business of a state minister is not to make policy. It
modify the application of rules and regulations on a particularistic
.'"' 255
return for money and/or loyalty

As

stated

by both Dalpino

(1990)

and Diamond (1990)

to

basis , in

in their study of

Thailand and Nigeria, corruption led to deep cynicism which

254 Mathur, 1992:347-348.
255 Klitgaard, Robert, "Strategies for Reform," in Larry

is

in turn led to

Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds..
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
Baltimore:
Johns
Democracy.
The Global Resurgencv of
1993:231.
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the

breakdown

of democracy.

of a democratic country.

Corruption

This corruption

in India is certainly not indicative

also evident with the

is

governments are overthrown by the center when
with the center. In the place of

in favor

acquiescent government

is

government, a more

placed in power. This happened both with the

Punjab and the Kashmir, especially with the

Move away from

governments are not

state

a hostile state

way

latter

on

at least a

few occasions.

a Secular State?

The following

a

is

breakdown by

religious orientation based

on the

1981 census. 256

Table 3
India's Religious Orientation

Hindus
Muslims

Number

Percentage

475,000,000

82.6%
11.4%
2.4%
2.0%
1.2%

75,500,000

Christians

16,200,000

Sikhs

13,100,000

Buddhists

&

7,900,000

Jains

There are two types of secularism. The
like

Gandhi who believed

politics,

and those

Gandhi, the
sought

to

who

latter

In this

and the people find

modern

society. 258

in the intrinsic relationship

25 6weiner, 1989:47.
257 Malik, Yogendra K.,

258 Malik

&

between

attempted to separate religion and

to all religions

way, secularism was an area

politics". 257

a balance

between

in

religion

politics.

and incorporated various

and

For

Gandhi
religions

which the government

religious beliefs

and the demands

of

In contrast, Jawarharlal Nehru's concept of secularism

involved a division between religion and

India's Secular

one was espoused by men

"understood neither religion nor

be respectful

into politics.

first

&

Democracy

His commitment to

Nandy, "The Rise of Hindu Militancy:
No. 3, March 1989:309.
Vol.XXIX,
Risk," Asian Survey,

Dhirendra K.Vajpeyi
at

politics.

citing

Vajpeyi, 1989:309.
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rational scientific ideology denied the relevance of religion.

policy he designed for the Congress

According

entire country.

between religion and

to this

politics.

The secular

became the dominant paradigm

for the

paradigm, there would be a division

Nehru believed

that industrialization

erode the influence of religion as these religious and ethnic

loyalties

would
would

be replaced by class identification. Although economic factors would
aggravate social

would

conflict,

decline. This

with modernization, the influence of religion

was supported by

who

scholars such as Smelser, Parsons,

Eisenstadt,

and

norms and

the value structure of the center

Shils

held that "constant interaction between cultural

and periphery would

result in

integration of the peripheral communities into a larger network based on a

cohesive value system ." 259 However, this has failed to come about in India,
as in the absence of a

common

value system there

is

only a further division

within society, between different religions. Political parties and their

have secured votes on communal

communal

and have therefore propagated these

divisions 260 According to Malik et
.

modernization would lead
politicization

including

lines,

elites

al.,

contrary to the belief that

to erosion of traditional religious sentiments,

and mobilization has

Hindu fundamentalism

led to revival of religious identities,
261
.

Additionally, where also there are major ethnic and regional
cleavages, the absence of provisions for decentralization of

ethnic insecurity, and violent conflict, which

demands. However, the resultant

may

feeds

lead to secessionist

force of curbing these

suppression of democracy. Unless resolved by

power

political

demands

leads to a

means which involve

moderation, compromise and accommodation, through institutions such as

259 Malik
260 Malik
261

Malik

&
&
&

Vajpeyi, 1989:311.
Vajpeyi, 1989:311.

Vajpeyi,1989:324.
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autonomy, federalism, or even statehood within the union,
there could be
authority imposed by force, which leads to the deterioration
of democratic
rule.

Also, a democratic Center could be questioned for

handling the secessionist

which once again leads

decay of democratic rule

Das Gupta, "when ethnic leaders
act according to the rues of the

ethnic mobilization

is

inefficiency in

therefore leading to military intervention,

crisis,

to a

its

262
.

Therefore, as cited by

are allowed to share power, they generally

regime ". 263 However, when the response

repression and exclusion, violence

leading to the failure of democracy

is

resultant,

264
.

Since the distribution of employment, education, wealth in India

determined by the Center and

is

determined by the

translates into the fact that each ethnic

resources by increasing

its

political

to

is

political process, this

group can improve

its

share of

power. Therefore, ethnic groups

try to

strengthen their group identity to improve their well being by becoming

more

politicized.

This has led to politicians appealing to

communal

divisions in order to get votes 265 The effect this has had on the secular
.

project in India

is

detrimental.

Additionally, the role of the state in maintaining these ethnic tensions

has fallen severely short. The recalcitrant Center especially under Indira

Gandhi, could have accommodated these

conflicts.

However, instead

of

attempting to incorporate ethnic demands, which would have lead to
successful

management

of the conflict, ethnic-based

demands have been

repressed. Such a policy has backfired on the government and has fueled the

growing ethnic

divisions. Prior to Indira Gandhi, rules for dealing with

262 Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1990:29.
263 Das Gupta, 1990:262,
264 Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1990:29.
265 Weiner, 1989:70.
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Center-State conflicts included

more inclusionary

demands were

non-secessionist and secular.

accommodated

itself to

Gandhi came
therefore,

to

The

strategies as long as the

under Nehru

state

the diverse nature of Indian society.

view accomodative

moved away from

However, Mrs.

strategies as a personal threat,

accommodation

political

and

to political

confrontation.

This decline of secularism in India has been coupled with
a

communalism. Communalism
a

supposed

then

religious identity

demands

program

in India is

and uses

a consciousness

this as the basis for

political allegiance to a religious

rise in

which draws on

an ideology.

It

community and supports

a

of political actions designed to further the interests of that political

community ." 266

Contrasting Views
Despite

all

the features of an eroding Indian democratic polity, quite a

few scholars are uneasy
fall",

and

in

suggesting that the democracy in India

insist that India is a "functioning

These scholars suggests that despite
to

be determined". Clearly, there

there are

mean

the problems, India's direction

all

exists troubled institutions in the

some elements

that India

of political

is

and

etc.

to disintegrate

social

However

may

is

"yet

form of
for these

because they suggest,

change such as periodic

elections that actually strengthen India's authority structure. 268

example, Kohli suggests that there

"about to

but strained democracy ." 267

greater corruption, lack of political parties, repression
scholars, this does not

is

For

be secessionist movements, but the

266 Thapar, Romila, "Imagined Religious Communities? Ancient History and the

Search for a Hindu Identity," Modern Asian Studies 23,
267 Kohli, 1988:315.
268 Kohli, 1990:8.
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2,

1989:209.

Modern

basic existence of India as a political unit does
not remain threatened.

He

suggests that as long as the armed forces are intact
a further division of India
is

not likely .269

i

n response

to

such a claim,

it is

evident that resorting to the

use of armed forces in order to maintain unity and
of a democratic state.

Therefore although India

stability is

may

not indicative

remain as a

unit,

and may keep the various parts demanding secession under military

rule,

this

does not make India a democratic country.

Another view which suggests
a serious threat are
to

still

that the

put forth by Mitra

democracy from

(1991).

problems faced by India are not

He

suggests that the challenges

political insurgency, intolerance of minorities,

criminalization of politics and the rise of authoritarianism are not an
accidental feature of Indian politics, but as a matter of

and "germane’’
first

place,

to the fact that

made democracy

and are therefore not

a problem.

He

fact,

are very essential

in India possible in the very

suggests that the state which

sustains Indian democracy appears to sustain regional conflicts by

accommodating them, and then by

localizing them. 270 Mitra tends to

suggests that the problems faced by India are not unique

,

and finds the

Indian democracy to be rather robust. This optimistic characterization of

democracy

in India

seems highly implausible when examining the evidence

presented in Chapters 2

accommodated

&

3.

The Central government has not

the conflicts in any way.

led to a mitigation of the conflict.
secessionist

demands

accommodated

is

Such accommodation would have

Clearly, the rise in violence

and

indicative of the fact that the Center has not

these people, and in contrast has very successfully alienated

them. Additionally, merely by localizing a conflict does not make

269 Kohli, 1990:13
270 Mitra, Subhatra

Kumar, "Crisis and resilience
August 1991: 571.

Science Journal, v. 43, n.3
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in Indian

a state

democracy," International

Social

democratic. Clearly, to a certain extent the state
has
conflict

and prevent

it

from spreading. However,

managed

to localize the

this localization

has taken

place at the expense of democracy in both the Punjab
and Kashmir.

Another optimistic picture of the democratic polity

by Weiner

(1989)

who

suggests that

the conflict

it is

Congress party which has been one of the key
democracy. While the governing leadership

in India is offered

managing

role of the

factors in sustaining

may

be tempted to suspend

democratic processes in order to consolidate power, there has also been
a
large

and

sustaining democracy.
India's
this

democracy

may

be true

the

a vested interest in

Therefore, the primary reason for the continuance of

is political,

and

in the

in the rest of India,

those professionals
state,

who have

influential class of professionals

who have

hands

of a

few

elite. 271

I

posit that

but the actions of the Center including

a vested interest in maintaining a democratic

has not translated into maintaining democracy for either the people of

Kashmir or the Punjab. As suggested

the case of the Punjab

and the Kashmir

been effectively suspended

in

both

before, the evidence offered in both

clearly

shows

that

democracy has

and the focus has been containing

states,

the secessionist desires with force.
In conclusion, clearly the debate

between the Marxists and the

As

structural functionalists can be applied to the Indian situation.

has shown,

it

appears that the

Huntington seems

to

latter,

be more applicable

independence, as the country started

from

a traditional

formed. These

most

economy

to a

its

particularly, the ideas of

to the

Indian

more modern

institutions of India

271 Weiner, 1989:33.
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state.

With

process of development and
one,

new groups had new demands on

However, the various

this thesis

new

social

moved

groups were

the central government.

have been unable

to

cope with

these various demands, and additionally, the
organizational decay of the

Indian Congress, along with the lack of an alternative
political party to
the

vacuum has

resulted in

anomie and decay.

Interesting to note also

demands made by

fill

the Sikhs

is

the fact that often times the religious

and Muslims were granted, however,

economic demands were ignored. This resulted

their

in the religious elements

being fostered, leading to a growing politicization of religion. For
example,
in the

Shahbano case

filed a case against

in the late 1980s

However,

where the husband
becomes the

this

in her favor,

Muslim woman, Shahbano,

was

and ordered the husband

no longer responsible

is

is

a provision for the

However,

husband

to

Supreme Court decision aggravated

demanded

it

and

a bill

was passed

in

pay alimony.
the

Muslims who

Congress that the personal

code of Sharia took precedence over the general
This

bill

feel the actions of the

labeled a holy city

civil

Center to be unfair in their

etc.,

code espoused

civil

in the

aggravated the Hindus, who, as documented before

case of the Sikhs, the allowance of religious

and the

further politicized religion and
conflicts,

in the Indian

be overturned. Rajiv Gandhi, fearful of losing Muslims

votes, granted this

Constitution.

pay

for his divorced wife, but she

Regardless, the
that

to

against the Muslim's personal code of Sharia

responsibility of her family.

constitution, there

a

her divorced husband asking him for monetary support.

The Supreme Court ruled
alimony.

where

moving away from

demands

rejection of the

made

interests.

Similarly, in the

of having Amritsar

economic demands have

religion the underlying factor of these

the secular principles of India.

Therefore, the politicization of these conflicts on religious demands,

and the organizational decay of the democratic
of proper channels for voicing concerns.

130

institutions

have led

to a lack

This, along with the inability of the

Center to be flexible enough to accommodate the tensions

in

fashion have resulted in increased tension and violence.

This violence has

been further repressed by the

to a

state,

which has further led

an appropriate

more

serious

alienation of the populace, and has eroded the legitimacy of the state

itself.

This has been most stark in the case of the Punjab and the Kashmir.

However, the way the Center has

dealt with the crisis in both these states, as

well as with the other crises in Assam, Nagaland

eroding the legitimacy of the

state nationwide.

131

etc.,

have

all

The prognosis

succeeded
is

in

not good.
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